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THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL CODE: GENERAL
DEFENSES

Paul H. Robinson*, Matthew G. Kussmaul**, Camber M. Stoddardy,
Ilya Rudyakz, and Andreas Kuersten§

ABSTRACT

American criminal codes (ACCs) are in many ways the most advanced in the
world. With three-quarters of them based in large part upon the American Law
Institute’s Model Penal Code of 1962 (MPC), they tend to be carefully drafted
and highly principled. When compared to the German Penal Code in terms of
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There are ﬁfty-two bodies of criminal law in the USA. Each stakes out often diverse positions
on a range of issues. This article deﬁnes the “American rule” for each of the issues relating to
general defenses, a ﬁrst contribution toward creating an “American Criminal Code”.
The article is the result of a several-year research project examining every issue relating to justiﬁcation, excuse, and nonexculpatory defenses. It determines the majority
American position among the ﬁfty-two jurisdictions, and formulates statutory language
for each defense that reﬂects that majority rule. The article also compares and contrasts
the majority position to signiﬁcant minority positions, to the Model Penal Code, and to
the National Commission’s proposed code.
Using these results, in focusing on the most controversial justiﬁcation defense,
Defense of Persons, the article then compares patterns among the states on legal
issues with a wide range of other variables—such as state population, racial characteristics, violent crime rates, and gun ownership—highlighting many interesting correlations. Applying this kind of doctrinal correlation analysis to all of the project’s existing
data would be a major undertaking. The goal here is to show how such analysis can be
done, and how interesting the revealed patterns can be.
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influence on criminal codifications in other countries, American codes, though
lacking the same long heritage, have an advantage in their comprehensiveness.
Unlike the German Code, they do not depend upon a mountain of legal scholarship for their application, but rather seek to provide, within their statutory
terms, a full set of the rules needed to resolve almost any criminal issue. But
despite the practical appeal of American code approach, there is a serious
limitation on their influence on codification in other countries, and, more
importantly, within the USA: how can one know what the American rule is
when there are in fact fifty-two American rules?
Each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government
has its own criminal code. (Contrary to the assumption of many in other
countries, the federal criminal code has little role in shaping and stating
American criminal law. The U.S. Constitution gives police power to the
states and, as a result, the federal criminal law has limited practical significance
beyond organized crime and drug cases.) Knowing the American rule could be
of enormous help to those wishing to take account of the majority American
position in formulating their own criminal law.
The American rule can also have significant influence in state legislatures. At
present, states are left to speculate about the rule most commonly adopted by their
peers, generally acting on what is taken to be the common wisdom. But the
common wisdom is commonly wrong, and understandably so. It is a major research undertaking to determine the majority rule among the fifty-two jurisdictions
on any matter. Thus, state legislatures considering criminal law reform are often left
to ignore what other states have done in the area, to guess what the majority rule
might be, or to focus on just a few states without knowing whether those states
reflect a common or an outlier position among the fifty-two jurisdictions.
This difficulty is even more severe for judges, especially judges in the federal
system and in the quarter of the states in which the criminal law was never
reformulated into a comprehensive modern criminal code, for these judges are
sometimes left with the task of constructing the legal rules that are missing from
their often-skeletal codes. An individual judge does not have the ability to
appoint a criminal law codification commission or to turn to a legislative research office to undertake the major research required to reliably determine the
American rule and its alternatives.
This article seeks to remedy that unfortunate situation—or at least to make a
start of it—with an analysis of the American rules relating to general defenses to
criminal liability. We encourage others to join in the larger project of drafting a
comprehensive “ACC” that will reflect the majority position on all major topics
of substantive criminal law among the U.S. jurisdictions.
In Section 1, we set out our general plan for the “majority code” provisions
relating to general defenses, and in Section 2, we provide the text for three
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1. THE CHALLENGE OF DEFINING AN ACC

No doubt the enormity of the task helps explain why such a project has not been
done before. We are in debt to the Criminal Law Research Group at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, whose devoted research efforts made
this project possible. The Group collected every statute relating to criminal
defenses in every ACC, filled in the statutory holes with the controlling case
law, and systematically organized them to allow the analyses that follow.
In Section 2, we take up each defense recognized by a majority of American
jurisdictions. The analysis of each defense offers a statutory formulation that, as
best as we can tell, approximates the majority American view. Together, these
provisions represent the “General Defenses” portion of the ACC.
For a broader perspective of our undertaking, consider the following outline
of the project. Our codification follows this plan (Chapters 1 and 2 of the ACC
are reserved for the code’s general principles of liability)1:
CH. 3 General Principles Of Justification
§301. Lesser Evils
§302. Execution of Public Duty

1

See Robinson 1997, Section 2; Robinson 1982, pp. 199–291; Robinson 2009, pp. 343–53, 361–63.
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chapters of the ACC capturing the majority view for those defenses. For each
defense, we provide commentary explaining how we reached our conclusions,
reporting significant minority positions, and comparing the majority results to
the two existing modern model codes: the MPC, and the proposed code of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Law (National
Commission), which some states used as a model after its promulgation in
1971.
Building on the extensive research conducted in Section 2, Section 3 explores
various ways in which this data can advance the study of criminal law by both
uncovering previously unexamined patterns among different statutory positions and previously unknown correlations with a variety of external factors.
The resulting insights can help set an agenda for further research by criminal
law scholars and social scientists. Using the framework of “Doctrinal
Correlation Analysis”, (Robinson 2014, p. 11–14) we devise tools and begin
the examination of questions such as: “What is the relationship between jurisdictions’ views on different contested issues within a particular defense?”; “Are
jurisdictions consistently strict or lenient in granting criminal law defenses?”;
and, “Do states’ characteristics—such as violent crime rate, racial composition,
or population size—bear on the former questions, and to what extent?”

4 ~ Robinson, Kussmaul, Stoddard, Rudyak and Kuersten: The American Criminal Code

§303.
§304.
§305.
§306.
§307.

Defense of Persons
Defense of Property
Law Enforcement Authority
Authority of Persons with Special Responsibility
Mistake as to a Justification

CH. 5 Other Bars to Liability
§501. All Offenses Defined by Statute
§502. Statute of Limitations
§503. Entrapment

The task of determining the majority view on a defense is considerably more
complicated than one might first think. A majority of jurisdictions may agree
on issue A within a defense, but that group may disagree on issues B and C. We
have sought to determine the majority view on each individual issue. Thus, the
majority formulation of a defense will include the majority view on issues A, B,
and C, even if only a minority of jurisdictions take such a view on all three.2
A majority on an issue requires twenty-seven of the fifty-two jurisdictions, of
course, but a few jurisdictions, especially those without modern codes, have
incompletely defined defenses. Where there is no controlling statute in a jurisdiction, we look to the case law. But even then, some jurisdictions have simply
not faced certain issues. (Notice a few empty cells in the Appendix A Summary
Citation Table.) In these few instances, we have had to base our formulation of
the majority view on a majority of those jurisdictions that have taken a position.
To give the reader a more in-depth sense of the diversity of opinions on an
issue, we also report and analyze the significant minority positions for each
defense—significant because of either the number of adherents (some majority
positions are only the barest of majorities) or the theoretical issues they raise.
For similar reasons, we also compare the majority view to the positions taken by
the prominent model codes.

2

The classification we make concerning each jurisdiction’s law on a given issue is our best approximation. For instance, while many statutory formulations use similar language, some are entirely
unique. For this latter group, we make our best effort to group them with the defense formulations
on the issue that have the most similar effect.

Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on March 16, 2015

CH. 4 General Principles of Excuse
§401. Insanity
§402. Involuntary Intoxication
§403. Immaturity
§404. Duress
§405. Involuntary Act or Omission
§406. Reasonable Mistake of Law
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We provide those additional analyses to show that a view being held by a
majority does not make it the best view. Legislatures, drafting commissions, or
judges looking to our analyses for help may find a minority view more attractive, depending upon the reasons behind its departure. The “majority view”
formulation we give is purely a reporting exercise; it is not offered as a recommended provision.
Finally, in the interests of space and clear organization, many of the footnotes
in this article reference only the names of the jurisdictions we cite in support of
positions in the text. The specific law underlying and supporting these citations
can be found in the Citation Table in the Appendix A.

2.1. Chapter 3. General Principles of Justification

Below are our formulations that reflect the majority view of each justification
defense in American criminal law.3 We have also adopted a scheme of defenses
that reflects the majority view in organizing justifications. So, for example,
though some jurisdictions provide separate defenses for self-defense and
defense of others, the majority combine these into a single defense of persons,
so that is the approach we take.
The reader will notice that certain words or phrases in our proposed justification defenses appear in brackets. This is due to our analysis of the Mistake as
to Justification defense in section 307. This examination produces two possible
methods for presenting this defense, either: (1) embedding it in every other
justification defense through the language in brackets (typically “reasonably
believes”); or (2) segregating it out into its own stand-alone defense, a draft
of which is produced in section 307. Although the majority of American jurisdictions utilize the first method, we recommend the second. We had drafted
the statutes using the “embedded” approach, but by adding the bracketed language we preserve the ability of jurisdictions to see how one might take the
segregated-defense approach instead.

3

Naturally, the law across jurisdictions is in a nearly constant state of revision. In general, we rely on
the law as it was on September 13, 2013. Nevertheless, we incorporate several more recent authorities
that were brought to our attention before submitting this article for publication. See, e.g., State v.
Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255 (Minn. 2014).
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2. THE AMERICAN GENERAL DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
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2.1.1. §301. Lesser Evils.

The majority view of the Lesser Evils defense among American jurisdictions
might be stated as follows:
Section 301. Lesser Evils.

(1) An actor is justified in engaging in otherwise criminal conduct if [he
reasonably believes] his conduct is necessary to avoid an imminent
harm or evil to himself or to another, and:

(2) The defense is not available when the actor was culpable in creating the
harm or evil to be avoided.
At least forty-five jurisdictions and the MPC recognize a lesser evils defense.4
This defense requires that the actor’s conduct be to prevent a harm or evil
greater than that caused by violating the law. Some jurisdictions provide a
very broad formulation; for example, Georgia’s lesser evils defense reads,
“[t]he defense of justification can be claimed . . . [in instances] which stand
upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enumerated in this article”
(Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (2013)); see also Tarvestad v. State, 261 Ga. 605, 606
(1991). In contrast, the typical common law formulation reads,
(1) that the defendant reasonably believed that his action was necessary
to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to
himself or others, (2) that the defendant did not intentionally or
recklessly place himself in a situation in which it would be probable
that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct, (3) that there

4

See the MPC § 3.02. See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The National Commission
does not recognize a lesser evils defense because, in its view, “the so-called ‘choice of evils’ rule, i.e.,
that emergency measures to avoid greater injury may be justified, has not been included in this
Chapter on the view that, while its intended application would be extremely rare in cases actually
prosecuted, even the best of statutory formulations (see N.Y. Pen. L. 5 35.10) is a potential source of
unwarranted difficulty in ordinary cases, particularly in the contest of the adoption of the broad
mistake of fact and law provisions found in the Code”. National Commission’s Report, Chapter 6:
Defenses Involving Justification and Excuse, p. 43.
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(a) the harm or evil [sought to be] avoided is greater than that sought
to be prevented by the law prohibiting the actor’s conduct;
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a contrary legislative balance does not otherwise plainly appear.
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existed no other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm except
the criminal conduct, (4) that the harm sought to be avoided was more
egregious than the criminal conduct perpetrated to avoid it, and (5)
that the defendant ceased the criminal conduct as soon as the necessity
or apparent necessity for it ended. (Bozeman v. State, 714 So. 2d 570,
572 (Fl. Ct. App. 1998)

5

Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.

6

See, e.g., Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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Finally, some jurisdictions articulate their lesser evils defenses by lumping it
in with necessity, duress, or general justification defenses. See, e.g., 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/7-13; Sam v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 312, 323 (Va.
Ct. App. 1991); and N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05.
Jurisdictions’ disagreements about lesser evils primarily revolve around five
issues, namely (a) how to define the conflicting evils that must be facing the
actor; (b) what temporal requirement must be met for the actor’s conduct to be
truly “necessary” at that time; (c) whether to codify the requirement that more
specific defenses be used, instead of lesser evils, wherever they apply; (d)
whether the defense ought to be available where the legislature has set a priority
of harms that conflicts with the actor’s choice; and (e) whether the defense is
available where the actor created the situation necessitating a choice between
harms.
(a) What competing evils must be facing the actor? While every jurisdiction
recognizing a lesser evils defense generally requires, on balance, that the harm or
evil actually caused by the defendant be less than the harm or evil prevented,
jurisdictions vary widely in the language they use to describe it. A thirty-fourjurisdiction majority generally compares the harm prevented by the actor to the
harm the law sought to avoid by prohibiting the action.5 Beyond that, a small
minority of jurisdictions recognizes specific exceptions to the defense, although
they do not agree on what those exceptions ought to be.6 For example, some
jurisdictions refuse to give a defense in the case of murder. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-417. (“An accused person may not assert [this] defense . . . for
offenses involving homicide or serious physical injury.”) Presumably, a jury
would reach the same conclusion by simply balancing interests without relying
upon a specified exception. It is also likely that the lesser evils defense would be
preempted in such a case by other justification defenses, so it is unclear whether
specified exceptions fundamentally alter a jury’s ultimate conclusion.

8 ~ Robinson, Kussmaul, Stoddard, Rudyak and Kuersten: The American Criminal Code

7 Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and
Vermont.
8 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.
9 See, e.g., Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.
10 Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.
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A significant minority of seventeen jurisdictions explicitly refuses to make a
lesser evils defense available if there was a readily available and less harmful
alternative.7 But if there is an alternative, then the actor does not truly face a
lesser evil, and his conduct is not “necessary”; thus, this restriction is already
implicitly contained within the majority rule.
(b) What must be the timing of the threat when a person acts to avoid
the greater evil in order for the act to be truly “necessary”? A twentyeight-jurisdiction majority requires that the impending harm be “imminent”
at the time of the defendant’s conduct.8 This means that the harm sought to be
avoided through the actor’s conduct must be just about to happen or actually
happening, not a threat in the future. This view is particularly popular among
jurisdictions that have not codified their lesser evils defenses.
(c) If the lesser evils defense and another more specific defense both apply to
a given situation, should lesser evils be unavailable? The majority of jurisdictions probably disallow the defense in such instances, though only a few jurisdictions, like the MPC § 3.02(1)(b), are explicit about this preference.9 On the
contrary, no jurisdiction disagrees with the rule. One widely accepted tenet
of statutory construction is that the specific controls the general. See Mesa
Petroleum Co. v. F.E.R.C., 688 F.2d 1014, 1016 (5th Cir. 1982). In practice,
the majority of jurisdictions give priority to the defense that most narrowly
addresses the situation at hand, relegating the broad lesser evils defense to serve
as a “catch-all” justification to be used only if no other applies. For clarity, the
majority formulation above includes this explicit requirement in Subsection
(1)(b).
(d) Should the lesser evils defense be available where the legislature has set a
priority of harms or evils that conflicts with the actor’s choice? A majority of
jurisdictions do not allow the defense in this type of situation.10 Though only a
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11 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and
Washington.
12 Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Montana, New York, Ohio, South Carolina,
Vermont, and Washington.
13 The MPC § 3.02(2); Arkansas, Hawaii, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania.
14 Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, and New Mexico.
15 California, Indiana, and Nevada.
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minority of jurisdictions codifies this preference, even jurisdictions without an
explicit codification on such a rule in fact deny a lesser evils defense when it
conflicts with a choice that the legislature has deliberately made. For example,
defendants frequently (and unsuccessfully) raise the lesser evils defense in medical marijuana cases, see, e.g., State v. Bonjour, 694 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 2005);
State v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 1991); State v. Poling, 207 W. Va. 299
(2000), and to justify anti-abortion activities. See, e.g., Allison v. City of
Birmingham, 580 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1991); City of Kettering v. Berry, 567
N.E.2d 316 (Ohio 1990); and City of Helena v. Lewis, 860 P.2d 698 (Mt.
1993). The majority formulation follows the majority rule reflected in the practice of denying the applicability of the defense in such instances. Subsection
(1)(c) uses the language of those jurisdictions that codify the rule, which are
themselves based upon the MPC section 3.02(1)(c).
(e) Should a lesser evils defense be available for an actor who caused the
situation requiring a choice between harms in the first place? A majority of
twenty-seven jurisdictions agree that it should not.11 This prohibition exists
both at common law and in codified jurisdictions. There is no majority consensus, however, regarding the required level of culpability, if any, the actor
must have had toward the creation of the emergency. The most common approach within the majority is to simply require that the actor be “without fault”
in creating the emergency.12 Another common method is the MPC’s
“sliding scale” approach, in which the availability of the defense is a function
of both the actor’s culpability in creating the situation and the required
culpability of the offense committed to prevent the harm.13 An equal number
of jurisdictions bar the defense in cases of reckless fault on the part of the
actor.14 Other jurisdictions also bar it for those who have substantially contributed to the emergency sought to be avoided.15 Without consensus, however,
a “bare” culpability requirement is included in Subsection (2) of the majority
formulation.
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2.1.2. §302. Execution of Public Duty.

The majority view of the Public Duty defense among American jurisdictions
might be stated as follows:
Section 302. Execution of Public Duty.

(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, conduct is justifiable when [the actor reasonably believes] it is required or authorized
by:

(2) This Section does not apply when other more specific provisions in this
Article apply to the situation.
A defense for execution of a public duty is somewhat tautological. It says, in
essence, “authorized conduct is justified”. It is therefore unsurprising that not
all jurisdictions that apply this defense in practice bother to codify it. Even those
that do codify it do not necessarily codify everything done in practice.
Significantly, however, no jurisdiction embraces a position contradictory to
anything in the majority formulation.
There is wide consensus among American jurisdictions concerning both the
existence and general contours of the defense for execution of a public duty. In
this regard, it is unique among justification defenses. The important features of
the defense on which jurisdictions differ include: (a) the sources of authorization
to act that the defense protects; (b) whether an actor can obtain a mistake defense
if he erroneously but reasonably believes his conduct is authorized; and (c) how
generally the defense applies relative to other defenses governing use of force.
(a) What sources of authority generate protected conduct? At least fifty-one
jurisdictions generally agree that actions required or authorized by law are
justified.16 Whether explicitly or not, jurisdictions commonly parse “by law”
into five categories: authority of public officers, court orders, legal process, the
armed forces, and other public duties. The National Commission does
not parse specific sources of authority, choosing instead to retain a general

16 Only the federal position is unconfirmed on this point.
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(a) the law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the
assistance to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his
duties; or
(b) the law governing the execution of legal process; or
(c) the judgment, order, or decree of a competent court or tribunal; or
(d) the law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war;
or
(e) any other provision of law imposing a public duty.
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defense for conduct authorized “by law”, see National Commission’s Report
§ 602(1), as well as setting forth two additional sources of authority not expressly included in the majority rule,17 but perhaps included by its catch-all
Subsection (1)(e).

17 They are: (1) conduct directed by a public servant and (2) citizens’ arrests. See National
Commission’s Report § 602(2)–(3).
18 Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
19 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.
20 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont.
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(i) Public Officer: thirty-two jurisdictions explicitly justify conduct authorized by “the law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the
assistance to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his
duties”.18 Many additional jurisdictions arguably support this position
in practice, though they do not codify it.
(ii) Court Orders: only twenty-five jurisdictions explicitly justify conduct
authorized by court orders, judgments, or decrees.19 But every jurisdiction
arguably supports this position in practice, though not all codify it. The
provision protects the integrity of the legal process by ensuring its directives receive their full effect and ensures people can act on judgments and
court orders with confidence that such will provide them legal protection.
(iii) Legal Process: only twenty-three jurisdictions explicitly justify conduct
authorized by “the law governing the execution of legal process”.20
Again, many additional jurisdictions arguably support this in practice,
though they do not codify it. The provision largely overlaps with the
justification of conduct authorized by court orders since legal processes
are “[t]he proceedings in any action or prosecution” (Garner 2006, p. 569
(defining “process”); ibid. at 264 (defining “execution”)). Conduct
authorized by the law governing the execution of legal process includes,
for example, issuing a summons or seizing property pursuant to a warrant. See, e.g., Jurco v. State, 825 P.2d 909, 911–12 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)
(recognizing State Troopers’ authority to seize the plaintiff’s vehicle pursuant to a court order). Like the “court orders” authority, this provision
protects the integrity of the legal process.

12 ~ Robinson, Kussmaul, Stoddard, Rudyak and Kuersten: The American Criminal Code

(b) Can an actor still receive a defense if he reasonably, but erroneously,
believes his conduct is authorized? Seven jurisdictions with specific public duty
provisions allow this defense when an actor is mistaken so long as he reasonably
believes his conduct is authorized.23 Seven others with these provisions simply
require the actor’s subjective belief that his conduct is authorized, imposing no
reasonableness requirement.24 Yet given the strong support for a reasonable
belief requirement for the mistake as to justification defense in general,25 the
majority rule reflects this approach by inserting the relevant language in brackets. The issue of mistake as to a justification is taken up and discussed more fully
in section 307.
(c) Should other, more specifically applicable defenses supersede the general
public authority defense? Like the choice of evils defense, a defense for the
21 Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Hampshire,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Vermont.
22 The MPC § 3.03(1)(e); Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.
23 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Texas.
24 Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania.
25 See infra section 307.
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(iv) Armed Forces: only twelve jurisdictions explicitly justify conduct authorized by the law governing the armed forces or the lawful conduct of war.21
But the states do not individually wage war; only the federal government
has a military, divided into several branches, that defends the USA as a
whole. As a matter of federal law, no state may deny a defense to a soldier
acting in obedience to a lawful order of his superior because such obedience is a legal duty (10 U.S.C. § 892(1)); see, e.g., Arce v. State, 202 S.W.
951, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918) (releasing Mexican soldiers from liability
for killing an American officer during the Mexican–American War because they were directed to fight according to lawful orders). It is proper,
therefore, to include this provision in the majority formulation; though
only a minority of states codify it, all are bound by it.
(v) Other Public Duties: only twenty-two jurisdictions follow the MPC by
including a catch-all provision for public duties not explicitly enumerated.22 Other jurisdictions fail to address this concern; however, there is
no significant case law denying such justification. It seems likely that if a
jurisdiction’s statutes impose a duty, its courts will justify conduct in
execution of that duty. Therefore, the majority formulation includes
such a catch-all provision.
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execution of a public duty stands as a backstop for those cases in which other
more specific public duty defenses—such as law enforcement authority or the
defense for persons with special responsibility—does not deal with the situation
at hand. Eighteen of the nineteen jurisdictions with specific public duty provisions make this limitation explicit,26 and the statutory interpretation maxim of
“the specific controls the general” would seem to reach the same result in most
other jurisdictions.27 Subsection (2) makes this majority rule explicit.
2.1.3. §303. Defense of Persons.

The majority view of the Defense of Persons justification among American
jurisdictions might be stated as follows:

(1) An actor is justified in using force that [he reasonably believes] is necessary to defend himself or a third person against imminent unlawful
force by an aggressor.
(2) The use of deadly force in self-defense is justified if [the actor reasonably
believes that] such force is necessary to protect himself or a third person
against death, serious bodily injury, sexual intercourse compelled by
force, or kidnapping.
(3) An actor is not justified in using force against another person:
(a) if he intentionally provoked unlawful action by the other person in
order to cause bodily injury to the person;
(b) if he is the initial aggressor, unless he has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated his withdrawal to the other person,
but the other person persists in continuing the conflict by force;
(c) if the force was the product of mutual combat by agreement not
specifically authorized by law; or
(d) to resist an arrest that the actor knows is being made by a peace officer,
even if the arrest is unlawful, except force may be used to resist an
arrest that is unlawful because the officer is using excessive force.
(4) An actor has no duty to retreat from a place he has a right to be before
using deadly or non-deadly force that is necessary to defend himself or a
third person.
Every jurisdiction embraces a justification for both self-defense and defense
of third persons. The defense of others is often included within the self-defense
26 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.
27 See supra section 301(b).
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Section 303. Defense of Persons.
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28 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
29 Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.
30 California, District of Columbia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wyoming, and Federal.
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provision but sometimes codified separately: twenty-four jurisdictions include
defense of others in the same provision as self-defense28; twelve jurisdictions
treat defense of others as a separate defense.29 (In sixteen jurisdictions, both are
common law defenses found only in case law.30) Following the lead of the
majority of the jurisdictions with a codified defense, the majority formulation
uses a single, combined defense.
Every jurisdiction recognizes a person’s right to defend himself or another
against unlawful force. Jurisdictions disagree, however, regarding a wide variety
of related issues, most prominently: (a) what constitutes the “unlawful force”
that triggers a right to use defensive force; (b) what temporal requirement must
be met for an actor’s conduct to be truly “necessary” at that time; (c) what
amount of force may be used; (d) when deadly force may be employed; (e)
whether and in what situations initial aggressors can claim self-defense; (f) the
legal effect of provocation of an encounter; (g) the legal effect of mutual
combat; (h) whether there is a right to resist an unlawful arrest; and (i) whether
there is a duty to retreat from unlawful aggression before using deadly force.
(a) What constitutes the “unlawful force” that triggers a right to use defensive
force? It appears that there is general agreement on this point but few explicit
statutory definitions codifying this shared understanding. Force that is objectively justified is not “unlawful force”, but force that is only excused (such as
force by a person acting under insanity, duress, or immaturity) is “unlawful
force” and will trigger a right of defense even though the attacker may be
excused for the attack. Similarly, force by an actor who is mistaken in his
belief that his conduct is justified—he “believes” it is justified, but is
wrong—is also “unlawful force” that triggers a right of defense. And force
that may have a nonexculpatory defense, such as diplomatic immunity, also
constitutes “unlawful force”. We have found no cases that contradict this principle, but only the Mode Penal Code and a few states that follow it provide an
explicit definition. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-105(40); and 11 Del. C.
§ 471(d).
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The MPC Section 3.11(1) provides:

(1) “unlawful force” means force, including confinement, which is employed without the consent of the person against whom it is directed
and the employment of which constitutes an offense or actionable tort
or would constitute such offense or tort except for a defense (such as
the absence of intent, negligence, or mental capacity; duress; youth; or
diplomatic status) not amounting to a privilege to use the force. Assent
constitutes consent, within the meaning of this Section, whether or not
it otherwise is legally effective, except assent to the infliction of death or
serious bodily harm.

31 For a full discussion of the formulation and content of a Mistake as to Justification defense, see
section 307.
32 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming, and Federal.
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The MPC’s provision is complex and obscure. It relies upon the tort concept of
“privilege”, which is nowhere defined, because the Code has tainted its own
definition of “justified” by including it in mistakes as to justification. A person
is “justified” under the code if he (even wrongly) believes that he is justified. The
Code drafters cannot, then, define the triggering condition for defensive force as
any “unjustified force” because, under their use of the term “justified”, some
forms of “justified” conduct cannot be lawfully resisted (those that are objectively, actually justified) and some forms can be lawfully resisted (those based
upon a mistaken belief in justification).
If a jurisdiction were to draft justifications objectively and deal with the issue
of mistake as to a justification under a separate provision—as proposed in
section 307—then the triggering condition for defensive force could be
simply “unjustified force”, without the need for an additional, special definition. But if mistakes as to a justification are mixed with objective justifications
by defining justifications subjectively, as the MPC does, then a convoluted
provision like section 3.11(1) is required. It is probably the difficulty of this
drafting approach by the MPC that explains why so few jurisdictions based on it
provide a definition of “unlawful force”.31
(b) What temporal requirement must be met for an actor’s conduct to be
truly “necessary” at that time? The majority view, held by forty-four jurisdictions, requires that the unlawful force or threat be “imminent” before defense
force becomes authorized.32
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33 The MPC § 3.04(1); Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Texas.
34 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Federal.
35 Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
36 Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
37 The MPC § 3.04(2)(b); Delaware, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania.
38 Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, and Texas.
39 Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Utah.
40 California, Idaho, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Washington.
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In contrast, the MPC and a minority of eight jurisdictions look to the timing
of the need for the defensive force, rather than the timing of the threat: it
requires that the use of force be “immediately necessary”.33 Under this view,
a person may use force when and only when it becomes necessary. Thus, if
waiting for the threat to become imminent would make it difficult for the actor
to defend himself, he may act earlier: at the moment just before his defensive
force would become ineffective.
(c) What amount of force may be used in defense of persons? A majority of
thirty-one jurisdictions require that an actor uses only the level of defensive
force that he reasonably believes is necessary.34 Eight jurisdictions drop the
reasonableness requirement and simply require the actor to “believe” that the
force is necessary—a completely subjective criterion.35 Thirteen others make no
mention of the actor’s belief, essentially requiring that the defensive force used
be objectively necessary.36 (The issue of mistake as to justification is taken up
and discussed more fully in section 307.) Furthermore, there are typically special limitations on the use of deadly force.
(d) When may deadly force be used in defense of persons? A majority of
thirty jurisdictions allow an actor to use deadly force against threats of death,
serious bodily injury, rape, and kidnapping. This majority includes: four jurisdictions, following the MPC, that allow deadly force against the explicit crimes
listed37; seven jurisdictions that embrace those specified crimes, but add robbery38; thirteen jurisdictions that allow deadly force against any forcible felony39;
and six jurisdictions that allow it against any felony.40 The National
Commission allows use of deadly force against all forcible felonies (National
Commission’s Report § 607(2)(b)). A significant minority of twenty jurisdictions provides a more narrow defense that allows deadly defensive force only
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41 Arizona, District of Columbia, Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
42 Cf. notes 50–52 (including robbery) with notes 49, 54–56 (excluding robbery).
43 Please note that while there is a majority of jurisdictions taking the position that deadly force is
justified in the four specific cases enumerated in Subsection (2), there is no such majority to support
the claim that these four are the only cases in which deadly force is justified (e.g., the even split
between jurisdictions in the case of robbery). For this reason, the wording of Subsection (2) above
does not preclude the possibility that deadly force may be justified in other, non-enumerated cases.
The authors thank Professor Eugene Volokh for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this
Subsection, leading to its present formulation.
44 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
45 The positions of Nebraska, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont could not be confirmed.
46 See, e.g., Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Federal.
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against threats of death or serious bodily injury.41 Michigan allows deadly
force against threats of death, serious bodily injury, and serious sexual
offenses (Mi. Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.972 (West 2006)). Finally, Rhode
Island embraces a “totality of the circumstances” approach to determine if
deadly force is necessary in a given situation (State v. Ventre, 811 A.2d 1178
(R.I. 2002)).
Note that the fifty-two jurisdictions are split twenty-six to twenty-six as to
whether robbery ought to automatically trigger the right to use deadly force in
defense of persons.42 If any one jurisdiction changes its position to embrace
robbery, it will become the majority view, requiring that our proposed draft text
be amended to include it in Subsection (2) above.43
(e) If an initial aggressor chooses to withdraw from a fight, can he regain the
right of self-defense? A thirty-six-jurisdiction majority provides that an aggressor who withdraws and effectively communicates his withdrawal may claim
self-defense if the other party unlawfully continues to attack.44 The National
Commission and North Dakota simply require an aggressor to “indicate” his
withdrawal, National Commission’s Report § 603(b)(ii); and N.D. Cent. Code
§ 12.1-05-03, whereas the majority text requires he “effectively communicate”
it.45 At least eleven other jurisdictions require an aggressor to withdraw before
regaining the right of self-defense, but do not mention a communication
requirement.46

18 ~ Robinson, Kussmaul, Stoddard, Rudyak and Kuersten: The American Criminal Code

47 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming, and Federal.
48 The MPC § 3.04(2)(b)(i); Delaware, Hawaii, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South
Dakota.
49 Only Rhode Island could not be confirmed.
50 See, e.g., Hawaii, Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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The majority view differs from the MPC only in form, not result. While the
Code does not explicitly state such a rule, its defense requirements implicitly
support it. If an aggressor withdraws, and effectively communicates this, then
defensive force is no longer “immediately necessary” and the defender is no
longer justified in its use. Continued use of force then becomes unlawful, which
triggers a right of self-defense with the initial aggressor.
(f) Can an actor attack to provoke a response, then justifiably use force in
self-defense? If an actor attacks another, provoking an attack in response, he
cannot lawfully defend against that responsive force because that lawful response is not “unlawful”, and thus does not trigger a right for him to use
force in self-defense. However, if the defender uses excessive force, or in
some other way exceeds the authorization of the defensive force justification,
then the initial attacker regains the right of self-defense.
But if the initial aggressor’s original attack was for the purpose of provoking an
unlawful response that would then allow him to use force (perhaps expecting or
hoping that the defender would overreact), a majority of forty-six jurisdictions
either explicitly or implicitly bar his use of defensive force.47 The MPC and a
six-jurisdiction minority deviate from the majority rule only in barring the
original, provoking aggressor from defending himself with deadly force.48
That is, under the MPC, the initial aggressor may use force to defend against
defensive force that he has provoked for that purpose, as long as he does not use
deadly force.
(g) It is not uncommon for participants in a fight to have entered it by
mutual agreement. What legal effect does mutual combat have upon the
right of self-defense? A majority of at least fifty-one jurisdictions do not recognize the use of force as justified when an actor is involved in consensual mutual
combat not specifically authorized by law.49 Some jurisdictions mitigate
offenses committed in mutual combat50; still others allow a combatant to
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51 See, e.g., Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oklahoma.
52 Also note that consent as to some combat does not necessarily preclude the right to self-defense if the
encounter escalates beyond the sort of combat agreed upon (e.g., one combatant pulls out a gun
during a mutually agreed upon fistfight). See Commonwealth v. Barber, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 460
(1984).
53 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
54 Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
55 Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, and Rhode Island.
56 District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
57 Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. The Federal
rule may differ by circuit. See U.S. v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1992).
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regain the right of self-defense if he withdraws from the encounter.51 But none
read a full justification into the consent to fight.52 Agreement may be made
verbally or through actions that clearly indicate consent.
The MPC does not include a section specifically addressing the mutual
combat by agreement situation, but it might reach a similar result. Under
section 2.11(2), consent can be a defense to assault that causes bodily injury,
which means that the use of force by each fighter would not trigger a right of
self-defense because it is not defending against “unlawful” force. A right of selfdefense would arise only if an actor was threatened with “serious bodily injury”,
for which consent is legally ineffective under section 2.11(2).
(h) May an actor ever use force to resist arrest? When police make arrests,
they must often use force. That force, without a special exception, might trigger
a right to self-defense, at least if the arrest was unlawful. A majority of thirty-six
jurisdictions, following the MPC § 3.04(2)(a)(i), do not permit the use of force
to resist an arrest made by a peace officer, even if the arrest is actually unlawful.53 Seven jurisdictions include this limitation in their defense of person’s
justification54; fifteen jurisdictions include this restriction in a separate portion
of their criminal codes55; and fourteen jurisdictions have this limitation in their
case law.56
A minority of fifteen jurisdictions, however, differs from the majority by
denying the right to self-defense against lawful arrests but allowing it against
unlawful arrests.57 Yet, it is unclear what level of awareness or belief a person
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58 See, e.g., Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, and South Carolina. Nevada requires that a
peace officer use both unlawful and excessive force in order for an individual to the have the right of
self-defense.
59 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Federal.
60 Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wyoming.
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must have regarding the lawfulness of his arrest—whether he must know, reasonably believe, or simply believe that the arrest is unlawful.
Importantly, however, while an arrestee normally cannot defend against
a police officer’s use of force when making an arrest, a majority of at least
thirty-one jurisdictions explicitly allow one exception: the arrestee may use
defensive force if the officer uses excessive force, whether the arrest itself is
lawful or not.58
(i) If confronted with unlawful force, does one have a duty to retreat from
danger if possible, rather than use defensive force? A majority of thirty-three
jurisdictions do not require a party to retreat under the threat of unlawful
force, even if they could do so with complete safety.59 This is the so-called
“stand your ground” rule. In contrast, the MPC and National Commission
require retreat if possible, at least before deadly force is used. See, e.g., the
MPC § 3.04(2)(b)(ii); and National Commission’s Report § 607(2)(b).
Under the MPC, an individual cannot use deadly defensive force if he is able
to retreat to safety or surrender possession of something to which the person
attacking asserts a claim of right. Like the majority, however, the MPC does not
set a duty to retreat before using non-deadly force. A significant minority of
eighteen jurisdictions side with the MPC by recognizing a duty to retreat at least
before deadly force may be used: fifteen jurisdictions explicitly require retreat
before the use of deadly force60; and three require it before the use of any force:
Com. v. Toon, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 642 (2002); Com. v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116
(2012); Iowa Code § 704.1; State v. Marin, 776 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa Ct. App.
2009); and State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014). North Carolina
recognizes a duty to retreat, but only when threatened with force that does not
risk death or serious bodily injury. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3; State v. Brown,
117 N.C. App. 239 (1994); and State v. Everett, 163 N.C. App. 95 (2004). It does
not require retreat when force threatens such elevated harm.
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2.1.4. §304. Defense of Property.

The majority view of the Defense of Property among American jurisdictions
might be stated as follows:
Section 304. Defense of Property

(1) The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable
when and to the extent [the actor reasonably believes] that such force is
necessary:

(2) The use of deadly force is not justified under this Section,
(3) “Possession” means having or exercising dominion or control over
property.
A majority of at least forty-five jurisdictions authorize the use of force in
defense of both real and personal property under a general “Defense of
Property” heading.61 For real property, the right to use defensive force is triggered
by a need to prevent or terminate trespass on the actor’s land. For personal
property, the right to use defensive force is triggered by the need to prevent or
terminate an unlawful interference with the actor’s personal property.
Defense of property formulations differ regarding a number of issues,
namely: (a) whether there is a temporal requirement for force to be truly necessary; (b) whether the owner must first request that the unlawful aggressor
desist in his activity before resorting to force; (c) whether deadly force is
authorized; (d) what other limits, if any, are placed upon the use of force; (e)
how to define “possession”; (f) whether an actor may use force to retake or
reenter his property; (g) whether a claim of right by the dispossessor should
limit the actor’s right to use force to resist; and (h) whether an actor may use
force to protect against all unlawful acts, or only criminal acts.
(a) Should a temporal requirement as to the necessity of force constrain its
use? Most jurisdictions embracing a justification for defense of property require
that the force used be necessary. This has a temporal requirement implicit in
61 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
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(a) to prevent the person’s unlawful trespass on real property or unlawful interference with personal property in the actor’s possession; or
(b) to retake the actor’s personal property or to re-enter real property
immediately following unlawful dispossession of it.
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62 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin. For a discussion of the difference between “immediate harm” and “immediately
necessary action” as qualifiers upon necessity, see section 305(1) Commentary.
63 The MPC § 3.06(1). Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.
64 The MPC § 3.06(3)(a); National Commission’s Report § 606; Delaware, Hawaii, Nebraska, New
Jersey, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania.
65 See, e.g., Alaska (authorizes deadly force to protect a vehicle and in prevention of theft or carjacking),
Colorado (preventing robberies), Georgia (deadly force allowed to prevent forcible felonies), Illinois
(same as Georgia), Indiana (deadly force allowed to prevent forcible felonies and protect one’s
dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle), and Louisiana (deadly force allowed to protect
one’s dwelling, place of work, or motor vehicle).
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it: the actor cannot use force until the time when it actually becomes “necessary”—that is, he could not effectively defend his property if he waited longer. A
majority of thirty-four jurisdictions leave it at that, as does the majority formulation above.62
Ten minority jurisdictions, however, add an emphasis to this temporal requirement, with seven of them following the MPC in requiring that force be “immediately necessary”.63 This emphasizes the temporal necessity for the use of force,
perhaps making it even more demanding than it would otherwise be. Compare this
with the three jurisdictions that require that the threatened force be “imminent”,
which focuses on the temporal proximity of the threat, rather than on the timing of
the needed defensive force: State v. Walsh, 119 P.3d 645, 652 (Ct. App. Id. 2005);
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2; and State v. Nelson, 329 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1983).
(b) Must the property owner request that the aggressor desist before the
owner can resort to force? The majority does not explicitly require such a
request, although one might argue that it might, in some circumstances, be
implicit in the requirement that the use of force be “necessary”. If the threat can
be effectively neutralized by such a request, then force is not necessary. Five
jurisdictions, however, are not content to leave this unstated and follow both
the MPC and the National Commission in making the requirement explicit.64
(c) Should deadly force be authorized in defense of property? Many jurisdictions expressly prohibit the use of deadly force in defense of property alone,
but do allow it in the defense of premises, habitation, or other similar contexts.65 The common rationale for these exceptions is the introduction of
danger to persons in addition to the property. Even without the rule, however,
in many cases such a threat would presumably trigger the Defense of Persons
justification. The MPC and National Commission authorize deadly force—but
only by cross-reference to such defense of persons. See the MPC § 3.06(3)(d);
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66 Hawaii, Iowa, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas.
67 See, e.g., Hawaii, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
68 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
69 Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
70 Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington. Only Pennsylvania follows the
MPC by supplying specific examples of possession within the defense of property justification (18
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 507(c)(1)).
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and National Commission’s Report § 607(2). It is generally understood that
Defense of Persons offers authority to use defensive force independent of and in
addition to Defense of Property. Therefore, despite the numerous and varied
exceptions embraced by several jurisdictions that relate to threats to persons,
none have been incorporated into the majority formulation of the defense of
property justification.
(d) What other limits, if any, should be placed upon the use of force? Beyond
the necessity requirement as a limit on the use of non-deadly force, no other
limits find majority support. The MPC, however, adds two additional explicit
limitations. First, it addresses the use of a protective device to defend property
(the MPC § 3.06(5)). Only six jurisdictions make such explicit reference to the
use of devices.66 Second, the MPC explicitly addresses the use of confinement
and authorizes the use of force to pass a wrongful obstructer. See, e.g., the MPC
§ 3.06(4) and (6). Only a small minority of jurisdictions follows the Code on
this issue.67 In practice, however, it is likely that the effect of these special
limitations is implicit in the normal application of the defense of property,
since the requirements of necessity and non-deadly force are likely to generate
results similar to the special rules set out by the MPC.
(e) What does “possession” mean? At least thirty jurisdictions explicitly
define possession.68 Of these jurisdictions, a majority of twenty-one broadly
use language that centers on having control or dominion over a tangible thing,
without distinguishing between real and personal property.69 This approach is
reproduced in the majority formulation above. The definition is broad enough
to encompass both actual and constructive possession, though only a handful of
jurisdictions specifically address both. A notable minority of six jurisdictions
embraces only actual, physical control, or dominion.70
It is likely the ubiquitous “know it when you see it” quality of possession that
explains why more jurisdictions do not bother to define it. Indeed, some
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71 Arizona, California, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia.
72 Allowing the use of force to recapture property at any time would invite the kind of vigilantism
expressly condemned by some jurisdictions that oppose such force in the first instance. See, e.g.,
Yocum v. State, 777 A.2d 782, 784 (Del. 2001).
73 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
74 Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, and Oregon.
75 Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin.
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jurisdictions’ definitions relied upon for the majority formulation appear only
in reference to a specific class of crimes (usually involving firearms or drugs) or
appear outside their criminal codes altogether. Such definitions, however, are
similar to each other regardless of where they are found, and thus are likely to
represent the jurisdictions’ general conception of possession, including in this
context.
(f) May an actor use force to retake or reenter his property of which he was
unlawfully dispossessed? A majority of at least twenty-seven jurisdictions authorize the use of force to retake property unlawfully taken by another or to
effect reentry upon land from which the actor was unlawfully dispossessed.
Twelve allow the use of force to retake or reenter property.71 They do not
specifically address when such force may be used; however, it seems implied
that it should only be allowed soon after the unlawful dispossession.72 Four
jurisdictions, following the MPC, authorize retaking real or personal property,
but only when “immediately necessary” and “in fresh pursuit” following an
unlawful dispossession: The MPC § 3.06(1)(b)(i); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281411; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 507; and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-614. Six
jurisdictions explicitly authorize the use of offensive force to “retake”, “regain”,
or “re-enter” the actor’s property; however, they differ regarding when such
force may be used. Three of these jurisdictions require it be used “immediately
following” the unlawful taking: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 105; N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 627:8; and Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.42 (using the language, “immediately after”). Connecticut requires it to be used within a “reasonable time”;
Massachusetts sets no explicit temporal restriction; and Rhode Island is silent
on the matter. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann § 53a-21; Com. v. Donahue, 148
Mass. 529 (1889); and State v. Holley, 604 A.2d 772 (R.I. 1992). Seventeen
jurisdictions authorize the use of force to “terminate” unlawful interference
or trespass73; however, only five of them interpret this authority to include
use of force to repossess property.74 Four others explicitly deny that
“terminating” interference includes repossession.75 Finally, another four jurisdictions explicitly restrict the use of force in protection of property to
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2.1.5. §305. Law Enforcement Authority.

The majority view of the Law Enforcement Authority defense among American
jurisdictions might be stated as follows:
Section 305. Law Enforcement Authority.

(1) Use of Force Justifiable to Effectuate an Arrest. The use of force upon or
toward the person of another is justifiable when a peace officer, or
private actor under the direction of a peace officer, is making or
76 Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, and Vermont.
77 See, e.g., Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Texas.
78 Alaska, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
79 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah.
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preventive measures, some going so far as to condemn repossessing property as
lawless vigilantism.76
Given the popularity of allowing reasonable force to retake or reenter property soon after being dispossessed (twenty-seven jurisdictions in total, versus
the eight jurisdictions that explicitly deny such authorization), it is likely that
even more jurisdictions than this bare majority would support that position,
given the right case.
(g) Should a claim of right by the dispossessor limit the actor’s right to use
force to resist? A majority of jurisdictions do not support this principle. The
MPC limits the use of force in such claim-of-right cases, in an effort to avoid
escalation of the conflict into physical injury, arguing that a person acting under
a claim of right is more likely to use force to resist the actor (The MPC
§ 3.06(1)(b)(ii) and Commentary). Yet, only a handful of jurisdictions follow
the Code in this respect.77
(h) May an actor defend against any unlawful aggression, or only against
criminal acts? At least twenty-nine jurisdictions permit defense of property
against most unlawful aggression,78 thus allowing the use of force to defend
against aggression that would be only civilly actionable. A minority of at least
thirteen jurisdictions require that the actor be defending against criminal force,
denying authority to defend against civil wrongs.79
The issue of mistake as to a justification is addressed in section 307, though
its effect can be seen in the bracketed language in Subsection (1) above.
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assisting in making an arrest and [reasonably believes that] such force is
necessary to effectuate the arrest.
(2) Limitations on the Use of Deadly Force. The use of deadly force is not
justifiable under this Section unless:

(a) the actor, where feasible, warns the suspect that he or she intends to
effectuate an arrest; and
(b) the actor has probable cause to believe:

(3) Use of Force to Prevent Escape from Custody. The use of force authorized in Subsections (1) and (2) can be used to prevent an escape from
custody either during or after an arrest.
(4) Use of Force to Prevent Escape from Detention Facility. A peace officer
is justified in using force that [he or she reasonably believes] is necessary
to prevent the escape of a charged or convicted detainee from a jail,
prison, or other such institution. However, a peace officer may not use
deadly force unless [he or she reasonably believes] the escapee is in
custody for committing a felony.
All jurisdictions agree that a peace officer, and those under the direction of a
peace officer, has the authority to use force to make a lawful arrest. The defense
protects the reasonable and necessary exercise of that authority. Jurisdictions
disagree, however, regarding: (a) what limits to place on such use of force
generally; (b) what limits to place on the use of deadly force for such a purpose;
and to what extent peace officers’ authority to use force extends to preventing
escape (c) from custody following an arrest and (d) from a detention facility.
(a) What limits should generally constrain actors’ use of force in making an
arrest? All jurisdictions require that the force used be necessary to make the
arrest. A majority of at least twenty-nine jurisdictions requires that the actor
either “believe”80 or “reasonably believe”81 that the force used is necessary
to effectuate an arrest. Others require the force used in any arrest situation

80 See, e.g., Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania.
81 See, e.g., Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.
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(i) the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to any individual, be it the officer or another; or
(ii) the suspect committed a crime that involved the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm; or
(iii) the suspect is threatening the actor with a weapon.
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82 See, e.g., Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
83 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
84 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, and Oregon.
85 See, e.g., Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
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be objectively reasonable or necessary.82 (The issue of mistake as to a justification is taken up and discussed more fully in section 307.)
Additionally, some jurisdictions follow the MPC, § 3.07(2)(a)(i), and require
that the officer’s purpose to affect an arrest be made known to the arrestee
before force may be used, see, e.g., Ariz. Stat. Ann. § 13-409(2); Del. Code. Ann.
§ 467(b)(1); and Ken. Rev. Stat. § 503.090(1)(b), though a majority of at least
thirty-four jurisdictions do not.83 Other jurisdictions also follow the MPC,
§ 3.07(2)(a)(ii), by specifically requiring an arrest warrant be valid, or at least
that the peace officer believe it to be valid, where an arrest warrant is at issue.
See, e.g., Ala. Crim. Code § 13A-3-27; Conn. Stat. Ann. § 52a-22; and Del. Code.
Ann. § 467. Some jurisdictions have a related limitation, barring the defense
only if the peace officer knows his arrest is unlawful.84 Ultimately, many jurisdictions recognize some limitation beyond the “reasonable belief” requirement.
None of these, however, commands majority support, so the majority formulation does not include any.
The MPC’s section 3.07(4)-(5) includes independent provisions for private
assistance in an unlawful arrest and for use of force to prevent suicide, but only
a handful of jurisdictions include similar provisions.85
(b) What limits should constrain an actor’s use of deadly force while effectuating an arrest? Under the common law, peace officers were authorized to use
deadly force to effectuate the arrest of any fleeing felon. In Tennessee v. Garner,
however, the Supreme Court held that the use of deadly force upon a fleeing
arrestee is itself a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, and thus subject to
constitutional “reasonableness” limitations that did away with the common law
rule many jurisdictions followed at the time. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S.Ct.
1694, 1699 (1985). Prior to Garner, “[m]ost American jurisdictions
[. . . recognized] a general privilege to use [deadly] force to stop a fleeing
felon.” Ibid. at 1702. To a certain extent, the Garner ruling now controls this
legal issue for all jurisdictions.
The Garner limitations are as follows: (1) a peace officer cannot use deadly
force to apprehend a suspected misdemeanant (this was always the majority
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86 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.
87 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, and Washington.
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rule, even under the common law), and (2) a peace officer cannot use deadly
force to effectuate the arrest of a suspected felon unless he warns the arrestee,
where feasible, of his intention and has probable cause to believe the arrestee
either: (a) poses a threat of serious physical harm, (b) has committed a crime
that involved the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, or
(c) threatened the officer with a weapon. The language of Subsection (2) in the
majority formulation above mirrors the Supreme Court’s ruling (Ibid. at 1701–
02). (“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus,
if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to
believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to
prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.”)
Consistent with Garner, at least thirty jurisdictions explicitly allow the use of
deadly force by peace officers if the arrestee poses a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily harm.86 Garner does not address the use of deadly force by
private actors under the direction of peace officers, but at least thirty jurisdictions allow these private actors to use deadly force in similar, if not identical,
circumstances as peace officers themselves.87 Therefore, the majority formulation includes such actors within the Garner requirements.
Note that the factors used to assess reasonableness in Garner are not technically an exclusive “test”, but rather one example of applying Fourth
Amendment reasonableness to seizures through means of deadly force.
Garner is cited so frequently for such reasonableness analyses, however, that
we find it appropriate to enshrine its specific components as the majority rule.
Additionally, Garner merely sets a constitutional “floor” for determining if the
use of deadly force is reasonable; there is, however, no majority support for
stricter limits than Garner provides.
The MPC does not allow the use of deadly force unless: (1) the arrest is for a
felony, (2) the actor is authorized to act, (3) the actor believes the force will not
create a substantial risk of injury to innocents, and (4) the actor believes the
crime involved the use or threatened use of deadly force or there is a substantial
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88 For examples of jurisdictions that follow the MPC in this regard, see New Jersey, Delaware, Hawaii,
Nebraska, and Pennsylvania.
89 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
90 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Federal, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin.
91 Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, South
Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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risk the felon will cause death or serious harm (The MPC § 3.07). Garner covers
(1), (2), and (4), as discussed above. While (3) is not incompatible with Garner,
it does not have majority support,88 and thus is not included in the majority
formulation.
(c) How much force may a peace officer use to prevent an arrestee’s escape? A
twenty-nine-jurisdiction majority explicitly includes use of force to prevent an
arrestee from escaping within the same provision as use of force to make an
arrest.89 Only two jurisdictions address arrestee escape in a separate provision;
however, the amount of force authorized is the same for both arrest and preventing escape after arrest (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.07; and Mont. Code Ann. § 453-106). This makes sense because an arrest is not truly “effectuated” if the
arrestee escapes. Thus, one can assume that in other jurisdictions the original
authorization to use force to make an arrest would also apply to recovering an
arrestee after an escape. In fact, the majority of jurisdictions do not distinguish
between these situations, so the majority formulation does not, either. See, e.g.,
State v. Lawler, 571 N.W.2d 486, 490 (1997) (defining the phrase, “[A]ny force
which the person reasonably believes to be necessary to make the arrest”, from
Iowa Code § 804.10 to include “prevent[ing] the escape of the arrested person
from custody”); Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 972-73 (1977)
(including prevention of escape in an analysis of “reasonable force” in “effect[ing] the arrest or detention” under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. C. Cr. P. Art. 220).
(d) May a peace officer use force to prevent escape from a detention facility?
If so, how much force? A majority of at least thirty-five jurisdictions allow
deadly force to be used under some circumstances of escape—although jurisdictions vary as to what those circumstances are.90 Like the MPC, § 3.07(3), at
least thirteen jurisdictions allow the use of deadly force under the same conditions as non-deadly force; that is, when it is (reasonably) believed necessary to
prevent escape.91 However, at least twenty-six other jurisdictions more strictly
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2.1.6. §306. Special Responsibility.

The majority view of the Special Responsibility defense among American jurisdictions might be stated this way:
Section 306. Special Responsibility.
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if:
(1) the actor is a parent, guardian, teacher, or other person similarly entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor, or the guardian of an
incompetent person, and:

(a) the force used [is with the purpose to] maintain discipline or promote the minor or incompetent person’s welfare, and
(b) the force used is reasonable;
(2) the actor is a warden or other authorized official of a correctional institution, and:
(a) the force used [is with the purpose to] maintain or restore order or
discipline, and
92 Alabama, Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Federal, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington.
93 Alabama, Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
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limit the use of deadly force to prevent escape.92 Of the different limitations
imposed by these jurisdictions, twenty-one say that peace officers cannot use
deadly force on escapees unless they believe those escapees to be felons (or to
have committed specified crimes of similar magnitude).93 Additional minority
restrictions include requiring peace officers to believe the escapee: threatens life
or serious bodily injury, possesses a firearm, or is escaping from a greater than
minimum-security correctional institution. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.056
(threatens life or serious bodily injury); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 732 (threatens life
or serious bodily injury); Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 9A.16.040 (threatens life or
serious bodily injury); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.81.410 (possesses a firearm); and
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.267 (escaping from a greater than maximum-security
correctional institution). Because over twenty of the twenty-six majority jurisdictions limiting deadly force more strictly than the MPC also specifically limit
the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of felons, the majority formulation
above has included that limitation as a widely accepted example of the limitations jurisdictions choose to apply.
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(b) [the actor reasonably believes that] such force is necessary;
(3) the actor is charged with the safety of a common carrier of persons, and:
(a) the force used [is with the purpose to] maintain order, and
(b) [the actor reasonably believes that] such force is necessary;
(3) the actor is a doctor or other therapist or a person assisting him at his
direction, and the force is used for the purpose of administering a
recognized form of treatment which the actor believes to be adapted
to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient, and:

Every jurisdiction agrees that there are some actors who hold special responsibilities that properly authorize the use of force when needed to promote order
or the safety of the persons in their charge. Of course, not all uses of force are
authorized by the defense, and the limitations on its use vary depending on the
relationship. (a) Parents, teachers, and guardians of both children and incompetent persons tend to be given one kind of authority, whereas (b) prison
wardens and authorized officials are given another. More limited authority is
given to (c) persons charged with the safety of common carriers and (d) doctors
and persons assisting them; though the nature of the authorization for these two
categories of actors is completely different.
(a) Parents, teachers, and guardians of minors and incompetent persons: a
majority of at least forty-nine jurisdictions recognizes a defense for parents
applying force to discipline their children.94 All of those jurisdictions have a
two-fold requirement for the use of force, comprised both a subjective and an
objective component. Subjectively, the defense looks to a parent’s state of
mind—whether his or her purpose in using force was to maintain discipline
or to promote the child’s welfare. It also requires, objectively, that the force used
be reasonable for that purpose. Thus, even objectively reasonable force or punishment would presumably not be justified if the parent acted with malice or a

94 Only Iowa, North Carolina, and South Carolina are unconfirmed.
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(a) the treatment is administered with the consent of the patient or, if
the patient is a minor or an incompetent person, with the consent
of his parent or guardian or other person legally competent to
consent on his behalf, or
(b) the treatment is administered in an emergency when [the actor
reasonably believes that] no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.
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95 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
96 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New York,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington.
97 Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
98 District of Columbia, Georgia, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Wyoming.
99 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
100 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
and Texas.
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mere desire to hurt the child. Nor would punishment with the acceptable motivation be tolerated if it were objectively unreasonable.
A majority of at least forty jurisdictions additionally recognizes a defense for
teachers applying reasonable force to discipline their students.95 At least twentyseven jurisdictions apply the same two-fold test regarding the appropriateness
of force used by teachers as is used for parents, requiring both proper subjective
purpose and objective reasonableness. Of these twenty-seven jurisdictions,
twenty-two explicitly treat teachers precisely the same as parents. Of those
twenty-two, twelve jurisdictions lump both parents and teachers together by
statute,96 whereas the other ten consider teachers to be in loco parentis97—
temporarily in the place of parents when the children are under their care.
The five remaining jurisdictions making up the twenty-seven-jurisdiction majority recognize certain actors to be in loco parentis, but it is not explicit as to
whether teachers are among them.98 Considering the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions that do so, however, it is likely that these latter jurisdictions do
intend that teachers be in loco parentis.
A majority of at least thirty-one jurisdictions further confer upon guardians a
legal status equivalent to parents for the purpose of this defense, either by
lumping them together with parents in the main statute or, like teachers,
recognizing them as in loco parentis.99
Only nineteen jurisdictions explicitly confer upon guardians of incompetent
persons a legal status equivalent to parents for the purpose of this defense.100
Other jurisdictions, however, are silent on this subject, and no cases could be
found in those jurisdictions contradicting their authority. Given the similar
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101 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
102 See, e.g., Delaware, Hawaii, and Nebraska. Cf. N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-05(1). (“The force may be
used . . . whether or not it is ‘necessary’ as required by subsection 1 of section 12.1.05-07.”)
103 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Federal.
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situation such people have to teachers and guardians of children, it is likely
those silent jurisdictions would support such authority, given the right case.
Therefore, guardians of incompetent persons are included with parents in
Subsection (1) above.
Like the majority formulation, the MPC treats parents, teachers, and guardians of both children and incompetent persons substantially the same. Cf.
The MPC § 3.08(1) with §§ 3.08(2)–(3). The majority formulation deviates
from the MPC, however, by applying an objective reasonableness standard to
the force used. Section 3.08(1)(a)–(b) of the Code focuses exclusively on the
actor’s motivation for the use of force and does not demand that the force be
objectively reasonable. However, to a similar end, the MPC and the National
Commission demand that the force “not be designed to cause or known to
create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement or
gross degradation”. See the MPC § 3.08(1)(b); and National Commission’s
Report § 605(1)(a). The Commission requires any force used to be “reasonable”, though it specifies that such force need not be “necessary” in the way that
use of force in defense of persons and property must be necessary. See National
Commission’s Report § 607(1).
Notably, a significant minority of at least twenty-two jurisdictions explicitly
imposes a necessity requirement upon the use of force by parents, teachers,
guardians, and others similarly situated, requiring that the force exerted be
“necessary”, “reasonably necessary”, or “reasonably believed to be necessary”.101 Other jurisdictions may implicitly consider necessity when determining whether force is reasonable, even though they do not include an explicit
necessity requirement.102
(b) Prison wardens and authorized correctional officials: at least thirty-two
jurisdictions specifically authorize the use of force in correctional settings.103 All
but two of them have tests with both objective and subjective components that
limit this authorization, similar to those governing parents, teachers, and
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104 Arizona’s test is purely subjective. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-403(2). Illinois has a purely subjective for use of non-deadly force, but switches to a dual objective-subjective test for deadly force.
See 20 Il. Admin. Code § 501.40(a)-(b).
105 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, and Federal.
106 Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
107 Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Vermont, and Washington.
108 California, Connecticut, Michigan, and Utah.
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guardians.104 Regarding the subjective portion of the test, the greatest number
of jurisdictions, twenty, require that the actor have the purpose of maintaining
order or discipline105—though some of them provide lists of objectives that can
be succinctly and accurately summed up that way. Nine other jurisdictions
require the actor’s purpose be to enforce the lawful rules and/or procedures
of the correctional institution.106 As those rules and procedures are generally in
place to maintain order and discipline, the “maintain order” version of the
subjective component is used for the majority formulation. The remaining
two jurisdictions allow the use of force for the purpose of performing any
legal duty or accomplishing any legitimate law enforcement objective: N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 10A:3-3.2; and Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9a.16.020, 72.09.650.
Regarding the objective portion of the test, of those that have one, the greatest number of jurisdictions, twenty-one, only allow force to be used when and
to the extent it is, or is believed or reasonably believed to be, necessary.107 Four
jurisdictions allow only a reasonable amount of force to be used.108 The remaining three jurisdictions allow any amount of force authorized by law: Ala.
Code § 13A-3-24; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.061; and N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10.
Additionally, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the use of force in correctional settings is subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment to determine
if such force is “cruel and unusual punishment”. In Hudson v. McMillian, the
Court suggested that inquiry into the necessity of force used might be appropriate when determining whether such force is reasonable, though it did not say
such inquiry is required (503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)). Nevertheless, the Court appeared to embrace the necessity requirement, since the factors the Court considered entered into an ultimate determination whether “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain” was carried out (Ibid.; emphasis added). Given the
close relationship between these concepts, and the great number of jurisdictions
that embrace necessity as the basic objective requirement, necessity is also
required in the majority formulation.
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109 Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania.
110 The MPC § 3.08(6)–(7); Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
111 The MPC § 3.08(4); National Commission’s Report § 605(d); Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania.
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The MPC only requires that the actor should believe that the force used is
necessary (The MPC § 3.08(5)(a)). Although a few jurisdictions agree with the
Code in this regard,109 most have a simple necessity or reasonableness requirement. The National Commission does not specifically address use of force by
wardens.
(c) Persons charged with the safety of common carriers: At least thirty-one
jurisdictions, following the MPC, authorize the use of force by persons charged
with the safety of common carriers.110 Some jurisdictions explicitly grant such
authority by statute. See, e.g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 509(6)–(7). Other
jurisdictions’ courts have recognized such persons’ authority, though the pertinent cases are mostly older ones regarding forcible ejection from railroad cars.
See, e.g., White v. Evansville & T.H. R.R. Co., 133 Ind. 480 (1893). Many jurisdictions’ rules on this subject could not be confirmed, so known majority authority only supports the grant of authority to persons responsible for common
carriers, not the specific contours of that authority. Among the known rules,
however, persons authorized to use force for the safety of common carriers may
only use force that is necessary for the purpose of maintaining order in the
course of their normal duties.
(d) Physicians and similar actors: At least eighteen jurisdictions follow the
MPC and the National Commission by including licensed physicians
acting in the course of their regular duties among the actors protected by the
special responsibility defense.111 Of those, all but two do so using language
nearly identical to the MPC. See Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9-3; N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:3-8. Furthermore, in the jurisdictions that do not give physicians such
explicit authorization, no support could be found for denying a defense under
relevant circumstances. Given the commonsense nature of acknowledging
physicians’ authority to exercise at least some physical force in the course of
normal treatment, it is highly likely that those silent jurisdictions would support
the MPC’s position, given the right case. Therefore, a slightly modified version
of the Code’s authorization is included in the majority formulation.
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2.1.7. §307. Mistake as to Justification.
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Every American jurisdiction excuses a person in some instances in which the
person reasonably but mistakenly believes his conduct is justified under one of
the recognized justification defenses. American jurisdictions vary greatly, however, as to: (a) exactly what mistakes concerning which aspects of a justification
will provide a defense; (b) whether culpable mistakes will provide a defense or
mitigation; and (c) the legal result when an actor makes a mistake as to the
lawfulness of the force being defended against.
Indeed, there is commonly some inconsistency within the defenses of a single
jurisdiction regarding these matters. The internal inconsistency arises, in part,
because of the approach most commonly used when defining the Mistake as to
Justification defense. It is commonly provided not by a discrete general statement of the “mistake-as-to-justification defense”, but rather by including
within each existing justification defense, the words “believes” or “reasonably
believes” immediately before that aspect of the justification defense about which
a mistake excuse will be recognized. The MPC popularized this approach.
(a) In determining what mistakes concerning which aspects of a justification
will provide a defense, a discussion of the relative characteristics of the two
primary forms of the mistake as to justification defense is warranted. If a formulation provides a defense for a person who “reasonably believes his conduct is
necessary to protect himself”, the actor will get a mistake defense even if he was
in error about whether his conduct was actually necessary. Unfortunately, this
piecemeal, “embedded” approach leaves some uncertainty as to the scope of the
defense. For example, if the formulation provides a defense for a person who
“reasonably believes his deadly force is necessary to protect himself from serious
bodily injury or death”, does the “reasonably believes” apply to both “necessary
to protect” and to “serious bodily injury”? That is, can he get a mistake defense
if in fact only minor bodily injury was threatened? Or what effect does the
“reasonably believes” language have on the use of deadly force if the “deadly
force” rules appear in a later or inferior subsection from the one containing
such language? Can a reasonable mistake as to the circumstances justifying
deadly force provide a defense? Can a reasonable mistake as to the special
deadly force rules themselves provide a defense? These uncertainties make it
difficult to determine the exact scope of a jurisdiction’s mistake as to a justification defense and, therefore, a majority view.
One could argue that a reasonable mistake as to any element of a justification
defense ought to exculpate. On the contrary, one might argue—as some have—
that mistakes as to certain aspects of a justification defense ought not be
recognized (Williams 1961, p. 337; Austin 1920, p. 239). For example, one
might want to exclude an actor’s mistake as to the law governing what is
justified, such as whether an actor had an obligation to retreat before using
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deadly force. A clearer approach than the “embedded” approach would be to
use a separate mistake as to a justification provision that applied to all justification defenses and defined the class of justification mistakes that could provide
a defense or mitigation.
This is the approach taken by the National Commission, which rejected the
MPC’s “embedded” approach in favor of one that removed the “believes” language from all justification defenses and provided the mistake as to a justification defense through an excuse provision that reads as follows:
Section 608. Excuse.

The separate provision approach states a general principle, thus avoiding the
linguistic ambiguities that can arise under the “embedded” approach, which
depends on the particular placement of “believes” or “reasonably believes”
language in a justification defense.
The National Commission’s approach also offers several other advantages,
which some will see as even more important. First, it more easily accommodates
what might be called the more nuanced “sliding scale” approach to mistake, as
opposed to the “all or nothing” approach, discussed below. If a person’s mistake
is completely reasonable, all agree that he ought to gain a complete excuse.
However, if he makes an honest mistake but one that a reasonable person would
not have made—that is, his mistake was negligent or reckless—then some jurisdictions (and the MPC) have his level of liability track his level of culpability
in making that mistake. The provision providing this sliding scale level of
liability is easily included within the National Commission’s provision above.
Thus, if a person kills another honestly believing that he must do so to protect
his life, but in fact has made a negligent mistake in coming to this conclusion,112
the sliding-scale approach would hold him liable, but only for negligent homicide. Under an “all-or-nothing” approach, he would be denied any defense
because his mistake was not “reasonable”, and thus he would suffer the liability
of a murderer—treated as if he had killed without any thought of self-defense.

112 That is, it never occurred to him that he was not threatened with immediate death, but that possibility would have occurred to the reasonable person.
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(1) Mistake. A person’s conduct is excused if he believes that the factual
situation is such that his conduct is necessary and appropriate for any of
the purposes which would establish a justification . . . under this
Chapter, even though his belief is mistaken, except that, if his belief
is negligently or recklessly held, it is not an excuse in a prosecution for
an offense for which negligence or recklessness, as the case may be,
suffices to establish culpability . . . .
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113 Note that the National Commission titles its defense an “Excuse”.
114 See text accompanying note 31.
115 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia.
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Beyond the advantages of promoting increased internal consistency and
allowing a more detailed formulation of the defense, a separate provision for
mistake as to a justification also provides greater conceptual clarity, which can
have practical benefits. As has been detailed elsewhere, (Robinson 1997, chs
6–11), the criminal law performs two distinctive functions: it announces
ex ante the criminal law’s rules of conduct and provides ex post rules by
which a breach of the former rules ought to be adjudicated. The objective
justification defenses are part of the rules of conduct. They are addressed to
the general public and, therefore, ought to be formulated with that audience in
mind to be as clear and objective as their function permits. A defense for a
mistake as to justification is not part of the ex ante rules of conduct but
rather part of the ex post principles of adjudication. It does not tell citizens ex
ante what the law requires of them, but rather tells adjudicators ex post when to
punish an offender who has done what the law seeks to forbid.113 Given its target
audience, a defense for a mistake as to a justification can afford to be more
complex and normative in its formulation.
The MPC’s approach of embedding the mistake excuse within the objective
justification defense—thereby introducing into the rule of conduct elements that
ought to relate only to adjudication—obscures the conduct rule. This and other
difficulties with commingling objective justifications and the excuse of mistake as
to justification have been examined more closely elsewhere. (Robinson 2009,
p. 343–53, 361–63) For example, the difficulties of defining the triggering
conditions for the use of defensive force are discussed in section 303: all agree
that objectively justified attacks ought not to trigger a right to use defensive force,
but attacks that are only subjective mistaken beliefs in justification ought to
trigger such a right. Thus, the MPC’s subjective approach makes it nearly impossible to provide a clear definition of what attacks may be lawfully defended.114
Having noted all of this, it is nonetheless the case that the most common
approach to the formulation of the mistake as to a justification defense is the
“embedded” approach using “reasonably believes” language in justification defenses. A thirty-six-jurisdiction majority, following the MPC, defines all justification defenses subjectively, requiring that the actor “reasonably believes” his
conduct to be justified.115 Four jurisdictions require only that an actor “believe”
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Section 307. Mistake as to a Justification Excuse

(1) Mistake. A person’s conduct is excused if he reasonably believes that the
factual situation is such that his conduct is necessary and appropriate
for any of the purposes that would establish a justification defense
under this Chapter.
(2) The excuse defense provided in Subsection (1) is unavailable if:
(a) the actor’s belief in the unlawfulness of the force or conduct against
which he employs protective force or his belief in the lawfulness of an arrest which he endeavors to effect by force is erroneous;
and
(b) his error is due to ignorance or mistake as to the provisions of the
Code, any other provision of the criminal law or the law governing
the legality of an arrest or search.
(b) Will culpable mistakes as to justification provide a defense or mitigation?
Moving from format to content, aside from the issue of embedded versus separate mistake defense, the primary disagreement among American jurisdictions
concerns whether to take the “all-or-nothing” approach or the “sliding-scale”
approach in providing a mistake excuse. A forty-three-jurisdiction majority
116 Deleware, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Nebraska.
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his conduct to be justified.116 Among modern codifications, only North
Dakota, following the National Commission, § 608(1), defines justification
defenses objectively while providing a freestanding mistake as to justification
defense (N.D. Cent. Code § 12.01-05-08 (North Dakota)). For those readers
who wish to follow the majority view regarding not only content but also
drafting form, the embedded approach is the clear majority view. This is why
every justification defense majority formulation in this article includes the
“reasonably believes” language.
But for those who are interested in following the majority view on content,
but who do not feel bound to use the majority form, we recommend using the
separate provision approach of the National Commission. If a jurisdiction takes
this “separate provision” approach, it will omit the embedded “reasonably believes” language—which is marked off with brackets in each of the justification
defenses in this article. Eliminating the bracketed language would convert the
justification formulation to a purely objective formulation—a better ex ante
rule of conduct—and would then allow a separate excuse provision—a better
principle of adjudication. If one were to adopt the majority view, but were to
draft a single provision governing the Mistake as to Justification defense, it
might be formulated this way:
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117 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
118 See, e.g., Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
119 Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
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embraces the “all-or-nothing” approach.117 Under this majority formulation,
only “reasonable” (i.e., non-negligent) mistakes as to justification warrant full
exculpation. Any culpable mistakes, regardless of their level of culpability, will
incur full liability. Thus, as similarly hypothesized above, a person who kills an
attacker honestly believing it was necessary to defend himself against a deadly
threat will get a complete defense if his belief was reasonable. But if his belief is
honestly held but negligent—that is, it never occurred to him that such force
was not necessary, but the reasonable person in his situation would have been
aware of a risk that it might not be—then the actor loses his self-defense altogether and is liable for murder. Under the sliding scale approach of the MPC
and the National Commission, he would still be criminally liable, but only for
negligent homicide.
Twenty-eight jurisdictions have explicitly committed themselves to this
“all-or-nothing” view in a statute,118 usually embedded in defensive force
statutes as discussed above. The other “all-or-nothing” jurisdictions have
seminal case law limiting mistake as to justification to a reasonable belief in
defensive force situations (defense of property, defense of self, defense of
others).119
The MPC and National Commission, in contrast, embrace the “sliding scale”
approach. See, e.g., the MPC § 3.09(2); and National Commission’s Report §
608; see also 11 Del. C. §470; and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 703-310. Under this approach, the defense formulation seems to grant the Mistake as to Justification
defense based merely upon a “belief” that the justifying conditions exist. Then a
separate provision—section 3.09 of the MPC and section 608 of the National
Commission (quoted above)—imposes mitigated liability if the mistake was
not reasonable (either reckless or negligent), with the level of liability depending
on the level of culpability in the actor’s mistake. In case law, this minority view
is often labeled as the doctrine of “imperfect self-defense”. See, e.g., Lanier v.
State, 684 So.2d 93, 97 (Miss. 1996).
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(c) What is the legal result when an actor makes a mistake as to the lawfulness
of the force being defended against? The MPC bars a mistake defense when an
actor erroneously believes that the force against which he is defending is unlawful and that error is due to ignorance or mistake of the law (The MPC
§ 3.09(1)). Nebraska and New Jersey are the only jurisdictions to have statutorily adopted a similar limit on the defense; however, even when left unspoken,
this prohibition follows the clear majority view that ignorance or mistake of law
is typically no defense to criminal liability.120
2.2 Chapter 4. General Principles of Excuse

The majority view of the Insanity defense among American jurisdictions might
be stated as follows:
Section 401. Insanity.

(1) An actor is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he did not know his
conduct was wrong.
(2) As used in Subsection (1), the phrase “mental disease or defect” does
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct.
Insanity defense formulations primarily differ regarding four issues, namely:
(a) the extent of cognitive disability required to excuse criminal conduct; (b)
whether a defendant’s cognitive impairment relates to the ability to understand
the morality or the criminality of his conduct; (c) whether and to what extent
the defendant’s inability to control his physical actions should excuse criminal
conduct; and (d) whether to exclude sociopathic behavior from the definition
of insanity.
(a) How impaired must a defendant’s cognitive abilities be to warrant a
defense? Subsection (1) of the majority formulation above reflects the socalled M’Naghten formulation,121 which requires absolute inability to tell
that one’s conduct is wrong. A thirty-four-jurisdiction majority supports
either M’Naghten or an even more restrictive position. First, twenty-two

120 For a full discussion of mistake of law, see infra section 406.
121 This formulation is named for the English case in which it was first articulated. M’Naghten’s Case, 8
Eng. Rep. 718 (1843) (“[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong”).
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2.2.1. §401. Insanity.
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122 Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
123 Alabama, Alaska, Indiana, Tennessee, and Federal. For instance, Alaska grants the insanity defense
when “the defendant was unable, as a result of a mental disease or defect, to appreciate the nature
and quality of that conduct” (emphasis added), thus incorporating the MPC’s “unable to appreciate” language but not the “substantial capacity” test (discussed below) into the M’Naghten formulation of the cognitive “prong” of the defense (Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.47.010).
124 Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, and Utah.
125 Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.
126 Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
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jurisdictions expressly embrace M’Naghten language.122 Second, five jurisdictions use hybrid language that appears similar to the MPC’s “unable to appreciate” standard (discussed below), but operates like M’Naghten.123 Third, six
jurisdictions have abolished the Insanity defense, obviously the most restrictive
position.124 Fourth, Missouri requires that an actor meet both the M’Naghten
formulation and the MPC’s less restrictive cognitive requirement, which makes
it a de facto M’Naghten jurisdiction because an actor must meet that more
restrictive standard in every case (Mo. Ann. Stat. § 562.086).
The remaining eighteen jurisdictions embrace one of three minority formulations of the cognitive dysfunction requirement. First, sixteen jurisdictions
follow the MPC formulation, which requires an actor’s cognitive function to
be substantially, rather than absolutely, impaired, and that he be unable to
“appreciate” the criminality (or wrongfulness) of his conduct.125 Second,
New York allows an actor to satisfy either the M’Naghten or the MPC formulation, which results, as a practical matter, in nothing more than the MPC’s
formulation (N.Y. Penal Law § 40.15). Third, New Hampshire follows the
Durham “product test”, which is even less demanding than the MPC, requiring
only that the actor’s insanity caused his criminal conduct, without a requirement as to the extent of the cognitive impairment (State v. Fichera, 153 N.H.
588, 593 (2006)).
(b) Precisely what cognitive faculty must be impaired to give rise to the
insanity defense? Is it the actor’s ability to tell moral right from wrong, or to
understand that his actions are criminally prohibited? A majority of thirtyseven jurisdictions discuss cognitive impairment in terms of an actor’s ability
to “know” or “appreciate” that his actions are wrong.126 Subsection (1) of the
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127 Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, and Vermont.
128 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Federal.
129 See note 124.
130 Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
131 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and
Federal.
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majority formulation therefore reflects this view. Six jurisdictions use the term
“criminal” instead of “wrong”.127 Interestingly, the MPC (and, by reference,
Massachusetts, which embraces the MPC’s version of the insanity defense
wholesale) uses the term “criminality”, but parenthetically includes “wrongfulness” as an acceptable alternative (The MPC § 4.01(1); and Commonwealth v.
McHoul, 352 Mass. 544 (1967)).
(c) Should an actor’s inability to physically control his actions give rise to an
insanity defense? Thirty-five jurisdictions agree that it should not, so Subsection
(1) above does not include a “control prong”. These thirty-five jurisdictions are
made up of twenty-nine that offer an insanity defense for cognitive but not
control incapacity128 and the six that offer no insanity defense at all.129 The
remaining jurisdictions embrace control dysfunction as part of the insanity
defense by following one of three minority views. First, three jurisdictions
use the “irresistible impulse” formulation, which requires absolute impairment
of the actor’s self-restraint: State v. Hartley, 90 N.M. 488, 490 (1977); State v.
Staten, 18 Ohio St.2d 13 (1969); and Herbin v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 173,
181–183 (1998). Second, thirteen jurisdictions use the MPC formulation,130
which only requires substantial impairment of the actor’s ability to “conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law” (The MPC § 4.01(1)). Third, and as
previously noted, New Hampshire follows the Durham “product test”, which
has no requirement regarding the extent of control impairment (State v.
Fichera, 153 N.H. 588, 593 (2006)).
(d) Ought sociopaths be considered insane for the purpose of excusing criminal conduct? Subsection (2) prohibits a defense for repeated criminal or antisocial conduct because a firm majority of forty jurisdictions, aligned with the
MPC, exclude such offenders from the Insanity defense. Thirty-four jurisdictions exclude such behavior explicitly,131 whereas the six jurisdictions with no
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insanity defense exclude such behavior de facto.132 Three jurisdictions arguably
do not automatically exclude sociopaths: United States v. Gay, 522 F.2d 429, 433
(6th Cir. 1975) (Michigan); State v. Fichera, 153 N.H. 588, 593 (2006); and
People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241, 248–49 (1980). The remaining jurisdictions
do not appear to have taken a position on the issue.
2.2.2. §402. Involuntary Intoxication.

The majority view of the Involuntary Intoxication defense among American
jurisdictions might be stated as follows:
Section 402. Involuntary Intoxication.

Involuntary Intoxication defense formulations primarily differ regarding
three issues, namely: (a) the extent of cognitive impairment required to
excuse criminal conduct; (b) whether and to what extent the defendant’s inability to control his conduct due to intoxication should excuse criminal conduct; and (c) how to define “involuntary”.
(a) To what degree must intoxication impair a defendant’s cognitive function
to warrant a defense? Of the forty-six jurisdictions with confirmed views,133
thirty-three treat involuntary intoxication as an excuse analogous in form and
operation to insanity, as reflected in the majority formulations above and in
section 401.134 The thirteen remaining jurisdictions only allow involuntary intoxication to negate the culpability requirement of an offense.135
Thirty-three jurisdictions would support the use of the restrictive language of
the M’Naghten Insanity defense cognitive prong by requiring either complete
loss of the actor’s ability to tell moral right from wrong or something even more
132 See note 124.
133 Six jurisdictions have uncertain or not yet established positions on the involuntary intoxication
excuse, namely: Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and West
Virginia.
134 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
135 Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont.
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(1) Intoxication is a defense if it is involuntary and if by reason of such
intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know his
conduct was wrong.
(2) Intoxication is “involuntary” if the intoxicating substance was introduced without the actor’s knowledge or under circumstances that
would afford a defense to a charge of crime.
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136 See, e.g., Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Federal. Kansas requires that the actor be “substantially incapable of knowing or understanding the wrongfulness of such person’s conduct and of conforming
such person’s conduct to the requirements of the law” (emphasis added; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5209).
137 See note 135.
138 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
139 See supra section 401.
140 The involuntary intoxication defenses in the MPC and National Commission’s Report are identical
to the majority view for the purpose of comparison. The MPC § 2.08(4); National Commission’s
Report § 502.
141 Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
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restrictive. At least twenty jurisdictions expressly adopt language similar to
M’Naghten.136 Furthermore, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, at
least thirteen jurisdictions take an even more constrictive view by only allowing
involuntary intoxication to negate the culpability element of an offense.137 The
position adopted in the majority formulation above is based upon the language
in the twenty M’Naghten jurisdictions. While the M’Naghten formulation fails
to gain majority support, this formulation is presented as the “majority” view
because it has the most support of the various formulations in existence and
would arguably be supported by those jurisdictions requiring more demanding
culpability element negation.
Also supporting the majority formulation above is the fact that twenty-eight
jurisdictions use the same cognitive language for Involuntary Intoxication that
they use for Insanity, regardless of their positions.138 The majority view of
Involuntary Intoxication above uses the same language as that of the majority
view of Insanity.139 This is also consistent with the approach of the MPC, which
shapes its Insanity and Involuntary Intoxication defenses similarly, both in
language and content.
Fourteen jurisdictions use the MPC’s cognitive formulation,140 which—like
its Insanity defense—requires only substantial impairment, rather than complete loss of the ability to tell moral right from wrong.141
(b) Should the fact that intoxication impairs an actor’s ability to
control his conduct give rise to a defense of involuntary intoxication? A
thirty-three-jurisdiction majority agrees that it should not. Twenty of these
thirty-three jurisdictions excuse involuntary intoxication solely under a
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142 Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Federal.
143 Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont.
144 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 422. Virginia’s language is somewhat opaque. It states that intoxication
must so unsettle the ability to reason as to prevent the individual from exercising his own free will.
Dir. of the Dept. of Corrections v. Jones, 229 Va. 333, 339 (Va. 1985). By using both the language
“ability to reason” and “free will” the court appears to awkwardly include both cognitive and
control elements.
145 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
146 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
147 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
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cognitive dysfunction theory.142 As mentioned above, thirteen more jurisdictions take an even more restrictive view, only allowing involuntary intoxication
to negate the culpability of an offense.143 Taken together, these thirty-three
jurisdictions suggest majority support for the formulation in Subsection (1)
above, which does not include a “control prong”.
A minority of sixteen jurisdictions recognizes control dysfunction as a
defense. Two jurisdictions use the “irresistible impulse” formulation, which
requires absolute impairment of the actor’s self-restraint.144 Fourteen jurisdictions embrace the MPC formulation,145 which, as with Insanity, requires only
that the actor “[lack] substantial capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law” (The MPC § 2.08(4)).
(c) How should “involuntary” intoxication be defined? Only thirty-nine jurisdictions provide guidance as to what the “involuntary” introduction of an
intoxicating substance actually means.146 Thirty-six of these jurisdictions agree
that an actor’s unknowing or innocent ingestion of an intoxicating substance, as
in the case where the actor has been drugged, is not voluntary.147 These jurisdictions utilize two different defense formulations to reach the same conclusion. First, some jurisdictions specifically find intoxication to be involuntary
where the actor was caused to ingest the intoxicating substance against his will
by artifice, contrivance, or fraud. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 870 P.2d 900, 902
n.8 (Utah 1993). Second, some jurisdictions say that intoxication is only
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148 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Federal.
149 Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah.
150 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
151 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
152 These jurisdictions actually define voluntary intoxication. One must infer that whatever does not fit
that definition is “involuntary”.
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voluntary when the actor “knowingly introduced [the intoxicating substance]
into his body”. See, e.g., Delaware Code § 424(2). Under the latter view, a drug
introduced to the actor by fraud would necessarily result in involuntary
intoxication.
Furthermore, a thirty-three-jurisdiction majority additionally defines “involuntary” in terms of circumstances that provide a defense to criminal conduct.148 First, eighteen jurisdictions list independent defenses to criminal
liability within which the introduction of an intoxicating substance would be
deemed involuntary (such as under force or duress).149 Second, fifteen jurisdictions instead define voluntary intoxication.150 These jurisdictions state that
intoxication is voluntary when it is “caused by a substance that the actor knowingly introduced into his body, and the tendency of which to cause intoxication
he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them under circumstances
that would afford a defense to a charge of crime” (e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-32(e)(2)). The common denominator between these two positions is the
“defense against a charge of crime” provision, which has been adopted in
the majority formulation above. Only Arizona and South Dakota utilize the
“defense to a charge of crime” definition of involuntary intoxication, but without any language allowing unknowing introduction of the intoxicating substance to provide a defense. See, e.g.,Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 115-17 (1931);
and Utsler v. State, 84 S.D. 360, 364-65 (1969).
A twenty-jurisdiction minority includes “tendency of a substance” language
for circumstances amounting to involuntary intoxication.151 Fifteen jurisdictions effectively hold that intoxication is involuntary where the actor either
lacks knowledge of the tendencies of the intoxicating substance152 or where a
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traditional defense (like duress) would make such an act involuntary.153 This
“either/or” formulation is essentially similar to MPC section 2.08. The other
five jurisdictions hold that intoxication is involuntary only when the defendant
lacks knowledge of the intoxicating tendency of the substance.154

2.2.3. §403. Immaturity.

A majority of jurisdictions provide an Immaturity defense, which might be
summarized as follows:
Section 403. Immaturity.

(a) 18 years old or older,
(b) 15 years old or older and is charged with [specified offenses], or
(c) 14 years old or older and the court determines after a hearing that
he should be transferred to a criminal court for prosecution as an
adult.
(2) In determining whether a person should be transferred to a criminal
court for prosecution as an adult under Subsection (1)(c), the court
shall consider the following factors:
(a) the nature and seriousness of the alleged offense,
(b) whether there is probable cause to believe that the person in question committed the alleged offense,
(c) the person’s prior history and record in the juvenile or criminal
system,
(d) the person’s age and physical and mental maturity,
(e) the facilities available to serve the person’s needs, and
(f) his amenability to treatment and the prospect of rehabilitation in
the juvenile system.
Only twenty-three jurisdictions specifically address infancy or immaturity
within their criminal codes.155 Other jurisdictions’ immaturity statutes are
scattered among various juvenile codes and other public laws. Cf. Utah Code
153 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal. These jurisdictions are also
counted among the majority for their traditional defense position.
154 Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Tennessee.
155 Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington.
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(1) A person may be prosecuted as an adult if he is:
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156 This includes all jurisdictions except Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, South Carolina,
and Wisconsin.
157 Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.
158 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Federal.
159 For example, Alabama and Arizona specifically provide for automatic treatment of juveniles as
adults for listed offenses: Ala. Code § 12-15-204; and Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-501. South Carolina
changes its definition of “child” for certain crimes to reflect a lower age (S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-19-20). Georgia, alternatively, grants exclusive jurisdiction to the superior court rather than
the juvenile court for specific crimes (Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-28). Maryland and Massachusetts both
deny the juvenile court any jurisdiction over certain criminal offenders above a specified age. Md.
Code Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-8A-03; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 74. Kansas creates
a rebuttable presumption of adulthood for certain offenses (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347).
Pennsylvania requires that juveniles who are alleged to have committed certain crimes be tried in
juvenile courts “under the criminal law and procedure”, unless they are transferred to an adult court
(42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6355).
160 Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on March 16, 2015

Ann. § 76-2-301, with Del. Code Ann. tit. X, § 1010. The defense codifications
vary greatly, both in form and content. Generally, however, immaturity defenses differ along four issues, namely: (a) the absolute age of maturity; (b)
whether to try juveniles above a particular age as adults for specified offenses;
(c) whether a court has the discretion to try a juvenile as an adult, and if so,
what factors ought to be considered; and (d) the cut-off age below which a court
lacks authority to try a juvenile as an adult.
(a) How old must a person be to be prosecuted as an adult in every case?
Forty-six jurisdictions agree that persons who are eighteen years of age or older
are subject to prosecution as an adult for any offense.156 Five minority jurisdictions set the age of majority at seventeen,157 and Nebraska alone sets it at
nineteen (Neb. Rev. St. § 43-245).
(b) Should youths of a certain age, but below the age of maturity, be tried as
adults for certain specified, serious offenses? A twenty-seven-jurisdiction majority agrees that they should. In twenty-four jurisdictions, a person below the
age of eighteen may be charged automatically as an adult for certain specified
serious offenses.158 Although the phrasing of these statutes varies, the resulting
authority is the same in each formulation.159 (While these twenty-four jurisdictions do not themselves make up the twenty-seven needed for a majority
view among the fifty-two jurisdictions, three additional jurisdictions set the
default age of majority for criminal prosecution at seventeen, rather than eighteen, years of age.160 This necessarily includes adult treatment for any offense
specified by another jurisdiction, thus creating of twenty-seven-jurisdiction
majority view on this issue.) To determine the age at which this automatic
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161 The exact average is 14.75 years. Including the three jurisdictions that set the age of majority at 17,
the average is 15.06 years.
162 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
163 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
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treatment is available for the majority formulation, each jurisdiction’s relevant
age was averaged: first, within each jurisdiction that has different ages assigned
to different offenses; and second, combining those internal averages with all
other jurisdictions, resulting in an age rounded to fifteen.161
The offenses for which adult prosecution is authorized are quite diverse,
however, such that no majority rule can be formed on this point. It is
common for jurisdictions to mention: “felonies”; violent crimes such as rape,
assault, or robbery; and crimes involving weapons.
A minority of jurisdictions do not provide for automatic adult criminal
treatment of an actor below the age of majority for any reason. The MPC
seems to agree with this approach by generally providing that the adult criminal
court has no jurisdiction over a sixteen- or seventeen-year old actor. The MPC
does not list any specific offenses for which a juvenile actor may be automatically charged as an adult. See the MPC § 4.10.
(c) Does a court, aside from automatic treatment as an adult for specified
offenses, have discretion to transfer a juvenile below the age of majority (eighteen in the majority formulation above) to criminal court? The majority—
at least thirty-five jurisdictions—allows court discretion in the transfer of
persons from juvenile to criminal court, but requires a hearing to determine
whether transfer should be allowed.162 In at least twenty-eight of these jurisdictions, specific factors or court findings are listed that must be considered
during such hearings.163 The factors contained in the majority formulation above are examples of those mentioned most often, though many jurisdictions leave the determination and weight of relevant factors to judges.
See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g)(10); and Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 192-518(4)(c).
Significantly, nineteen of the thirty-five majority jurisdictions have specific
offense requirements that must be met before a transfer hearing can be held to
determine whether a juvenile of a certain age should be prosecuted as an
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adult.164 This minority view, if incorporated into (1)(c) of the majority formulation above, would read:
(1) . . . if he is:
(c) 14 years old or older and charged with [specific offenses] and the court
determines after a hearing that he should be transferred to a criminal court
for prosecution as an adult.

164 Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
165 The exact average is 14.025 years.
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In congruence with the majority, both the MPC and National Commission
allow for the discretionary transfer of a juvenile actor to adult criminal court,
though with far less operational specificity. The MPC allows for transfer without specifying factors to consider, and the National Commission allows for the
prosecution of an actor under the age of eighteen to “promote justice” (The
MPC § 4.10; and National Commission’s Report § 501).
(d) Below what age does a court lack discretion to transfer a juvenile to
criminal court? Fourteen years—the age in (1)(c) of the majority formulation
above—is the average of every age at which jurisdictions allow transfer to a
criminal court, not including the ages at which adult prosecution is required or
automatic. For example, Hawaii allows for transfer under different circumstances at fourteen and sixteen (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571.22). Thus, fifteen is the
age used to calculate the average. Alabama only allows for transfer to adult
proceedings at age fourteen, so this age was used in the averaging (Ala. Code §
12-15-203). The average for all jurisdictions was approximately fourteen
years.165
Under the majority formulation, persons below fourteen years of age fall
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system and cannot be
criminally prosecuted or convicted for any offense. Jurisdictions either imply
such a cut-off by providing for transfer above a certain age, but not below,
see, e.g., Tex. Family Code Ann. § 54.02, or explicitly prohibiting the criminal
prosecution of juveniles below a certain age. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-301. In either case, the result is the same for the purpose of forming a
majority view. Both the MPC and the National Commission have the
same restriction on adult prosecution of a juvenile, but they specify higher
ages—sixteen and fifteen, respectively—below which prosecution is prohibited.
See, e.g., the MPC § 4.10; and National Commission’s Report § 501.
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2.2.4. §404. Duress.

The majority view of the Duress defense among American jurisdictions might
be stated as follows:
Section 404. Duress.
In a prosecution for an offense other than murder, it is a defense that
the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to
do so by what he reasonably believed was an unlawful threat of
imminent death or severe bodily injury to himself or another. This
defense is not available if the actor culpably placed himself in a
situation where duress was foreseeable.

166 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
167 Alabama, California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
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At least fifty of the fifty-two jurisdictions recognize some type of Duress
defense.166 Their formulations differ, however, regarding a variety of issues,
most significantly whether: (a) to allow a defense for any offense upon coercion
by any “unlawful force”, or to require that the actor be coerced by a particularly
serious threat; (b) the actor must have a “reasonable belief” that his actions were
required under the circumstances; (c) the anticipated threat or harm must be
“imminent”; (d) the defense should be unavailable for specific offenses; (e) the
defense ought to be available when the threat is to a third party, rather than the
actor himself; and (f) an actor can claim duress when responsible for putting
himself in the situation that led to his coercion.
(a) Should the Duress defense be available only upon coercion by a very
serious threat? A twenty-nine-jurisdiction majority takes this demanding approach, championed by the National Commission.167 Only three of these jurisdictions, however—Indiana, North Dakota, and Texas—actually reflect the
full National Commission approach of applying different standards of the defense availability to acts amounting to felonies (requiring threats of “serious
bodily injury”) and acts amounting to non-felonies (requiring threats of “use of
force”). See, e.g., Ind. Code § 35-41-3-8; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-10; Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 8.05; and National Commission’s Report § 610. Most of the
majority jurisdictions, and thus the majority formulation as well, require the
more serious threat before offering a defense to any offense, even a non-felony.
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168 Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah.
169 Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
170 See, e.g., Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
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The remaining minority jurisdictions take one of two approaches to the issue.
First, thirteen adopt a more lenient formulation in which a duress defense is
available when an actor is subject simply to “unlawful force”.168 Some of these
jurisdictions appear to agree with the MPC’s approach, which—although similarly lenient when compared to the majority view—shifts the issue from the
nature of the threat to an objective assessment of the strength of the coerced
actor’s resolve, thus requiring that a “person of reasonable firmness” would not
have been able to resist (The MPC § 2.09(1)). Second, nine minority jurisdictions require that the crime committed be less severe than the harm threatened
to coerce the actor into committing that crime.169 Essentially, these latter jurisdictions treat duress like a lesser evils defense. That is, they define duress in a
way that makes it a justification (the actor did the right thing and avoided a
greater evil) rather than an excuse (the actor did the wrong thing but is judged
blameless nonetheless). In some jurisdictions, this “lesser harm” test is implied;
other jurisdictions overtly require it. Cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-412 (allowing
the duress defense when an actor is subjected to “a threat or use of immediate
physical force against his person or the person of another which resulted or
could result in serious physical injury”. Simultaneously, it asserts, “the defense
provided by subsection A is unavailable for offenses involving homicide or
serious physical injury”. Thus, an actor threatened with serious physical
injury may not commit a crime in response to that threat which results in
the serious physical injury of another. In other words, the actor may not perform an “equal evil” under duress.) with Tugmon v. State, 896 P.2d 342, 345-46
(Ibid. 1995) and State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278 (Conn. 2007).
(b) To receive the Duress defense, must an actor “reasonably believe” that he
or someone else will be harmed unless he carries out a given crime? At least
twenty-seven jurisdictions agree that he must.170 Jurisdictions formulate the
requirement in one of two ways, requiring either a “reasonable belief” in or
“well-grounded apprehension” of the threatened harm. Both formulations
apply an objective standard to determine whether a duress claim applies in
a given situation, making them similar enough to jointly form a majority.
The majority formulation adopts the “reasonably believes” language because,
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171 Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
172 Arizona, District of Columbia, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.
173 Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
174 Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
175 Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
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of the two, it is used most often. None of the remaining jurisdictions require
that an actor’s belief necessarily be reasonable.
(c) Must the threatened harm be “imminent?” At least thirty-nine jurisdictions require that the harm threatened upon the actor not be too far removed in
time from the unlawful act performed in response. Of those thirty-nine, a
twenty-six-jurisdiction majority specifically uses the term “imminent”, either
alone or in conjunction with other terms.171 Therefore, the majority formulation’s temporal requirement takes this form. Thirteen more jurisdictions use
terms like “immediate” and “instant” to describe the threat’s proximity in
time,172 but in practice these terms are interchangeable with “imminent”. A
few jurisdictions use more than one term, which underscores such interchangeability.173 The remaining jurisdictions do not explicitly require a temporal relationship between the criminal conduct and the unlawful threat that coerces it,
theoretically allowing broader use of the Duress defense.
(d) Should the Duress defense be available in prosecutions for all offenses?
Thirty-two jurisdictions exclude the use of duress as a defense for certain,
specified offenses.174 Although exclusions range from “intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] physical injury” to intentional homicide, the only offense that
commands majority exclusion is murder. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 704.10 (“other
than . . . intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] physical injury”); and Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 501.090 (“other than an intentional homicide”). Twenty-nine jurisdictions exclude murder,175 usually under a larger umbrella such as homicide
generally or “offenses punishable by death”. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 26.
Wisconsin and New Jersey do not allow a full duress defense for homicide or
murder, but instead allow mitigation from first- to second-degree intentional
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176 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
177 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and
Federal.
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homicide, or from murder to manslaughter. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.46
(“except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the
degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide”); and
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-9 (“In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only
available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter.”). The remaining
jurisdictions, like the MPC, do not specifically preclude duress as a defense to
any particular crime, although, as a practical matter, its terms will be more
difficult to satisfy in increasingly serious cases.
(e) Should the Duress defense be available if a third person, rather than the
actor himself, is the one under threat? At least twenty-seven jurisdictions embrace a duress defense for third person threats of some sort. At least twenty-four
jurisdictions allow a duress defense if the threat is made toward any third
person.176 Three more jurisdictions make the same concession, but only if
that third person is a spouse, child, or other family member: 720 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 5/7-11; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5206; and Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 156. Since
the greatest number of jurisdictions within the majority supports a defense for
any third person, that version is adopted in the majority formulation.
(f) Should an actor receive a duress defense if he placed himself in the position leading to his coercion? A majority of at least twenty-seven jurisdictions
follow the MPC and National Commission by barring a Duress defense if the
actor, with some specified level of culpability, placed himself in a situation in
which duress was “probable” or “foreseeable” (these terms being used interchangeably).177 These jurisdictions disagree, however, about the specific culpability requirement for the actor putting himself in that position. Some
jurisdictions require intent or recklessness, while others will deny use of
the defense if the actor’s behavior was negligent, particularly where
negligence is sufficient culpability for the crime itself. See, e.g., Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 18-1-708 (requiring intent or recklessness); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. §9a.16.060 (requiring intent or recklessness); Ala. Code § 13A-3-30
(allowing negligence to prohibit the defense when negligence is sufficient culpability for the crime itself); and Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 103-A (allowing
the same). The majority formulation reflects the need for some level of culpability while maintaining this ambiguity concerning the specific requirement.
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2.2.5. §405. Involuntary Act or Omission.

The majority view of the Involuntary Act defense among American jurisdictions
might be stated as follows:
Section 405. Involuntary Act or Omission.

(1) In any prosecution, it is a defense that the defendant’s conduct constituting the offense was involuntary or, in the case of liability for an
omission, that the defendant was not physically capable of performing
the conduct required by the offense.
(2) An act is involuntary if it is not the product of the defendant’s conscious
effort or determination.

178 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
179 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
180 Unlike the majority formulation, the National Commission does not require any sort of “voluntariness” (National Commission’s Report § 301(1)). Only North Dakota follows the National
Commission formulation, requiring only an “act” in violation of the law (N.D. Cent. Code §
12.1-02-01(1)).
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Arguably, a voluntary act is the most fundamental requirement of criminal liability. See the MPC § 2.01, Commentary on Subsection (1). The
Involuntary Act or Omission defense is therefore largely ubiquitous. There
are, however, key areas of difference among American jurisdictions that must
be addressed in constructing this portion of the ACC, namely: (a) the broad
formulation of the defense and whether to include omissions along with acts;
(b) the definitions of “involuntary” or “voluntary” acts or omissions; and
(c) whether specific dysfunctions giving rise to this defense are listed in the
provision.
(a) American jurisdictions broadly agree that an involuntary act should receive a defense to liability. At least forty-two jurisdictions either require a voluntary act as an element of every offense or specify a defense for involuntary
acts.178 Additionally, the majority formulation recognizes liability for an omission only when the actor failed to perform an act of which he is “physically
capable”. Only fifteen jurisdictions explicitly include this language in their formulations179; however, no jurisdiction rejects this requirement, and it may well
be implicit in the requirement of voluntariness.180
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2.2.6. §406. Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law.

The majority view of the Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law defense
among American jurisdictions might be stated as follows:
Section 406. Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law.
A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a
defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct
when the actor reasonably relies upon an official statement of law,
afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

a statute or other enactment;
a judicial decision, opinion or judgment;
an administrative order; or
an official interpretation by the public officer or body charged by
law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or
enforcement of the law defining the offense.

As a general rule, ignorance or mistake of the law is no defense unless it
negates a required offense element. That is, there is typically no general excuse

181 See, e.g., Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, and
Vermont.
182 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.
183 The MPC § 2.01(2). See, e.g., Indiana, Maine, Montana, Ohio, Texas, and Wyoming.

Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on March 16, 2015

(b) Many jurisdictions provide the defense but fail to define what constitutes
involuntary conduct, or a “voluntary” act.181 The majority formulation above
follows the most common definition among those jurisdictions that do define
either “involuntary” or “voluntary” (in which case, “involuntary” is inferred to
be the negative of it).182 The MPC goes further to explicitly include “habitual”
(though unconscious) acts to be “voluntary”; however, only a few jurisdictions
follow its lead. See, e.g., the MPC § 2.01(1)(d); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 243; and
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702-201. Most do not address the issue.
(c) Some jurisdictions follow the MPC in listing specific dysfunctions that are
not to be considered voluntary acts.183 These lists of involuntary actions may
not be exhaustive or exclusive, but they paint a general picture of what might
constitute an involuntary act. These lists commonly are capped with a catch-all
provision, with language similar to that in Subsection (2) of the majority formulation above. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-101(33) (“An ‘involuntary
act’ means an act that is . . . a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product
of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual”).
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for even a reasonable mistake of law. Only one state, New Jersey, provides such a
general excuse:
c. A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a
defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct
when:

However, a majority of American jurisdictions recognize an excuse for someone who reasonably relies upon an official misstatement of law. The arguments
in support of such a rule are not just the blamelessness of the actor, but also—
and perhaps more importantly—estoppel against a government that has
brought about the offense by its own erroneous advice.
A majority of thirty-six jurisdictions, following the MPC, § 2.04(3)(b), recognize a reasonable reliance upon mistake of law defense.184 A minority of
jurisdictions closely follow the MPC by explicitly requiring that the official
misstatement of law be “afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous”.185
We believe this is implicit even when not explicitly stated. Thus, it has been
included in the majority formulation. After all, if the official statement of law is
not actually erroneous, then the actor has not actually committed an offense,
and therefore needs no defense. The majority formulation, therefore, tracks
MPC § 2.04(3)(b).
Although commonly recognizing a defense for reliance upon official misstatement of law, jurisdictions disagree on several issues, namely: (a) what
sources of official misstatement are recognized as giving rise to a defense; (b)
whether to expressly require that the actor have relied upon the misstatement in
good faith; and (c) whether to provide a defense where the mistake arises not
from an official misstatement but because the law has not been published or
otherwise publicly made known.
184 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Federal.
185 The MPC § 2.04(3)(b). See, e.g., Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Missouri, Montana, and New Jersey.
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[. . .]
(3) The actor . . . diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the
meaning and application of the offense to his conduct and honestly
and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in
circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also
so conclude.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-4(c).
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186 The MPC § 2.04(3)(b)(i); Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania.
187 The MPC § 2.04(3)(b)(ii); Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Federal.
188 The MPC § 2.04(3)(b)(iii); Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Federal.
189 The MPC § 2.04(3)(b)(iv); Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
190 Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania.
191 Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, and Rhode Island.
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(a) What legal sources have such authority that their misstatement of law
gives rise to a defense to criminal liability? Most jurisdictions have, either explicitly in their various codes or generally in their case law, adopted some
combination of the four official sources of misstatements recognized in the
MPC. At least twenty-two jurisdictions allow reliance upon statutes186;
twenty-nine allow reliance upon judicial decisions187; twenty-three allow reliance upon administrative orders188; and twenty-six allow reliance upon official
interpretations of law by those legally charged with this duty.189 Fifteen of the
eighteen jurisdictions providing for this defense by statute follow the MPC and
allow reliance on all four of these sources.190 Four additional common law
jurisdictions support all four sources of authority.191
It is likely that these tabulations understate the support for reliance upon
statements from these sources. In the remaining common law jurisdictions that
have failed to address the various sources of authority, it is likely the only reason
these four sources have not been explicitly recognized is that relevant cases
debating their merits have not come up in their court systems. For this
reason, we have relied on the simple majority statutory support and significant
minority common law support for all four sources of authority in including
them in our majority formulation.
(b) Must the actor have relied upon the misstatement of law in “good faith?”
Only twelve jurisdictions, following the National Commission § 609, explicitly
require that the defendant’s belief that the conduct does not constitute a crime
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192 Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Federal.
193 Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, and Montana.
194 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Vermont.
195 In Com. v. Kratsas, 564 Pa. 36, 52 (2001), the court explained, “Some state legislatures, following the
example in Section 2.04(3)(b) of the MPC, have enacted statutes providing for a limited defense
based upon a mistake of law in a manner that parallels the reliance doctrine, affording an elemental
structure and the status of an affirmative defense. In such jurisdictions, it is clear that, even if the
circumstances involving an official misrepresentation are not sufficient to require dismissal of the
prosecution on due process grounds, the defendant would generally be permitted to present them to
the jury in the context of the affirmative defense. However, the availability of a reliance defense on
such terms (independent of constitutional due process principles and constraints) is not so clear in
Pennsylvania—although the General Assembly adopted many provisions of the MPC in enacting
the comprehensive Crimes Code, it declined to adopt Section 2.04(3)(b) or to effectuate any substantial equivalent. Indeed, official commentary reflects the legislative intent that ‘[g]enerally speaking, ignorance or mistake of law is no defense.’ 18 Pa.C.S. § 304 (official comment)” (emphasis
added).
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be in good faith.192 Only two jurisdictions have codified this: N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:2-4(C); and N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-09. Alabama references the need
for good faith in the commentary for Ala. Code § 13A-2-6. But the lack of
codification probably exists because a “good faith” requirement is implicit in
the defense. A “good faith” belief in this instance is a belief that the actor truly
holds—an honest belief. Such a requirement is inherent in the statutory
requirement that a “belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense
is a defense”, as appears in the majority formulation. It is also inherent in the
requirement that the actor’s reliance upon the official statement of law be
“reasonable”. Since neither the MPC nor the majority of jurisdictions thought
it necessary to include redundant “good faith” language, the majority formulation does not include it, either.
(c) Should an actor have a defense where his mistake arises not from relying
upon an official misstatement, but rather because the law has not been published or otherwise made publicly known? The MPC explicitly recognizes such a
basis for defense; however, only two jurisdictions appear to follow the MPC in
recognizing such a defense: The MPC § 2.04(3)(a); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A
§ 36; and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-4. Four others specifically allowing the defense
with regard to administrative regulations or orders, but not statutes.193 A majority of jurisdictions simply do not address the issue, failing to account for it in
either their statutes or case law.194 The Pennsylvania Legislature arguably explicitly declined to adopt such a defense.195 On the contrary, such a defense may
be constitutionally required by notions of due process. See State v. Berberian,
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427 A.2d 1298, 1301 (R.I. 1981); and Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482,
487 (Va. 1997).
2.3 Chapter 5. Other Bars to Liability
2.3.1. §501. All Defenses Defined by Statute.

The majority view among American jurisdictions is that all offenses must be
defined by statute. It might be codified as follows:
Section 501. All Offenses Defined by Statute.
No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation
under this Code or other statute.

196 Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
197 Cf., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal
offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely
creatures of statute.”) and Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 184 (1994) (“There is no federal common law of crimes . . . .”) with Ben Rosenberg. 2002.
The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law. 29 Am. J. Crim. L. 193 (discussing the practical
existence of a Federal criminal common law).
198 Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
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By requiring that all offenses be defined by statute, the provision above
provides a defense for any person whose conduct does not satisfy the elements
of a codified offense. A thirty-four jurisdiction majority supports this requirement in barring judicial creation of offenses. Legislatures in thirty-two jurisdictions have explicitly abolished all common law offenses, recognizing only
those crimes that have been or will be enacted by legislation.196 Arizona has
further abolished all common law affirmative defenses (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-103). Federal courts have affirmed that there is, technically speaking, no
federal criminal common law—though some scholars insist that there is at least
some such body of law in practice.197
An eighteen-jurisdiction minority recognizes common law offenses to the
extent that they have not been explicitly superseded by statute.198 These states
maintain “reception” statutes, which codify the incorporation of common law
offenses without defining them. Some of these reception statutes do not specifically refer to criminal offenses, but simply incorporate the common law in its
entirety, so long as it is not inconsistent with U.S. or state law. See, e.g., Ark.
Code Ann. § 1-2-119. This incorporation necessarily includes the criminal
common law, unless abolished or repealed elsewhere.
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2.3.2. §502. Statute of Limitations.

The majority view of the Statute of Limitations among American jurisdictions
might be stated as follows:
Section 502. Statute of Limitations.

Nearly every jurisdiction recognizes a defense under a statute of limitations.199 Jurisdictions disagree, however, about several of the specific demands
of the defense, including: (a) whether to suspend the statute of limitations for
serious offenses other than murder; (b) the period of limitation that should be
set for most felonies; (c) the period of limitation for other offenses; (d) under
what conditions the limitation period can be extended, and for how long; and
(e) whether to alter the limitation rules under special circumstances.
(a) Should the statute of limitations be suspended for especially egregious
crimes? An overwhelming majority of at least forty-four jurisdictions, following
the MPC, § 1.06(1), and National Commission, § 701(3), have no statute of
limitation for murder.200 These jurisdictions either specifically exempt murder
or exempt a category of crime that necessarily includes murder, such as capital
offenses.
Additionally, at least thirty-seven jurisdictions additionally have no limitation period for one or more crimes other than murder.201 As to what other
199 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Federal, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
200 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Federal.
201 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
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(1) The prosecution of murder [and other specified serious felonies] may
be commenced at any time.
(2) The prosecution of a felony is barred unless commenced within 6 years
of the commission of the offense.
(3) The prosecution of any other offense is barred unless commenced
within 2 years of the commission of the offense.
(4) The period of limitation is extended for any period during which the
defendant is continuously absent from the State or has no reasonably
ascertainable place of abode or work within the State.
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Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Federal.
202 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York,
Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont.
203 See, e.g., Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont.
204 See, e.g., Alabama, Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
205 See, e.g., Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, and Mississippi.
206 See, e.g., Alaska, Arizona, Mississippi, Texas, and Vermont.
207 See, e.g., Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi, and Nebraska.
208 See, e.g., Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, and Nevada.
209 See, e.g., Idaho, New York, and Rhode Island.
210 See, e.g., Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, and Vermont.
211 See, e.g., Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
212 Arizona, Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
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serious felonies should have this exemption, these jurisdictions disagree. The
bracketed text in the majority formulation (“and other specified serious
felonies”) is included to acknowledge this situation. The most common offenses
additionally exempted include: sexual abuse of a minor,202 sexual assault
generally,203 arson,204 child pornography,205 human trafficking,206 forgery,207
terrorism,208 rape,209 kidnapping,210 and drug trafficking. See, e.g., Ala. Code
§ 15-3-1; and R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-12-17. The MPC does not provide for
exemption of offenses other than murder. See the MPC § 1.06(1).
(b) What should be the limitation period for felonies? The majority formulation above imposes a six-year limitation period for felonies. This represents
the average limitation period for felonies (other than those exempt, such as
murder, as discussed above) of all American jurisdictions. (The average is actually 6.15 years, rounded down to 6—all jurisdictions express the limitation
period in whole years.) However, this average is not quite as simple a measure as
one might like.
Some jurisdictions break felonies into two or more subclasses, each with a
different limitation period.211 The MPC, for example, recognizes two felony
classes distinguished by degree, with limitation periods of six and three years.
The MPC § 1.06(2)(a)-(b). However, most jurisdictions—at least twentyeight—treat felonies generally as a single class,212 though many list several exceptions to the general category. See, e.g., Ariz. Code § 13-107. For example, the
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213 See, e.g., Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
214 Though some jurisdictions express their sub-felony limits in months, rather than years, most do
not, and 2.27 is close enough to two that rounding down is appropriate.
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National Commission sets a general limit of five years for felonies, but separates
out a small group of treason- and corruption-related felonies for a ten-year
limit (National Commission’s Report § 701(2)(a)–(b), (4)). (Jurisdictions do
not consistently exclude the same crimes, however, so these exceptions are
ignored for the purpose of the majority rule.) Among the jurisdictions that
break felonies into two or more classes, the average of those different classifications within the jurisdiction was used to compute an average for that jurisdiction and it was this average that was used for the jurisdiction in the averaging
done to reach the figure in the majority formulation.
(c) What should be the limitation period for lesser crimes than felonies?
Nearly every jurisdiction describes one or more categories of crimes that are
less serious than felonies—for example, misdemeanors and/or petty offenses—
and assigns a shorter limitation period to these grades of offenses.213 A majority
of these jurisdictions have a single statute of limitations for all such subfelonies. A minority of these jurisdictions provides a different limitation
period for their different sub-felony classes, but there is little agreement as to
the grading distinctions between them.
For the purposes of the majority calculation for sub-felony limitation period,
where a jurisdiction had more than one sub-felony limitation period, the subfelony periods were averaged to give a figure for that jurisdiction. This was used
in averaging all jurisdictions’ sub-felony limitation periods to reach an overall
average of 2.27 years, rounded down to 2 years for the majority formulation
limit for sub-felonies.214 (As with felonies, the MPC diverges from the majority
formulation by dividing sub-felony crimes into misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors, with limitation periods of three years and six months, respectively
(The MPC § 1.06(2)(c)-(d)). The National Commission aligns with the majority view in treating all sub-felony crimes as a single class, with a three-year
limitation period (National Commission’s Report § 701(2)(c)).
(d) Under what circumstances, and for how long, can the limitation period
be extended? Commonly referred to as “tolling”, jurisdictions take many
different approaches to this question. The only circumstance commanding a
majority of jurisdictions is tolling the limitation period where the accused is a
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215 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Federal.
216 See, e.g., Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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“fugitive from justice”. Thirty jurisdictions follow this rule.215 Some jurisdictions explicitly require the accused to be outside its borders, while others toll in
any case where the accused is somehow evading prosecution. See, e.g., N.Y.
Penal Law § 30.10(4)(a)(i) (requiring the accused to be outside its borders to
toll the limitations period); and Ind. Code § 35-41-4-2(h)(1)–(2) (allowing
tolling where the accused is evading prosecution).
The shared concept is to toll the limitation period when the accused is unavailable for prosecution, but there is significant disagreement regarding how
this provision should function. With this level of disagreement, no single wording could accurately describe the approach used by a majority of jurisdictions.
Instead, the majority formulation is stated narrowly. This ensures that the
described conduct will toll the statute of limitations in a majority of jurisdictions, even if other related conduct would also be sufficient in many.
Jurisdictions also disagree about the maximum number of years the tolling
mechanism can add to the limitation period. At least twenty-eight jurisdictions
allow the clock to toll indefinitely, at least when the defendant is not located
within the state.216 Some jurisdictions limit this period to a certain number of
years. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-109; and Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.14.
In contrast, MPC section 1.06(3) tolls in specific cases—where fraud or
breach of fiduciary duty is a material element, or for misconduct by anyone
holding public office—for a maximum of three years. Only a handful of states
follow the MPC by addressing these specific tolling instances. See, e.g., Ind.
Code § 31-4-2(h)(3); and Iowa Code Ann. §§ 802.5, 802.6. Section 1.06(4) of
the MPC describes when the limitation period actually begins, and section
1.06(5) defines what it means for prosecution to commence. Both of these
more technical sections were left out of the majority formulation due to the
lack of similar provisions in the majority of jurisdictions. On the contrary,
many jurisdictions, if not most, may reach similar results through uncodified
rules or common practice.
Finally, section 1.06(6)(b) of the MPC includes another tolling circumstance
in addition to the “fugitive from justice” rule: for any time when the accused is
being prosecuted for the same conduct. Only thirteen jurisdictions follow the
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2.3.3. §503. Entrapment.

The majority view of the Entrapment defense among American jurisdictions
might be stated as follows:
Section 503. Entrapment.
A person has a defense to an offense if:
(1) he was induced to commit it by a public law enforcement official, or a
person acting in cooperation with such an official, for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of the commission of the offense; however,
(2) the defense is unavailable if the person was predisposed to commit the
offense and the public law enforcement official, or agent of such, merely
afforded the person an opportunity to commit the offense.

All fifty-two jurisdictions recognize an entrapment defense by statute or case
law in one form or another, typically when a person commits an offense because

217 Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
218 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Federal.
219 See, e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York,
Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont.
220 See, e.g., Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, and Federal.
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MPC in codifying this condition,217 but presumably it is the standard practice.
Any other rule would bar retrial after reversal on appeal if the limitation period
had ended in the meantime, which it commonly does.
(e) Should the basic limitation rules change under special circumstances?
There is no majority support for any particular special circumstance, but two
are common enough to warrant mention. First, fifteen jurisdictions modify
their basic rules for crimes against minors.218 The exact modifications vary
greatly, however, so these jurisdictions can only be loosely considered one
group. The largest group provides that there is no statute of limitation for
“sexual abuse of a minor”, as mentioned in (a) above.219 Second, at least thirteen jurisdictions alter their statute of limitations when DNA evidence later
surfaces linking the accused to the crime.220 Some jurisdictions limit their DNA
rule to sexual crimes, whereas others allow DNA evidence to prolong the limitation period for any offense. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 802 (limiting DNA rule to
sexual crimes); and Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-109 (allowing DNA evidence to
prolong the limitations period for any defense).
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221 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Federal.
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a law enforcement officer or his agent improperly provided the opportunity to
do so to gain evidence for its prosecution.221 Jurisdictions differ greatly, however, both on the broad policies justifying such a defense as well as on the
specific language used to give these policies content.
The most fundamental split between jurisdictions is over the proper focus of
the defense. Should an entrapment defense be based purely on an assessment of
the propriety of the police conduct in response to which the person committed
the offense, without regard for the actor’s own inclination toward committing
that offense? Under this approach (called an “objective” or “police misconduct”
formulation), even a career criminal can get the defense if the police acts improperly. This approach ignores what effect the entrapping conduct had or did
not have on the defendant; it only cares about the propriety of what the police
did. Or, alternatively, should the defense be limited to cases where police induce
persons who are not already predisposed to commit the offense? Under this
approach (called the “subjective” or “predisposition” formulation), a person
predisposed to commit the offense cannot invoke the Entrapment defense.
Note that even the latter, subjective formulation is not an excuse defense.
That is, the Entrapment defense is available even though the person was not
induced to commit the offense by such pressure as would entitle the defendant
to a duress excuse. Rather, the actor has simply been presented with a temptation that he has chosen to act on. The underlying rationale for the defense is not
the actor’s blamelessness, but rather objection to police overreaching by creating improper temptations, then prosecuting persons who give in to them. The
basis for the defense is rooted in principles of limitation on governmental
intrusion in private lives and in notions of collateral estoppel. (That is why
this defense is included in Chapter 5 of the code, among the nonexculpatory
defenses.) The nonexculpatory rationale is more obvious in the objective formulation, in which even career criminals looking for the opportunity to
commit the offense can get the defense if the police overreach. The subjective
formulation is different only in that it is formulated to limit the price we are
willing to pay to rein in police overreach: we are not willing to let predisposed
offenders go free. Notice, for example, that even under the subjective formulation an actor committing an offense induced by a private party has no defense
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222 Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
223 Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
224 See, e.g., Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
225 See, e.g., Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, and Minnesota.
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whatever, even if the inducing conduct is identical to that which would give an
entrapment defense if performed by the police.
The question of (a) whether to take the subjective or objective approach to
entrapment is the most significant disagreement among American jurisdictions.
Beyond that, however, there are disagreements about a variety of other issues,
such as: (b) how to define “predisposition”; (c) who can commit an improper
entrapment; (d) whether to explicitly require that law enforcement’s inducement be for the purpose of prosecution; (e) what behavior on the part of law
enforcement constitutes an improper entrapment; and (f) whether there should
be an exception to the defense for violent crimes.
(a) Which approach to entrapment predominates—subjective or objective? A
majority of thirty-one jurisdictions take the subjective, predisposition approach.222 A minority uses the objective formulation, following the MPC and
National Commission: The MPC § 2.13(1); and National Commission’s Report
§ 702(2). The majority of jurisdictions use different language to capture the
importance of the actor’s inward preparedness to commit a crime, but all require some sort of inducement or persuasion by law enforcement toward a
person who would not normally behave as they did.
Thirty-one jurisdictions include additional statements intended to clarify the
relevant standard that do not change its basic meaning. Twenty-nine use language noting that merely affording an opportunity for offense commission does
not establish entrapment.223 Other jurisdictions provide that the criminal
design must originate with the entrapper, who “implants” it in the mind of
the defendant.224 Some jurisdictions include both of these types of provisions.225 Since a majority embraces some clarifying statement, the most
common “merely affording an opportunity” language is incorporated in the
ACC formulation above.
(b) What does it mean for an actor to be “predisposed” toward criminal
conduct? This question is crucial because the predisposition requirement is at
the heart of the subjective formulation. See State v. Vallejos, 123 N.M. 739, 741
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226 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
227 See, e.g., People v. Watson, 22 Cal.4th 220, 223 (2000).
228 Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and
Wisconsin.
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(1997) (“the focal issue is ‘the intent or predisposition of the defendant to
commit the crime’ ”). Its key feature is that it considers only the accused and
not whether the inducement would have encouraged the average person.
Though jurisdictions explain this requirement in a variety of ways, the only
significant difference between the approaches is the level of generality used to
describe what the accused was predisposed to do. Some jurisdictions describe it
broadly—that is, that the accused cannot have been predisposed to engage in
“conduct of the sort induced”. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-709. This
language immediately presents the problem of deciding precisely what conduct
is of that “sort”. Consider a person who was predisposed to sell marijuana but
was not predisposed to sell prescription drugs until the idea of selling prescription drugs was introduced to him by a police officer. In this scenario, the
broader “conduct of the sort induced” might (or might not, depending on
how it is applied) prevent the accused from claiming the defense, whereas a
more narrow requirement that the accused be predisposed to commit the specific criminal conduct that was committed might be more likely to entitle him
to a defense. No more than a few jurisdictions use any particular version of this
generality aspect, so broad language has been adopted in the majority formulation. This way, the majority jurisdictions would all agree to at least this limited
an application of the Entrapment defense.
(c) Who can commit an improper entrapment? A thirty-five-jurisdiction
majority explicitly indicates that the person committing the entrapment must
be acting as an agent for, or working with, law enforcement.226 Jurisdictions use
a variety of terms to describe this class. Some refer to “the police or their
agents”,227 whereas others refer to “a public law enforcement official or a
person acting in cooperation with such an official”. See, e.g., People v.
Watson, 22 Cal.4th 220, 223 (2000); and Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.81.450.
(d) Must law enforcement act with a particular kind of purpose to commit
entrapment? A bare majority—twenty-seven jurisdictions—requires that the
entrapping behavior be done with the purpose of using the criminal justice
system against the actor in some way.228 Jurisdictions use slightly different
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229 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, Vermont, and Washington.
230 The MPC § 2.13(3). See, e.g., Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Utah.
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language to describe this requirement. For example, some jurisdictions require
officers to act “in order to obtain evidence of the commission of an offense”.
See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.81.450. Others require that the entrapping
conduct be done for the “mere purpose of instituting criminal proceedings”.
See, e.g., State v. Nelsen, 228 N.W.2d 143, 146 (S.D. 1975).
(e) What behavior must law enforcement perform to commit an improper
entrapment? Thirty jurisdictions describe the basic “entrapping” behavior as an
“inducement”,229 or use additional terms generally illustrating the same concept, rather than recognizing specific qualifying behavior. For example,
Alabama holds that “[e]ntrapment occurs when State officers or persons
under their control, incite, induce, lure, or instigate a person into committing
a criminal offense, which that person would not have otherwise committed,
and had no intention of committing” (Johnson v. State, 285 So.2d 723, 724
(Ala. 1973)).
MPC section 2.13(1)(a), allowing an entrapment defense when the actor’s
conduct was based on false representations by law enforcement, is not included
in the majority formulation because only a small minority of jurisdictions adopt
this rule. See, e.g., U.S. v. Schafer, 625 F.3d 629, 637 (2010); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 702-237; and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-12; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 313. This is
analogous in some ways to the defense of Reliance Upon Official Misstatement
of Law—outlined in section 406 above. In both instances, a government official
is telling the defendant that the conduct at issue is not a crime, then the criminal
justice system seeks to prosecute him for it. But under section 406, the actor
must reasonably rely upon this misstatement. The entrapment defense’s foundation, in contrast, is not the actor’s blamelessness, therefore, the MPC’s objective entrapment defense is available even if the offender never believed the
undercover agent’s claim of the lawfulness of the conduct since such attempts to
mislead are improper and the defense exists to deter such conduct.
(f) Should the Entrapment defense be available for violent offenses? Only a
handful of jurisdictions follow the MPC in providing such an exception,230 but
this is likely because few jurisdictions have had occasion to adjudicate cases
where police entrapped someone into committing a violent offense. No jurisdiction explicitly embraces an entrapment defense for violent offenses, except
perhaps South Dakota. See State v. Huber, 356 N.W.2d 468 (S.D. 1984). But
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without authority, we do not include this limitation in the majority
formulation.
One last issue deserves discussion. Subsequent to the enactment of many of
the state entrapment statutes, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a due processbased defense apart from an entrapment defense, for especially egregious forms of
police inducement. In United States v. Russell, a case involving a drug manufacturing conviction despite an entrapment instruction, Justice Rehnquist alluded to
this due-process defense in his “some day” dicta, saying, “[W]e may some day be
presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction” (411 U.S. 423, 431–32
(1973)). He went on to clarify that the case before the Court did not meet this
description. While Rehnquist later attempted to repudiate his earlier dicta in a
subsequent case, a plurality of justices in that same case suggested that the defense
would be cognizable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Hampton
v. U.S., 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976)). Lower courts have overwhelmingly accepted
this “outrageous government conduct” defense as a valid exercise of substantive
due process. See, e.g., U.S. v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d. Cir. 1978); and U.S. v.
Bogart, 783 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986); but see U.S. v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420
(6th Cir. 1994) (refusing to accept an “outrageous government conduct” defense
with regard to substantive due process).
State v. Lively provides one example (921 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1996)). Lively
was charged and convicted of delivering cocaine. At trial, the court rejected the
entrapment defense, as she was not induced to commit a crime that she would
not otherwise have committed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington
reversed, holding that although Lively failed to prove an entrapment defense,
the government’s conduct of soliciting Lively in her vulnerable and emotional
state was so outrageous as to violate due process.
Because the due process defense and the objective entrapment formulation
both focus on the nature of the police misconduct, independent of the offender’s predisposition, the two defenses are easily confused and are somewhat
redundant. In State v. Knight, for example, the West Virginia Supreme Court
incorporated a consideration of unconscionable police conduct into the state’s
entrapment defense (230 S.E.2d 732, 736-37 (W.Va. 1976)). Shortly thereafter,
however, the court overruled itself, putting forth that there should be a separate
and distinct defense, other than entrapment, for a criminal defendant subjected
to police or government agent misconduct (State v. Houston, 475 S.E.2d 307,
318-19 (W. Va. 1996)). If the Constitution in fact already bars liability for
conduct induced by improper police entrapment, it is worth considering
whether a separate entrapment defense remains necessary in the particular
form it now takes.
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3. DOCTRINAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS: UNCOVERING
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG JURISDICTIONS AND DEFENSES

231 For a more comprehensive explanation on the creation and analysis of such variables, see Section
3.2.1.
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Is there a way to use the findings reported in the preceding section to uncover
previously unexplored patterns and correlations pertaining to criminal law
defenses? As suggested in the introduction to this article, Doctrinal
Correlation Analysis (DCA) is a versatile framework that can examine a
broad spectrum of correlations, ranging from general patterns across the surveyed defenses to relationships between specific doctrines.
The DCA framework, developed and employed by one of the authors’ in a
previous work, contains two main analytical components. The first is the internal aspect, which looks into correlations between the criminal law doctrines
among the various jurisdictions. The second is the external aspect, which examines correlations between these doctrines and variables outside the realm of criminal law, such as demographic qualities and certain statistical data on crime
rates in the various jurisdictions. (Robinson 2014).
The specific criminal law doctrines surveyed in the preceding section serve as
the basis for both the internal and external aspect of the DCA. Importantly,
however, DCA can be conducted on various levels of generality pertaining to
such doctrines, ranging from correlations between two or more issues on which
jurisdictions disagree within a particular defense, through comparison of similar issues in distinct defenses (such as the nature of the required cognitive
dysfunction in the insanity and the involuntary intoxication defenses) between
jurisdictions. Moreover, the surveyed criminal law doctrines can serve as the
building blocks for constructing complex, multifactorial variables such as jurisdictions’ “strictness” in granting criminal law defenses, and DCA can be conducted, in turn, on these constructed variables, in order to analyze even broader
patterns related to jurisdictions’ approaches to specific defenses or classes of
defenses.231
In what follows, we will illustrate the usefulness of DCA by suggesting preliminary answers to certain important questions, such as: “What is the relationship between jurisdictions’ views on different contested issues within a
particular defense?”; “Are jurisdictions consistently strict or lenient in granting
criminal law defenses?”; and “Do states’ characteristics—such as violent crime
rate, racial composition, or population size—bear on the former questions, and
to what extent?”
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232 Specifically, for each jurisdiction we obtained and used the following “statistical” parameters: (1)
population size; (2) racial composition of the population; (3) the quotient between urban and rural
population; (4) violent crime rate; and (5) gun ownership rate. Citations to each appear in notes to
the analysis below.

Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on March 16, 2015

Before delving into the analysis, however, a methodological note and an important caveat regarding the purpose of this section are in order. Aside from the
findings reported in the previous section, this section relies on certain statistical
data related to the aforementioned characteristics of jurisdictions—specifically,
crime rates and demographic qualities. We obtained this data from the
U.S. Census website and additional reliable sources.232 Nevertheless, since the figures were obtained from different data sets representing different data collection
methodologies, their approximation of the “real world” is not uniform—which,
naturally, affects our findings. Moreover, as a general matter, a temporal misalliance exists between the (relatively) contemporary statistical data we collected
on jurisdictions and these jurisdictions’ positions on criminal law defenses.
For example, our findings in the previous section represent the present view of
each jurisdiction on an issue—such as the duty to retreat in Defense of
Persons—which is appropriate to compare to a jurisdictions’ present or recent
violent crime rates, but it is also true that some jurisdictions may have initially
adopted their views on this issue in the early 1970s.
This brings us to the aforementioned caveat. Naturally, more sophisticated
methods might more fully substantiate our data, enhance their temporal alignment, and improve the quality of the findings presented below. These, however,
are not necessary for the purposes of this section. Our analysis below is not
intended to guide legislative reform, and it is neither comprehensive nor conclusive on any of the issues we address. Rather, its main purpose is to illustrate
the kinds of correlations that can be explored and the kinds of patterns that can
be uncovered using DCA. Although we suggest preliminary answers to the
questions raised above, our goal in this section is not to provide such answers,
but rather to set an agenda for further research.
To illustrate the possibilities of DCA, we will first present several correlations
pertaining to two specific issues on which jurisdictions disagree within Defense
of Persons and the correlations between them. We will then explore the broader
patterns related to all of the issues on which jurisdictions disagree within
Defense of Persons. Our caveat notwithstanding, and as demonstrated below,
DCA yields intriguing, and at times counter-intuitive, findings.
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3.1 Correlations Between Jurisdictions’ Disagreement: Duty to Retreat and Resisting
Unlawful Arrest
3.1.1. General Patterns

3.1.2 Specific Patterns and Correlations

Although the discussion above focuses on patterns pertaining to U.S. jurisdictions in general, we were also interested in what DCA could reveal about the
specific jurisdictions adopting a particular approach to the duty to retreat and
right to resist unlawful arrest. We suspected that jurisdictions’ approaches to
these issues might correlate with some of what one might call their “statistical”
characteristics, such as rates of gun ownership, racial composition, and the
quotient between urban and rural populations.
As we suspected, some correlation exists between a jurisdiction’s imposition of
a duty to retreat and characteristics such as its percentages of urban population
233 We suspected that whether a jurisdiction tends to adopt a strict or lenient approach to Defense of
Persons might mediate such correlation. We explore the strictness–leniency continuum in Section 3.2.1.
234 Thirteen out of sixteen jurisdictions adopt such an approach.
235 Sixteen out of nineteen jurisdictions adopt such an approach.
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What is the relationship between a jurisdiction’s view on the duty to retreat
prior to the use of force and its view on the right to use force to resist unlawful
arrest? One might assume that a jurisdiction is likely to exhibit some consistency with regard to its view on these two contested Defense of Persons issues.
That is one might expect that a jurisdiction’s choice to impose a duty to retreat
would correlate with a choice to bar resistance to unlawful arrest, and vice versa.
To explore this question, we relied on our findings in section 303 above.
For each jurisdiction, we coded whether, for the purposes of granting a Defense
of Persons justification, it imposes a duty to retreat from unlawful aggression
before using deadly force and whether it recognizes a right to resist unlawful
arrest. Table 1 below details our findings.
As expected, the majority of jurisdictions are consistent in their approaches
to both issues (as can be observed in the upper-left and lower-right cells of
Table 1, marked in light gray).233 Moreover, consider the upper-right cell,
representing the only three jurisdictions allowing resistance to unlawful arrest
while imposing a duty to retreat. This cell reveals a significant asymmetry within
the jurisdictions with inconsistent approaches to both issues and highlights an
interesting relationship between them. By knowing that a jurisdiction recognizes a right to resist unlawful arrest, we have at least 80 percent certainty that it
also imposes no duty to retreat.234 Similarly, by knowing that a jurisdiction
imposes a duty to retreat, we have at least 84 percent certainty that it does not
recognize the right to resist unlawful arrest.235
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Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest vs Duty to Retreat

No Duty to Retreat

Duty to Retreat

Right to Resist Unlawful
Arresta

AL, GA, LA, MI, MS,
NV, OK, SC, TN, VA,
WA, WV, FED

MD, NC, OH

No Right to Resist
Unlawful Arrest

AK, AZ, CA, CO, DC, FL,
ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, MT,
NH, NM, OR, SD, TX,
VT, UT, WI

AR, CT, DE, HI, IA, ME,
MA, MN, MO, NE, NJ,
NY, ND, PA, RI, WY

and gun ownership. For instance, among the nineteen jurisdictions imposing a
duty to retreat,236 eight are those in which the urban population is below the U.S.
average (74.1 percent),237 and eight are jurisdictions in which the gun ownership
rate is above the U.S. average (36.99 percent).238 At this point, however, it is
important to note that not every correlation is meaningful. In fact, correlations
with gun ownership rate (other than in the present example) consistently yielded
weaker findings than correlations with other characteristics we examined.
For assessing our findings we used the following simple method exemplified
by the current case: since in twenty-nine among the fifty-two U.S. jurisdictions
the gun ownership rate is above average, a corresponding proportion (29/52) of
such jurisdictions can be expected to exist in any random group of jurisdictions
as a matter of chance. Consequently, in a group of the nineteen jurisdictions
imposing a duty to retreat, we might expect some to be also jurisdictions in
which the gun ownership rate is above average. Specifically, we might expect
10.6 such jurisdictions ((29/52)*19 ¼ 10.6). Nevertheless, we observe only eight
236 Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Wyoming.
237 Arkansas, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Wyoming. See
U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Decennial Census: Urban Areas. http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid¼DEC_10_113_P2&prodType¼table (last visited August
15, 2014).
238 Arkansas, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Wyoming. See
Gun Ownership by State, The Washington Post (May 30, 2006). http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/health/interactives/guns/ownership.html.
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a. The Federal jurisdiction imposes no uniform duty to resist unlawful arrest; the situation
in the Federal jurisdiction may vary by circuit. See U.S. v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1992). Therefore, it appears in both cells pertaining to such right (representing Federal
jurisdiction’s view not to impose a duty to retreat).
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239 Due to specific nature of our data on criminal law doctrines, it is uncertain whether using standard
methods for statistical analysis such as Analysis of Variance, which, inter alia, rely on certain assumptions that might not hold for such data, is appropriate. Admittedly, the alternative method of
assessment we use is somewhat crude and may be improved upon by using more sophisticated
statistical analyses. Nevertheless, we believe this method is suitable for our present purposes, which
are not to reveal statistically significant findings, but rather to exemplify DCA’s potential and outline
interesting paths for future research.
240 We created this division using the U.S. Census data on “Race”, which included data on “Black or
African American” population, and the U.S. Census website map creating tool, employing the
“natural breaks” classing method which “identifies groupings that naturally exist in the data”.
See U.S. Census Bureau, ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates 2008–2012. http://factfinder2.
census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid¼ACS_12_5YR_DP05&prodType¼
table and http://factfinder.census.gov/help/en/changing_data_classes_help.htm.
241 As mentioned in note a to Table 1 above, with regard to the right to resist unlawful arrest, the
situation in the federal jurisdiction may vary by circuit. Thus, for the purpose of the current
analysis, the federal jurisdiction is excluded.
242 Washington and West Virginia.
243 Ohio, Oklahoma, and Nevada.
244 Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia.
245 Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia.
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jurisdictions with both characteristics. Thus, the expected number of jurisdictions is different from the observed by 2.6 jurisdiction, representing approximately 25 percent difference from “chance” findings (2.6/10.6 ¼ 25%).239
Note that all findings presented in the text from this point on are different
from “chance” findings by more than approximately 15 percent.
A more intriguing correlation, however, exists between the right to resist
unlawful arrest and the racial composition of a jurisdiction’s population.
Using the U.S. Census data and website, we divided U.S. jurisdictions into
four groups according to the percentage of their total population that is
Black or African American.240 We found that among the fifteen jurisdictions
adopting the right to resist unlawful arrest,241 only two are those in which the
Black or African American population is 0.5–5.1 percent (first group) of the
total,242 and only three are those in which it makes up 5.8–12.2 percent (second
group).243 The remaining ten jurisdictions have Black or African American
percentages of their total populations that are higher than 13.5 percent (third
and fourth groups). Viewed a different way, these data reveal that among the
seventeen jurisdictions with Black or African American population percentages
higher than 13.5 percent,244 ten adopt the right to resist unlawful arrest.245 See
Figure 1 for a graphic representation of this data.
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Black or African American Representation vs Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest.

Black or African American Representation

Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest
Source (Map): U.S. Census Bureau; (Data): Section 2.1.3. (h) supra.

In addition, among the fifteen jurisdictions adopting the right to resist unlawful arrest, all but Nevada are in the lower three quartiles246 of the urban
population percentage.247 Viewing the data another way, observe that among
the sixteen most urban jurisdictions (in which the urban populations consists of
84.7–100 percent of the total populations), only Nevada allows an actor to resist
unlawful arrest. In addition, among the fifteen jurisdictions adopting the right
to resist unlawful arrest, ten have gun ownership percentages above the U.S.
average (36.99 percent).248
The discussion above involves correlations of jurisdictions’ characteristics
with the right to resist unlawful arrest and the duty to retreat as separate doctrines. However, the interactions between the right to resist unlawful arrest and
the duty to retreat (represented by the cells of Table 1 above), when compared
to jurisdictions’ crime and demographic characteristics, also yield several interesting findings.
First, some correlation exists between jurisdictions allowing resistance to
unlawful arrest while imposing no duty to retreat (upper-left cell of Table 1
above) and their respective percentages of gun ownership. Specifically, all of the

246 Seven of these (Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington) still have
urban populations above the U.S. average (74.1 percent).
247 We used U.S. Census data for the urban/rural division (see, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid¼DEC_10_113_P2&prodType¼table). The percentage
of urban population in U.S. jurisdictions runs the gamut from 38.66 percent (Maine) to 100 percent
(District of Columbia). Therefore, we divided the jurisdictions to four groups with equal intervals
(of 15.35 percent) between them.
248 Oklahoma, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee,
West Virginia, and Michigan.
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Source (Map and Data): U.S. Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American
Community Survey
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249 See Gun Ownership by State, The Washington Post (May 30, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/health/interactives/guns/ownership.html. Additionally, in eight of such jurisdictions
the percentage of the Black or African American population is higher than 13.5 percent.
Nevertheless, this finding is fully accounted for by the right to resist unlawful arrest and does not
appear to result from an interaction between such right and a duty to retreat. See text accompanying
notes 240–245.
250 For this division, we divided the U.S. census data using the “natural breaks” classing method. See
supra note 240, for a more detailed explanation.
251 Arkansas, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See
U.S. Census Bureau, ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates 2008-2012. http://factfinder2.census.
gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid¼ACS_12_5YR_DP05&prodType¼table.
252 Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming. See ibid.
253 See text accompanying notes 246 and 247.
254 See text accompanying notes 237.
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thirteen jurisdictions adopting such an approach are in the third (33.4–44.4
percent) and fourth (47.7–59.7 percent) quartiles of gun ownership rate in the
population.249
Second, and perhaps more intriguing, is the correlation between jurisdictions
allowing no right to resist unlawful arrest while imposing a duty to retreat
(lower right cell of Table 1) and the percentage of their total populations that
are white.250 Here, as before, we divided U.S. jurisdictions into four groups
according to the white population percentage in each. Among the sixteen jurisdictions allowing no right to resist unlawful arrest while imposing a duty to
retreat, twelve have white population percentages in the upper two groups:
seven are in the third group (76.5–86 percent),251 and five are in the fourth
(87.2–95.3 percent).252
What do the specific correlations examined in this part tell us? Though we are
not in a position to offer any definitive conclusions, our findings suggest several
hypotheses and promising directions of further exploration.
For instance, it appears that a more urban population suggests a more restrictive view in permitting resistance to unlawful arrest.253 One might speculate that the reasons underlying this phenomenon are an increased danger to
bystanders from the use of force in densely populated urban environment, or
alternatively better training of law enforcement officials along with timely accessibility to legal institutions in urban settings (whether real or perceived),
which might be seen as decreasing the burdens associated with unlawful arrests.
According to the former hypothesis, however, one might also expect a correlation between an increase in urban population and the imposition of a duty
to retreat, while our findings, if anything, imply the opposite.254 Conversely, the
latter hypothesis appears to be more plausible due to its differential import on
the duty to retreat and the right to resist unlawful arrest.
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3.2 Correlations Between Jurisdictions’ Disagreement: Defense of Persons
3.2.1. General Patterns and the Strictness-Leniency Continuum

So far, we have explored several correlations between two specific issues on
which jurisdictions disagree within Defense of Persons. Such an examination
can indeed reveal interesting correlations; however, it is somewhat limited by
the specific issues under consideration. Moreover, it is unclear whether jurisdictions’ views on these specific issues are consistent with their views to other
255 See text accompanying notes 244 and 245.
256 See text accompanying, and immediately following note 243.
257 See text accompanying notes 250–252.
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Another, and perhaps more intriguing finding, is the correlation between a
jurisdiction’s racial composition and its view on the issues under consideration.
Recall that a majority of jurisdictions with a relatively high percentage of Black
or AfricanAmerican population adopt the right to resist unlawful arrest255 and
two-thirds of the jurisdictions adopting such a right are those with a relatively
high percentage of Black or African American population.256 It may be that the
reasons underlying this phenomenon are a combination of an increased (real or
perceived) amount of improper law enforcement practices (due to racial profiling or similar methods) in these jurisdictions, along with a greater Black or
African American populations’ political influence and public sensitivity to such
practices. These, in turn, increase the chances for an appropriate case to spark
public attention to the issue and impact criminal legislation. (Robinson 2014,
pp. 15, 19).
Interestingly, this hypothesis is also partially substantiated by a contrasting
finding: three-fourths of the jurisdictions allowing no right to resist unlawful
arrest (while also imposing a duty to retreat) are those with a relatively high
white population percentage. These are jurisdictions in which the chances for
an appropriate case to catch public attention and impact legislation are naturally reduced.257
The discussion above does not exhaust the inferences that may be drawn
from our findings in this section. Neither is it conclusive for the particular
phenomena discussed. Which are the precise reasons underlying these phenomena? The purpose of this discussion is not to answer this question. It is rather to
illustrate the potential of DCA as a method enabling researchers to uncover
these phenomena in the first place, form the appropriate questions, and evaluate hypotheses in light of the findings. Such potential will be further elucidated
in the next section.
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258 Among the nine issues discussed in section 303, issue (a), “What constitutes the ‘unlawful force’ that
triggers a right to use defensive force?” does not lend itself to the strictness–leniency analysis in this
section due to both the lack of explicit statutory definitions referring to this issue and apparent
general agreement on this point. Thus, it is excluded from the analysis—as is issue (g), “What legal
effect does mutual combat have upon the right of self-defense?” The reason for this second exclusion
is that at least fifty-one jurisdictions take a strict position of not recognizing a right to regain the
defense. Although the differences between jurisdictions’ approaches on this issue are interesting and
merit presentation, we exclude it from the present analysis to avoid tilting the result toward the strict
end of the strictness–leniency continuum.
259 The division into strict, intermediate, or lenient pertains to the approaches jurisdictions take within
each issue under consideration. We make no claims as to the relative strictness of the positions
between the issues under consideration.
260 The strict view gains a majority for issue (d) by adding the strict and intermediate-strict approaches
together.
261 The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that our presentation of this
issue in a previous draft required clarification.
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Defense of Persons issues or happen to represent an issue-specific idiosyncrasy.
Can broader patterns be uncovered?
Yes. Relying on the comprehensive research into each Defense of Persons
issue on which jurisdictions disagree (reported at length in section 303), we can
explore, for instance, whether jurisdictions are consistently strict or lenient in
their approach to all contested issues within the Defense of Persons justification
that yield to such analysis.258 To do so, we determined which among the various
views on each contested issue in Defense of Persons represented the strict,
lenient, or intermediate (if applicable) approach to that particular issue.259
We then placed each jurisdiction in its appropriate place on the strictness–
leniency continuum, as shown in Table 2 below.
The first broad pattern, revealed by the table below, is that, with regard to
Defense of Persons, the ACC leans strongly toward the strict side of the strictness–leniency continuum. Among the seven issues analyzed, the lenient approach gains majority only once. Conversely, the strict approach gains
majority in five issues,260 and is also adopted by a significantly larger number
of jurisdictions than the lenient approach in the remaining issue (in which the
intermediate approach gains majority).
Of course, the revealed skew toward strictness is relative rather than absolute,
as it only pertains to positions that were in fact adopted by the various jurisdictions under examination. Thus, for instance, our present findings do not
support a statement that U.S. jurisdictions are fundamentally “strict” or skewed
toward strictness as compared to foreign jurisdictions. The main point, however, is that among the available plausible options (i.e., options adopted by
some domestic jurisdictions), U.S. jurisdictions consistently adopt the stricter
ones.261
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Table 2. The Strictness-Leniency Continuum
Defense of Persons Issues

Strict

Lenient

1. Precisely when in time may an actor use
defensive force? (Issue (b))
Imminent threat = Strict;
Immediately necessary = Lenient

AL, AK, AR, CA, CO, CT, DC, FL,
GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME,
MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NV,
NH, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR,
RI, SC, SD, UT, VT, VA, WA, WV,
WI, WY, FED

2. What amount of force may be used in
defense of persons? (Issue (c))
Defensive force is objectively necessary =
Strict;
Defendant believes defensive force is
reasonably necessary = Intermediate;
Defendant believes defensive force is
necessary = Lenient

MA, MN, MS, NM,
ND, OH, OK, RI,
SC, SD, VA, WA,
WY

AZ, DE, HI, NE, NJ, PA, TN, TX,

Intermediate

AL, AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO,

DE, HI, KY, NE,
NV, NC, PA, WV

CT, DC, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN,
IA, KS, LA, ME, MD, MI,
MO, MT, NH, NJ, NY OR,

3. Limitations on the Use of Deadly Force
in Defense of Personsa (Issue (d))
Allowing the use of deadly force against:
Death or serious bodily injury = Strict;
Listed felonies = Intermediate Strict;
Any forcible felony = Intermediate Lenient;
Any felony = Lenient

Strict

Intermediate
Strict

Intermediate
Lenient

Lenient

AZ, CT, DC, KS,

AL, AK, C O ,

AR, FL, GA,

CA, ID, MS,

LA, MD, M A ,

DE, HI, ME,

IL, IN, IA,

O K , S D , WA

MN, NJ, NM,

MI, NE, NH,

KY, MO, M T,

NC, OH, SC, TN,

NY, PA, TX

NV, ND, OR,

VT, VA, WV,

UT

W I, WY, FED
4. If an initial aggressor chooses to
withdraw from a fight, does he regain a
right to self-defense? b (Issue (e))
Requiring withdrawal and effective
communication = Strict;
Requiring withdrawal only = Lenient

AL, AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE,
DC, FL, GA, HI, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY,
LA, ME, MA, MI, MN, MO, MT, NV,
NH, NY, NC, OR, SC, TN, TX, UT,
WA, WI, WY

ID, MD, MS, NJ, NM, OH, OK, PA,
VA, WV, FED

5. Can an actor attack in order to provoke
a response, then justifiably use force in
self-defense? (Issue (f))
Barring use of defensive force by the attacker
= Strict;
Barring use of only deadly force = Lenient

AL, AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DC, FL,
GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME,
MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NV,
NH, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR,
RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VT, VA, WA,
WV, WI, WY, FED

DE, HI, NE, NJ, PA, SD

6. Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest (Issue
(h))
No right to resist unlawful arrest = Strict;
Right to resist unlawful arrest = Lenient

AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, FL,
HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, ME, MA,
MN, MO, MT, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NY,
ND, OR, PA, RI, SD, TX, UT, VT, WI,
WY, FED c

AL, GA, LA, MD, MI, MS, NV, NC,
OH, OK, SC, TN, VA, WA, WV, FED

7. Duty to Retreat (Issue (i))
A duty to retreat imposed = Strict;
No duty to retreat = Lenient

AR, CT, DE, HI, IA, ME, MD, MA,
MN, MO, NE, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OH,
PA, RI, WY

AL, AK AZ, CA, CO, DC, FL, GA,
ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MI, MS, MT,
NV, NH, NM, OK, OR, SC, SD, TN,
TX, UT, VA, VT, WA, WV, WI, FED

a. As noted in section 303 above, Rhode Island takes a unique position on this issue, adopting a
“totality of the circumstances” test. Thus, Rhode Island is excluded from the analysis.
b. As noted in section 303 above, the state of the law in Nebraska, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
and Vermont on this issue could not be conﬁrmed. Thus, these jurisdictions are excluded from
the present analysis. North Dakota is also excluded because, as noted in note 45, it uses the
slightly different standard of “indication”, rather than the majority’s “effective communication” of
withdrawal.
c. See note a to Table 1.
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TN, TX, UT, VT, WI, FED
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3.2.2 Specific Patterns and Correlations

Aside from the intriguing “tendency to strictness” pattern on Defense of
Persons, the strictness–leniency division presented in Table 2 above allows us
to conduct a more sophisticated examination of both the correlations between
jurisdictions’ general tendencies and their particular views on specific Defense of
Persons issues, as well as broader patterns and correlations with their statistical
characteristics, such as crime rates and demographic makeups. Although similar in form to the analysis conducted above on the correlations between the duty
to retreat and the right to resist unlawful arrest, the exploration below is much
more general in its nature since it applies to all pertinent Defense of Persons
issues.
262 Note, however, that some discrepancies exist. For example, the majority formulation pertaining to
the limitations on the use of deadly force in defense of persons (allowing an actor to use deadly force
against threats of death, serious bodily injury, rape, and kidnapping) is constructed by using the
common denominators of several approaches that vary greatly on the strictness–leniency continuum. In contrast, the present analysis refers to each of these approaches separately, enabling us
to explore their correlations to other issues directly.
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Such strictness of the ACC is reflected in the text of the majority formulation
we presented at the beginning of section 303.262 Nevertheless, the text of the
formulation cannot reveal the underlying pattern pertaining to the strictness–
leniency continuum, which is easily uncovered by the analysis above.
Significantly, we had little reason to posit the skew toward strictness ex ante.
In light of the important interests at play in cases when Defense of Persons
applies and the many debates and various opinions that exist on each issue
(reflected not only in scholarly disputes, but in the actual legislation of many
jurisdictions), we could have expected a more mixed, and perhaps even an
opposite, result.
We do not claim that the skew toward strictness in Defense of Persons among
U.S. jurisdictions is a result of a deliberate decision-making process with the
conscious goal to be strict on such issues. We are only pointing out the state of
affairs as they exist. This finding, in turn, opens interesting routes for further
exploration of the strictness–leniency continuum regarding other defenses. For
instance, in light of the skew toward strictness on Defense of Persons, researchers may hypothesize that jurisdictions’ approaches to other justification,
excuse, and nonexculpatory defenses should be even stricter. The data we collected on jurisdictions’ approaches to such defenses and further analysis similar
to the one presented in Table 2 above will allow researchers to explore such
questions and uncover broad patterns related to the consistency (or lack
thereof) in jurisdictions’ approaches to criminal law defenses.
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263 Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Federal.
264 For the purpose of this analysis, we counted the number of times a jurisdiction took the strict or
lenient position on the issues considered. If a jurisdiction took the intermediate position on issue
(c), this position was not included in the count for that jurisdiction, even though it might have
affected the classification of that jurisdiction into one of the groups. Conversely, if a jurisdiction
took the intermediate-lenient or intermediate-strict position on issue (d), we counted this position
as lenient or strict, respectively. See supra Table 2.
265 Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
266 Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
267 Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and Wyoming.
268 For convenience, below we refer to the four groups as the “lenient”, “strict”, “most lenient”, and
“strictest” jurisdictions.
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To conduct this examination, we divided the jurisdictions according to their
location on the strictness–leniency continuum, creating four groups. Two of the
groups are broad and cover the whole continuum. The first broad group consists of thirty-one “lenient” jurisdictions263 positioned on the lower end of that
continuum (i.e., jurisdictions that are strict on only 3–4 issues).264 The second
broad group consists of the remaining twenty-one “strict” jurisdictions (i.e.,
jurisdictions that are strict on 5–7 issues).265 The last two groups are more
narrowly tailored and cover the extreme ends of the continuum. The first
narrow group includes the sixteen “most lenient” jurisdictions (i.e., jurisdictions which are lenient on 3–4 issues).266 The second narrow group includes the
six “strictest” jurisdictions267 (i.e., jurisdictions which are strict on 6–7
issues).268
These groups allow us to reexamine and refine our findings above regarding
specific Defense of Persons issues. For example, recall that jurisdictions’
approaches to the duty to retreat issue is somewhat anomalous: among the
seven contested issues in Defense of Persons, it is the only issue for which the
lenient approach gains majority. Does this mean that findings related to the
duty to retreat are idiosyncratic and have little bearing on broader questions
related to Defense of Persons? Close examination of the correlations between
jurisdictions’ positions on the duty to retreat and their positions on the strictness–leniency continuum suggests the opposite.
In fact, a jurisdiction’s view on the duty to retreat is a good proxy for
its location on the strictness–leniency continuum. We found that among
the nineteen jurisdictions imposing such a duty (the strict position for this
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269 See text accompanying note 60 or Table 1.
270 Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, North Carolina, Ohio, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wyoming.
271 Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, New York, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wyoming.
272 See supra note 59 or Table 1.
273 Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Federal.
274 Naturally, the position a jurisdiction takes, on the duty to retreat, may influence its categorization
within one of the four groups and account for a portion of the correlation. Such influence, however,
is probably modest, since jurisdictions’ classification into groups is also influenced by six other
issues, and since those groups were deliberately structured to prevent a single issue from having a
decisive effect on a jurisdiction’s classification.
275 The division into regions conforms with the division used by the Uniform Crime Report of the FBI.
See Table 4, Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2011–2012
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/4table
datadecoverviewpdf/table_4_crime_in_the_united_states_by_region_geographic_division_and_
state_2011-2012.xls#overview.
276 Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
277 Connecticut, Maine and Massachusetts.
278 Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
and West Virginia.
279 Arkansas, District of Columbia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
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issue),269 thirteen are also strict jurisdictions,270 including all six of the strictest.271 Similarly, among the thirty-three jurisdictions not imposing such a duty
(the lenient position for this issue),272 twenty-five273 are also lenient jurisdictions.274 In short, knowing a jurisdiction’s position on the duty to retreat enables us to better predict the position it is likely to take on other Defense of
Persons issues.
Moreover, although these four groups are, in a sense, a purely artificial construct (created by us according only to jurisdictions’ positions on contested
Defense of Persons issues), several interesting connections nevertheless exist
between them and the real world. We explored various correlations between
these groups and certain statistical characteristics of jurisdictions and discovered several intriguing findings.
First, a regional geographic pattern is apparent.275 Five of six New England
jurisdictions are strict jurisdictions,276 including three of the strictest jurisdictions.277 Conversely, Southern jurisdictions are predominantly lenient. Among
the seventeen Southern jurisdictions,278 only four are strict.279 The remaining
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thirteen are lenient jurisdictions, including eight of the most lenient
jurisdictions.280
Second, a correlation exists between jurisdictions’ strictness and their violent
crime rates. Using data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report,281 we divided all
U.S. jurisdictions between those in which the violent crime rate is either above
or below the U.S. national average.282 We found that, of the twenty-nine jurisdictions in which the violent crime rate is below average,283 twelve are among
the sixteen most lenient.284

281 See, Table 5, Crime in the United States by State, 2012. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crimein-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/5tabledatadecpdf/table_5_crime_in_the_united_
states_by_state_2012.xls. Of note, UCR data are subject to various criticisms (see, e.g., Nathan James
& Logan Rishard Council. 2008. How Crime in the United States is Measured, 56, Cong. Research
Serv., RL3430917–21. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34309.pdf; Kimberly A. Lonsway &
Joanne Archambault. 2012. The “Justice Gap” for Sexual Assault Cases: Future Directions for
Research and Reform. 18 Violence Against Women 145, 149; Corey Rayburn Yung. 2014. How to
Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis. 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1197, 1206–1207), with the
possible exclusion of homicide rate, which appears to be the most accurate UCR data (see, e.g., ibid
How to Lie at 1225–1226). Nevertheless, “Despite the shortcomings of the system, the UCR remains
the dominant source of information about crime levels and rates in the United States. The media
uncritically reports the statistics from the program without noting the limitations of the
data. . . . The UCR data often serves as the basis for crime and social policy in
America. . . . Policymakers also regularly use the UCR data to evaluate the efficacy of criminal justice
programs. As a result, the annual FBI reports become the definitive proxy for evaluating crime
control.” (ibid, How to Lie at 1207–1208, (internal quotations and references omitted, emphasis
not in the original). See also ibid, at 1200; ibid, How Crime in the United States is Measured at 1-2;
ibid, The “Justice Gap” at 149). In other words, the criticisms of the UCR notwithstanding, UCR
data, as is (rather than the real, but unknown crime rate) influences criminal justice policy.
Therefore, and since data on offences such as forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault
(which are included, along with homicide, in the UCR’s violent crime rate data, see, Crime in
the United States 2012, Violent Crime http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/violent-crime/violent-crime), are likely to influence criminal justice policies
related to the Defense of Persons, we elected to conduct our analysis on the “violent crime” data set,
rather than rely solely on the much narrower criteria of homicide rate. We are grateful to an
anonymous commentator for noting that such choice requires clarification.
282 Since there are compatibility problems with the reported data for some jurisdictions (specifically,
District of Columbia and Minnesota), rather than calculating the average violent crime rate from
the jurisdictions’ data, we used FBI’s estimate for such a rate. See, Table 1, Crime in the United
States by volume and rate per 100,000 inhabitants, 1993–2012. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/
ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_
crime_in_the_united_states_by_volume_and_rate_per_100000_inhabitants_1993-2012.xls.
283 Connecticut, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
284 Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
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280 Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
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285 For the division, we employed the U.S. census data and the “natural breaks” classification method.
See supra note 240, for a more detailed explanation.
286 See U.S. Census Bureau, Total Population 2008–-2012. , available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid¼ACS_12_5YR_B01003&prodType¼table (last
visited Sept.ember 2, 2014).
287 Alaska, District of Columbia, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
and Wyoming.
288 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
289 Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, and
Wyoming.
290 Maine, Minnesota, and Wyoming.
291 See U.S. Census Bureau, ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates 2008–2012. http://factfinder2.
census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid¼ACS_12_5YR_DP05&prodType¼
table (last visited September 2, 2014).
292 Delaware, Georgia, Mississippi, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Virginia.
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Third, a correlation exists between jurisdictions’ strictness and population
size. Using the U.S. Census data, we divided all U.S. jurisdictions into five
groups according to their population size.285 We discovered that among the
sixteen jurisdictions in which the population is below 2,055,287 (the first
group),286 eight are strict jurisdictions.287
Fourth, a correlation exists between jurisdictions’ strictness and the racial
composition of their populations. As mentioned above, we divided U.S. jurisdictions into four groups according to the percentage of their total population
that is Black or African American. We found that among the twenty jurisdictions in which the Black or African American population is 0.5–5.1 percent of
the total (the first group),288 a mere nine are strict jurisdictions (which is not
very different from chance distribution);289 however, those include three of
the strictest jurisdictions.290 The reverse correlation also exists, though to a
lesser extent. Among the seventeen jurisdictions in which the Black or
African American population makes up more than 13.5 percent of the total
population (the third and fourth groups),291 six are among the most lenient
jurisdictions.292
What insights can be derived from these findings? Here, as in Section 3.1.2,
we cannot offer definitive answers. Our present findings, however, allow us to
suggest some interesting conjectures, reexamine the correlations found in previous sections, discover broader patterns and detect promising paths for further
examination.
Consider, for instance, that ex ante, one might have expected jurisdictions
with a relatively high violent crime rate to be lenient. The reasoning is that in a
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293 See text accompanying notes 250–252.
294 See text accompanying notes 241–245.
295 See text accompanying notes 291 and 292.
296 In fact, a change in a jurisdiction’s position on one or more issues may result in a re-categorization
of that jurisdiction (e.g., from strict to lenient, or from merely “strict” to one of the “strictest”
jurisdictions) and consequently change the sizes of these categories themselves. This, in turn, is
likely to influence many of the calculations by either strengthening or weakening the findings above.
Since changes in jurisdictions’ positions involve dynamic processes and are likely to occur, the
strength of some of the findings above might fluctuate. Nevertheless, as will be further elaborated in
the main text, the larger point of the analysis does not hang on any particular finding.
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high-crime environment, jurisdictions may be likely to support individuals’
right to defend themselves and others. Nevertheless, we observed no such correlation. On the contrary, we found that the jurisdictions in which the crime
rate is relatively low are relatively lenient. This finding may imply a starkly
different causal story, suggesting that a jurisdiction’s leniency in granting the
defense of persons may have an impact on the violent crime rate, helping to
reduce it. Naturally, we do not claim proving the existence of such a causal
connection. Our data on correlations cannot support a claim on causation. We
do suggest, however, that the possibility of such causal connection is interesting,
and may merit further examination.
Recall also the finding that more than two-thirds of the jurisdictions allowing
no right to resist unlawful arrest while also imposing a duty to retreat (represented by the lower right cell of Table 1) are those with a relatively high white
population percentage.293 Currently, we can clearly see that such a correlation
represents the strict position on both issues, suggesting that it might be fruitful
to explore its relationship with our present findings on other groups of jurisdictions with a tendency to strictness, such as New England jurisdictions, jurisdictions with relatively small populations or those in which the Black or
African Americans population percentage is relatively low.
Similarly, our present findings allow us to notice that the correlation we
found between the Black or African American population percentage in a jurisdiction and its tendency to adopt the right to resist unlawful arrest294 may be
part of a broader pattern. Such correlation, as we are now in a position to see, is
consistent with (and might represent a private case of) such jurisdictions’ general tendency for lenience.295
The important takeaway from this discussion is, once again, not any particular conjecture.296 It is the larger point: DCA enables one to engage in these kinds
of analyses, which may reveal new and previously unexplored specific connections and broad patterns between jurisdictions’ characteristics and their
approaches to criminal law. Clearly, applying these analyses to all of the data
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4. CONCLUSION

What is the American rule on each general defense? This article’s most direct
and immediate contribution is in providing detailed answers to this question on
each contested issue concerning each justification, excuse, and nonexculpatory
defense. The majority formulations, and their comparisons with significant
minority positions, the MPC, and the National Commission, provide legislatures, drafting commissions, judges, lawyers, and scholars with valuable and
formerly unavailable information. That information, rather than the frequently
wrong common wisdom, can presently be used to improve the quality of criminal legislation, legal arguments, and judicial opinions.
Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, the existing ACCs’ influence on
codification in other countries can be significantly improved. Despite such
codes’ accessibility and comprehensiveness, their practical appeal is significantly reduced by the seemingly insurmountable obstacles—especially for
foreigners—to determining the American rule. By removing uncertainty, this
article enhances the attractiveness of using ACCs in developing and reforming
criminal legislation abroad.
The article’s goals, however, extend beyond these immediate contributions. It
serves as the cornerstone for a broader project: drafting a comprehensive ACC
reflecting the majority position on all major topics of substantive criminal law
297 See supra sections 401(a) and 402(a).
298 See supra sections 301(e) and 404(f).
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presented in Section 2 would be a major undertaking beyond the scope of the
present article. We can, however, suggest some additional interesting directions
of further exploration that can be pursued relying on such data.
For example, it may be of interest to researchers to compare jurisdictions’
positions on similar issues in distinct defenses. For instance, they can examine
the differences in the nature of the cognitive dysfunction requirement between
the Insanity and Involuntary Intoxication defenses,297 or in the weight assigned
to one’s culpability in creating a situation in which the Lesser Evils justification
or Duress excuse arise.298 Moreover, broader patterns may be unearthed by
expanding the strictness–leniency continuum we used for Defense of
Persons issues to all justification defenses, or even to all defenses. This may
allow examining whether jurisdictions are consistently strict or lenient between
specific defenses or classes of defenses. Notably, the data in our article and its
methodology provide fertile ground for such and other intriguing
investigations.
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among U.S. jurisdictions. Although drafting such a code (or parts thereof) is
indeed a major research undertaking, this article demonstrates (contrary to the
skepticism expressed by some before its initiation) that such an endeavor can be
accomplished and exemplifies what the results of such a project might look like.
This may embolden others to embark on similar efforts and draft additional
portions of the ACC, such as its general principles of liability, inchoate crimes,
or specific offense chapters.
In addition, as illustrated in the article’s last section, by using DCA, the
findings pertaining to a jurisdiction’s approaches to various criminal law
issues can be leveraged to uncover and explore previously unexamined correlations and patterns. The added value of that section is not in its particular
insights but rather in demonstrating how such analysis can be done, and providing the tools for further research in a similar vein. For instance, the strictness–leniency continuum we used for assessing correlations related to defense
of persons can be utilized to assess jurisdictions’ positions on issues such as
complicity, attempts, or criminal homicide. Studying whether jurisdictions take
strict or lenient positions on these issues may help disentangle the rhetoric of
being “tough on crime” from the actual state of legislation and assist in implementing consistent policies in this regard.
Similarly, criminal law scholars can use additional metrics, such as deviations
of jurisdictions’ approaches to particular issues from the MPC or National
Commission, to evaluate the impact (or lack thereof) of those model codes.
Social scientists can use additional demographic variables, such as religious
affiliation, income disparity, or political inclinations, to account for those jurisdictions’ positions on subjects pertaining to criminal law or other issues.
Importantly, although our comprehensive analysis of the general defenses
provides clear and well-defined answers on the American rule, our DCA mainly
raises additional questions. Both, however, are essential for achieving key purposes of the article: eliciting interest in the ACC drafting project and helping to
set an agenda for further research employing DCA. It is our hope that by
exemplifying how such drafting can be done, and how interesting the discovered patterns and correlations can be, this article will help entice criminal
law scholars and social scientists to engage in this new and fascinating research
field.
It is the authors’ sincere hope that the reader can now appreciate the immense value a completed ACC would have, both at home and abroad.
Legislators and criminal law reformers could survey the complete landscape
of positions on every issue of American criminal law, enabling them to advocate
with confidence knowing where their jurisdictions stand among all others.
Furthermore, criminal law reformers abroad looking to the USA for guidance
would know, for the first time, exactly what we collectively have to offer. We

90 ~ Robinson, Kussmaul, Stoddard, Rudyak and Kuersten: The American Criminal Code

therefore invite other criminal law researchers to pick up where we have left off
and furnish the remaining parts of the ACC, both general principles and specific
offenses. We also invite social scientists to fully mine the data provided for
useful patterns and relationships. We hope that this article is the beginning of a
larger project that has the potential to revolutionize global understanding of
American criminal law.
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Mass.App.Ct. 642 (2002)a

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A, § 106a,c,d; Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §
107b
Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d
341 (Md. 1978)a

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
71, § 37Ga; Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 103, §
505.07b; Com. v. Rubeck,
833 N.E.2d 650 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2005)a; Old
Colony R. Co. v. Tripp,
147 Mass. 35 (1888)c;
Com. v. Power, 7
Metcalf 596 (1844)c;
Vinton v. Middlesex
Railroad Co., 11 Allen
304 (1865)c
Mi. Comp. Laws Ann. §
610d; Mi. Comp. Laws

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A, § 107a,b,c,d

(continued)

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:20a; La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:22a; State
v. Morris, 22 So.3d 1002
(2009)b

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:18a

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. C. Cr. P.
Art. 220a,c; La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. C. Cr. P. Art.
227.1d

Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 779
A.2d 992 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2001)a,c

§ 307. Mistake as to justiﬁcation

§ 306. Special
responsibility

§ 305. Law enforcement
authority

Downloaded from http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on March 16, 2015

Stodghill v. State, 892 So.2d
236 (Miss. 2005)a,b

Miss. (MS)

Mo. (MO)

State v. Johnson, 289 Minn.
196 (Minn. 1971)a,b,e; State
v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d 77
(1991)d

Hubbard, 115 Mich.App.
73 (1982)d

§ 301. Lesser evils

Minn. (MN)

Jurisdiction

Appendix A1. Continued

Mo. Ann. Stat. §
563.021a(i),a(ii),a(iii),a(iv),a(v),b,c

Minn. Stat. Ann. §
609.06a(i),a(ii),a(iii); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 609.065a(i);
Minn. Stat. Ann. §
609.09a(i),a(ii)

§ 302. Public duty

People v. Dupree, 486 Mich. 693
(2010)b; People v. Riddle,467 Mich.
116 (2002)b,g; People v. Kerley, 95
Mich. App. 74 (1980)e; People v.
Moreno, 491 Mich. 38 (2012)h;
People v. Rauch, 2006 WL 3682754
(2006)h
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.06c; Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 609.065d; State v. Radke, 821
N.W.2d 316 (2012)b; Bellcourt v.
State, 390 N.W. 2d 269 (Minn.
1986)e; State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.
2d 405 (2006)f,i; State v. Penkaty,
708 N.W. 2d 185 (2006)f; State v.
Baker, 280 Minn. 518 (1968)g; State
v. Kutchara, 350 N.W. 2d 924
(1984)h; State v. Wick, 331 N.W. 2d
769 (1983)h; State v. Devens, 852
N.W.2d 255 (Minn. 2014)h
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-15b,d,i; Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-9-73h; Sheppard v.
State, 777 So. 2d 659 (2000)b;
Chambers v. State, 973 So.2d 266
(Ct. App. Miss. 2007)c; McIntosh v.
State, 749 So.2d 1235 (Ct. App. Miss.
1999)c; Patrick v. State, 285 So. 2d
165 (Miss. 1973)e; Parker v. State,
401 So.2d 1282 (1981)f; Robinson v.
State, 773 So. 2d 943 (2000)g;
Murrell v. State, 655 So. 2d 881
(1995)h; Maye v. State, 49 So. 3d
1124 (2010)
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.031b,c,d,e,f,i; Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 575.15h; State v.

§ 303. Defense of persons

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.041a,d,f,h;
State v. Dooley, 121 Mo.

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.031a; State v.
Sanders, 556 S.W.2d 75 (1977)b
Mo. Ann. Stat. §
563.061a,b,c,d

(continued)

Lanier v. State, 684 So.2d 93
(1996)b

Miss. Code Ann. § 47-51215b; Wolfe v. State,
743 So.2d 380 (Miss.
1999)a

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-315a,b; Miss. Code Ann. §
47-5-1215d

Garner v. State, 2 So.2d 828
(Miss. 1941)a,f; Thomas v.
State, 165 Miss. 897 (Miss.
1933)f

State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8
(1996)b

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.06a,f,h;
State v. Herrick, 12 Minn.
132 (Minn. 1866)f

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.06a,c

VanVorous v. Burmeister,
687 N.W.2d 132 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2004)a

Minn. Stat. Ann. §
609.06a,c; Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 609.066b,c

§ 307. Mistake as to justiﬁcation

Mi. Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.972a;
People v. Reese, 491 Mich. 127
(2012)b

§ 306. Special
responsibility
Ann. § 800.41b; People
v. Green, 199 N.W. 1087
(Mich. 1909)a

§ 305. Law enforcement
authority

Henry, 202 Mich. 450
(Mich. 1918)f; People v.
Flick, 487 Mich. 1 (Mich.
2010)e

§ 304. Defense of property
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Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281407a,c,d,e

Hoagland v. State, 240 P.3d
1043 (2010)d,e

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
627:3a,e; State v. Dorsey,
118 N.H. 844 (1978)d
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-2c,d

Neb. (NE)

Nevada (NV)

N.H. (NH)

N.J. (NJ)

City of Helena v. Lewis, 260
Mont. 421 (Mont. 1993)d;
State v. Pease, 758 P.2d
764 (1988)b; State v.
Nelson, 36 P.3d 405
(2001)e

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.026a,b,e;
City of St. Louis v. Klocker,
637 S.W.2d 174 (1982)d

§ 301. Lesser evils

Mont. (MT)

Jurisdiction

Appendix A1. Continued

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33a(i),a(ii),a(iii),a(iv),a(v),b,c

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
627:2a(i),a(ii),a(iii),a(iv),a(v),b,c

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
200.140a(i),a(ii),a(iii)

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281408a(i),a(ii),a(iii),a(iv),a(v),b,c;
Wagner v. City of Omaha,
236 Neb. 843 (1991)b

§ 302. Public duty

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-4b,c,d,f,h,i; N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:3-5; State v. Jones, 71
N.J.L. 543 (1905)e; State v. MachareLudena, 2007 WL 967014 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. April 3, 2007)

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1409b,c,d,f,h,i;
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1410; State
v. Schroder, 218 Neb. 860 (1984)g;
State v. Yeutter, 252 Neb. 857
(1997)h
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.120d,i; Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.450g; Runion v.
State, 116 Nev. 1041 (2000)b; State
v. Hennessy, 29 Nev. 320 (1907)c;
State v. Smith, 10 Nev. 106 (1875)e;
Johnson v. State, 92 Nev. 405
(1976)f; State v. Smithson, 54 Nev.
417 (1933)h; Batson v. State, 113
Nev. 669 (1997)h; Culverson v. State,
106 Nev. 484 (1990)i; Marquez de
Santiago v. State, 2013 WL 485859
(2013)
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:2h; N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 627:4b,c,d,e,f,g,i

Gardner, 606 S.W.2d 236 (1980)i;
State v. Harris, 717 S.W.2d 233
(1986)i; State v. Hatﬁeld, 465 S.W. 2d
468 (1971)g; State v. Hernandez, 651
S.W. 2d 187 (1983)h
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-102b,c,d,i; Mont.
Code Ann. § 45-3-105e,f; Mont. Code
Ann. § 45-3-108h; State v. Eisenman,
155 Mont. 370 (1970)g

§ 303. Defense of persons

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4f;
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
627:8a,f,h
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-6a,b,f,g,h

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281411a,b,d,f,g,h; State v.
McKimmey, 10 Neb.App.
595 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001)e

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3104a,f,h;Mont. Code Ann. §
45-2-101e

591 (Mo. 1894)f; State v.
Barnett, 767 S.W.2d 38
(1989)e

§ 304. Defense of property

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
627:5b; N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 627:6a,c,d
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-8a,c,d;
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10A:33.2b

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
627:5a,b,c,d
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-7a,b,c,d

Newman v. State, 298 P.3d
1171 (Nev. 2013)a;
Crumley v. Southern Pac.
Co., 42 Nev. 337
(1918)c; Forrester v.
Southern Pac. Co., 36
Nev. 247 (1913)c

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3107a; Rand v. Butte
Electric Ry. Co., 40
Mont. 398 (1910)c;
Doherty v. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co., 43 Mont. 294
(1911)c
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281413a,b,c,d

§ 306. Special
responsibility

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
200.140b,d

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281412a,b,c,d

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3106c,d

Mo. Ann. Stat. §
563.046a,b,c; Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 563.056d

§ 305. Law enforcement
authority
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N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-4a; N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:3-5a; N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:3-6a; State v. Finley, 714
A.2d 918 (N.J. 1998)b

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4a,b

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1409a;
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281410a; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
28-1412b; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-1414b
Hill v. State, 98 Nev. 295 (1982)a,b;
Culverson v. State, 106 Nev. 484
(1990)a

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-102a,b;
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-105a,b

§ 307. Mistake as to justiﬁcation

N.Y. Penal Law §
35.05a(i),a(ii),a(v),c

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05a,b,c,e;
People v. Craig, 78 N.Y.2d
616 (1991)d
State v. Thomas, 103 N.C.App.
264 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)a,d

N.Y. (NY)

N.C. (NC)

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-26a(i),a(ii),a(iii)

State v. Rios, 127 N.M. 334
(1999)a,b,e

N.M. (NM)

§ 302. Public duty

§ 301. Lesser evils

Jurisdiction

Appendix A1. Continued

(unpublished)g; State v. Mulvihill, 57
N.J. 151 (1970)h
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-5190i; N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 30-2-5f; State v. Maples, 300
P. 3d 749 (2013)b,c; State v. Gallegos,
130 N.M. 221 (2001)d; Territory v.
Clark, 15 N.M. 35 (1909)e,f; State v.
Vasquez, 83 N.M. 388 (1971)f; State
v. Robert H., 2009 WL 6667962 (Ct.
App. N.M. June 5, 2009) (unpublished)g; State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100
(1978)h; State v. Ellis, 144 N.M. 253
(2008)h
N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15b,c,d,e,f,g,i; N.Y.
Penal Law § 35.27h; People v.
Stevenson, 31 N.Y. 2d 108 (1972)h
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3i; State v.
Norman, 324 N.C. 253 (1989)b; State
v. Brown, 117 N.C. App. 239
(1994)c,i; State v. Everett, 163 N.C.
App. 95 (2004)i; State v. Ramseur,
739 S.E. 2d 599 (2013)d; State v.
Platt, 85 N.C. App. 220 (1987)e; State
v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583 (1992)f;
State v. Meadows, 158 N.C. App. 390
(2003)f; State v. Quick, 150 N.C. 820
(1909)g; State v. Sampley, 60 N.C.
App. 493 (1983)h; State v. Anderson,

§ 303. Defense of persons

State v. Lefevre, 117 P.3d
980 (N.M. Ct. App.
2005)a; Doe v. State,
542 P.2d 834 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1975)a

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10a,b,c,d

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-151c

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-6b,d;
State v. Ellis, 186 P.3d
245 (N.M. 2008)a,c

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30a,b,c,d

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A401a,b,c,d

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.25a,f,h;
N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00e
State v. Goodson, 69 S.E.2d
242 (N.C. 1952)h; State v.
Wells, 27 N.C.App. 144
(N.C. Ct. App. 1975)e

N.M. U.J.I. § 14-5180a,h

§ 306. Special
responsibility

§ 305. Law enforcement
authority

§ 304. Defense of property
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N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15a; N.Y. Penal
Law § 35.20a; People v. Goetz,
68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986)b
State v. Ramseur, 739 S.E.2d 599
(2013)a,b

State v. Abeyta, 120 N.M. 233
(1995)a,b; State v. Maples, 300
P.3d 749 (2013)a

§ 307. Mistake as to justiﬁcation

§ 301. Lesser evils

State v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d 185
(N.D. 1991)a,d; State v.
Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d
843 (1994)e

City of Kettering v. Berry, 567
N.E.2d 316 (1990)a,b,d,e

Long v. State, 74 P.3d 105
(2003)a,d

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.200a,b; State v. Clowes,
310 Or. 686 (1990)d

Jurisdiction

N.D. (ND)

Ohio (OH)

Okla. (OK)

Or. (OR)

Appendix A1. Continued

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.195a(i),a(ii),a(iii),a(iv),a(v),c

Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 732a(ii),a(iii)

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-0502a(i)

§ 302. Public duty

40 N.C. App. 318 (1979)h; State v.
Phifer, 165 N.C. App. 123 (2004)
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-03b,e,f,g,; N.D.
Cent. Code § 12.1-05-04; N.D. Cent.
Code § 12.1-05-07c,d,i; State v. Hass,
268 N.W.2d 456 (1978)c; State v.
Ritter, 472 N.W. 2d 444 (1991)h
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.33i; State
v. Lewis, 976 N.E. 2d 258 (2012)c;
State v. Bundy, 974 N.E. 2d 139
(2012)b,f,i; State v. McLeod, 82 Ohio
App. 155 (1948)c; Goldfuss v.
Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (1997)d;
State v. Davis, 8 Ohio App.3d 205
(1982)e; State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.
3d 630 (1992)g; State v. Milling, 2009
WL 1800138 (2009)g; State v. Lynch,
2011 WL 2518626 (2011)g; State v.
Hendren, 110 Ohio App.3d 496 (Ct.
App. Ohio 1996)h; State v. Belanger,
941 N.E.2d 1265 (Ohio Ct. App.
2010)h; State v. D.H., 169 Ohio App.
3d 798 (2006)
Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 643c; Okla. Stat. tit.
21 § 731f; Okla. Stat. tit. 21 §
733b,d; Waldon v. State, 16 Okla.
Crim. 402 (1919)b; Holloway v. State,
602 P.2d 218 (Ct. Crim. App. Ok.
1979)e; Ruth v. State, 581 P.2d 919
(1978)f; Larry v. State, 10 Okla. Crim.
340 (Crim. Ct. App. Okla. 1913)g;
Hayes v. State, 566 P. 2d 1174
(1977)h; Allen v. State, 871 P. 2d 79
(1994)i
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.209b,c; Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 161.215e,f,g; Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 161.219d; Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 303. Defense of persons

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.209a,b;
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.215b;
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.205a,c; Or. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 161.267b
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.235a,c; Or. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 161.239b; Or.

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.015e; Or. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 161.229a,f,h

(continued)

Davis v. State, 268 P.3d 86 (2011)b;
Waldon v. State, 16 Okla.Crim.
402 (1919)a

Okl. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 45c;
Holman v. Wheeler, 677
P.2d 645 (Okla. 1983)a

State v. Goff, WL 139545 (2013)b

State v. Adaranijo, 792
N.E.2d 1138 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003)a; Martin v.
State, 21 Ohio Dec. 520
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
1910)a; Hoepf v. Dep’t of
Rehab. And Correction,
2002 WL 31948019 (Ct.
Claims Ohio Oct. 17,
2002)b

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 643a;
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §
732b,c,d

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-08a;
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d
811 (1983)b

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-0505a,c; N.D. Cent. Code §
12.1-05-07d

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-0507b,c,d; N.D. Cent. Code
§ 29-06-13a

§ 307. Mistake as to justiﬁcation

§ 306. Special
responsibility

§ 305. Law enforcement
authority

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 643a,f,h;
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 30.2e

State v. McLeod, 80 N.E.2d
699 (1948)a,f,h; State v.
Kingsland, 177
Ohio.App.3d 655 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2008)e

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-0506a,b,f,h; N.D. Cent. Code §
12.1-24-04e

§ 304. Defense of property
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18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
501e; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 503a,c; 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 510d

Pa. (PA)

State v. Cole, 304 S.C. 47
(1991)a,b,d,e

State v. Bowers, 498 N.W.2d
202 (1993)d

S.C. (SC)

S.D. (SD)

R.I. (RI)

§ 301. Lesser evils

Jurisdiction

Appendix A1. Continued

S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 22-182a(i)

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
504a(i),a(ii),a(iii),a(iv),a(v),b,c

§ 302. Public duty

Ann. § 161.260h; State v. Wright, 310
Or. 430 (1990)h; State v. Sandoval,
342 Or. 506 (2007)i
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 505b,c,d,f,h,i; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 506; Com. v.
Sheppard, 436 Pa.Super. 584 (1994)e;
Bowalick v. Com., 840 A.2d 519
(Com. Ct. Pa. 2004)g
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-7-10h; State v.
Quarles, 504 A.2d 473 (1986)b,c;
State v. Ventre, 811 A.2d 1178 (R.I.
2002)d; State v. Guillemet, 430 A.2d
1066 (1981)f; State v. Urena, 899 A.
2d 1281 (2006)I; State v. Gelinas, 417
A. 2d 1381 (1980)
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440i; State v.
Jackson, 384 S.C. 29 (2009)b,c,d,f;
State v. Bryant, 336 S.C. 340 (1999)e;
State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153
(2006)f; State v. Taylor, 356 S.C. 227
(2003)g; State v. McGowan, 347 S.C.
618 (2001)h; State v. Williams, 367
S.C. 192 (2005)h; State v. Starnes,
340 S.C. 312 (2000)
S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 20-9-8c; S.D.
Codiﬁed Laws § 22-5-9b; S.D.
Codiﬁed Laws § 22-16-31f; S.D.
Codiﬁed Laws § 22-16-34d; S.D.
Codiﬁed Laws § 22-16-35b; State v.
Stumbaugh, 28 S.D. 50 (1911)f; State
v. Bennis, 457 N.W.2d 843 (S.D.

§ 303. Defense of persons

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
509a,b,c,d

State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d
785 (R.I. 1981)a

S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-30b

S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 22-185a; S.D. Codiﬁed Laws §
24-2-6b

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-78a; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.
§ 12-7-9b

S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-30d

S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 22-1632b; S.D. Codiﬁed Laws
§ 22-18-2a; S.D. Codiﬁed
Laws § 24-2-6d

State v. Selengut, 95 A. 503
(1915)a,f; State v. Motyka,
111 R.I. 38 (R.I. 1973)e

State v. Starnes, 49 S.E.2d 209
(1948)a,f

S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 22-184a,h

§ 306. Special
responsibility

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
508a,b,c,d

Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.267d

§ 305. Law enforcement
authority

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
507a,b,d,e,f,g,h

§ 304. Defense of property
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S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 22-5-9b

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-410b; S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-11-420b; S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-11-430b; S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-11-440b; S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-11-450b

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 505a; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 506a; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2503a,b;
Com. v. Tilley, 595 A.2d 575
(1991)a
State v. Garcia, 883 A.2d 1131
(2005)b

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.219a,b;
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.225a,b

§ 307. Mistake as to justiﬁcation

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §
2305a(iii),a(iv)

State v. Myers, 190 Vt. 29 (Vt.
2011)a,b; State v. Cram,
157 Vt. 466 (1991)d,e

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
9.21a(i),a(ii),a(iii),a(iv),a(v),b,c

Vt. (VT)

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
9.22a,b,d

Tex. (TX)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11610a(i),a(ii),a(iii),a(v),b,c

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2401a(i),a(v)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11609a,b

Tenn. (TN)

§ 302. Public duty

Utah (UT)

§ 301. Lesser evils

Jurisdiction

Appendix A1. Continued

State v. Grace, 160 Vt. 623 (1993)b;
State v. Ovitt, 178 Vt. 605 (2005)c;
State v. Wheelock, 158 Vt. 302
(1992)d; State v. Bogie, 125 Vt. 414
(1966)f; Willey v. Carpenter, 15 L.R.A.
853 (1892)f; State v. McDonnell, 32
Vt. 491 (1860)g; State v. Peters, 141

1990)g; State v. Miskimins, 435
N.W.2d 217 (S.D. 1989)h; State v.
Cottier, 755 N.W. 2d 120 (2008)i
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611b,c,d,e,f,g,i;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-612;
Cooper v. State, 138 S.W. 826, 846
(Tenn. 1911)f; State v. Williams, 38
S.W. 3d 532 (2001)g; Shelton v. State,
3 Tenn.Crim.App. 310 (1970)h
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31b,c,e,f,g,i; Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 9.32d; Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 9.33; Hughes v. State,
101 Tex. Crim. 164 (1925)g; Anthony
v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 138 (1910)g;
State v. Mayorga, 901 S.W.2d 943
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1995)h
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402b,c,d,e,f,g,i;
State v. Trane, 57 P.3d 1052 (Utah
2002)h

§ 303. Defense of persons

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2406a,f,h; Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-407f,h; Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-409.5e; Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-601e
State v. Cleveland, 72 A. 321
(1909)f

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
9.42a,d,f,g,h

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11614a,d,f,g,h; Tenn. Code
Ann. § 67-4-1001e

§ 304. Defense of property

§ 306. Special
responsibility

Marlar v. Bill, 178 S.W.2d
634 (Tenn. 1944)a

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
9.53b; Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 9.61a; Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 9.62a; Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §
9.63a
Utah Code Ann. § 64-1332b; State v. State, 981
P.2d 848 (Utah Ct. App.
1999)a
Wood v. Eddy, 833 A.2d
1243 (Vt. 2003)a;
Eastman v. Williams,
207 A.2d 146 (Vt.
1965)a; In re Goddard,
142 Vt. 437 (1983)b

§ 305. Law enforcement
authority

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11620a,b,c

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
9.51a,b; Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 9.52c,d

Utah Code Ann. § 64-1332d; Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-403a,c; Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-404b
Coll v. Johnson, 636 A.2d
336 (Vt. 1993)a
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State v. Shaw, 168 Vt. 412 (1998)b

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402a; Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-407a; State v.
Coonce, 36 P.3d 533 (2001)b

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31a; Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 9.32a; Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 9.33a; Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 9.34a;
Alonzo v. State, 353 S.W.3d 778
(2011)b

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611a;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-612a;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-613a;
State v. Boyland WL 2464211
(2011)b

§ 307. Mistake as to justiﬁcation

Sam v. Commonwealth, 13
Va.App. 312 (1991)a

State v. Harvill 169 Wash.2d
254 (2010)a,e

State v. Poling, 207 W. Va.
299 (2000)d

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.47a,b

Va. (VA)

Wash. (WA)

W. Va. (WV)

Wis. (WI)

Wyo. (WY)

§ 301. Lesser evils

Jurisdiction

Appendix A1. Continued

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.45a(i)

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9A.16.020a(i); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §
9A.16.040a(i),a(ii)

§ 302. Public duty

Vt. 341 (1982)h; State v. Albano, 92
Vt. 51 (1917)i; State v. Hoadley, 147
Vt. 49 (1986)
Lynn v. Com., 27 Va. App. 336
(1998)b,d; Couture v. Com., 51 Va.
App. 239 (2008)c; Bailey v. Com., 200
Va. 92 (1958)d,f; Brown v. Com., 86
Va. 466 (1890)e; Sands v. Com., 33
Va. App. 669 (2000)f,i; Bull v. Com.,
14 Gratt. 613 (Va. 1857)g; Brown v.
Com., 27 Va.App. 111 (1998)h
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.16.020c;
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9A.16.050b,d; State v. Dennison, 115
Wash. 2d 609 (1990)e; State v.
Douglas, Wash. App. 555 (2005)f;
State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435
(1902)g; State v. Valentine, 132
Wash.2d 1 (1997)h; State v. Allery,
101 Wash. 2d 591 (1984)i
Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, 210 W. Va. 740
(2001)b,d,i; State v. Cook, 204 W. Va
591 (1999)c; State v. Terrall, 79 W.
Va. 358 (1917)e; State v. Smith, 170
W.Va. 654 (1982)f; State v. Alderson,
74 W. Va. 732 (1914)g; State v. Clark,
64 W.Va. 625 (1908)h
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.48b,c,d,e,f,i; State v.
Wenger, 593 N.W.2d 467 (1999)i;
Campbell v. State, 111 Wis. 152
(1901)g; State v. Hobson, 218 Wis.2d
350 (1998)h
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-602d; Scheikofsky
v. State, 636 P.2d 1107 (1981)b;
Duckett v. State, 966 P. 2d 941
(1998)c; Drennen v. State, 311 P.3d
116 (Wyo. 2013)e; State v. Flory, 40

§ 303. Defense of persons

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 169.01e; Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 939.49a,f,h

State v. Allen, 49 S.E.2d 847
(W.Va. Ct. App. 1948)f;
State v. Winston, 170
W.Va. 555 (W.Va. Ct. App.
1982)f

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9A.16.020a,d,f,h; Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 9A.56.380e

Montgomery v. Com., 36 S.E.
371 (1900)a; Com. v.
Simone, 63 Va. Cir. 216
(2003)f

§ 304. Defense of property

§ 306. Special
responsibility

Carpenter v. Com., 44
S.E.2d 419 (Va. 1947)a;
Smith v. Norfolk City
School Board, 46 Va. Cir.
238 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1998)a

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9A.16.020c; Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 9A.16.100a;
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
72.09.650b

W. Va. Code Ann. § 18A-51a; Courtney v. Courtney,
413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va.
1991)a; Carpenter v.
Com., 186 Va. 851
(1947)a
Steber v. Norris, 206 N.W.
173 (Wis. 1925)a; State
v. Killory, 243 N.W.2d
475 (Wis. 1976)d
Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739
(1987)b

§ 305. Law enforcement
authority

Hendricks v. Com., 178 S.E.
8 (Va. 1935)a,b,c; Berry v.
Hamman, 125 S.E.2d
851 (Va. 1962)c

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9A.16.020a; Wash. Rev.
Code Ann.
§9A.16.040b,d

State ex rel. Mullins v.
McClung, 17 S.E.2d 621
(W. Va. 1941)a

State v. Mendoza, 258
N.W.2d 260 (Wis. 1977)a

Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263
(Wyo. 1985)a
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Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304a,b,c,d

State v. Camacho, 176 Wis.2d 860
(1993)b

State v. Miller, 178 W.Va. 618
(1987)b; State v. Cook, 204
W.Va. 591 (1999)a

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9a.16.050a; State v. Hughes, 106
Wash.2d 176 (1986)b

Couture v. Com., 51 Va.App. 239
(2008)a,b; Bailey v. Com., 200
Va. 92 (1958)a

§ 307. Mistake as to justiﬁcation

The MPC
National
Commission

Federal

Jurisdiction

The MPC § 3.01

§ 301. Lesser evils

Appendix A1. Continued

The MPC § 3.03

§ 302. Public duty

Wyo. 184 (1929)f; Leeper v. State,
589 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1979)g; Roberts
v. State, 711 P.2d 1131 (Wyo.
1985)h; Garcia v. State, 667 P. 2d
1148 (1983)i
Dixon v. U.S., 126 S.Ct. 2437 (2006)b;
Harris v. U.S., 364 F. 2d 701 (1966)c,f;
U.S. v. Tunley, 664 F. 3d 1260
(2012)d; Stevenson v. U.S., 86 F. 106
(5th Cir. 1898)e; Huber v. U.S., 259
F. 766 (9th Cir. 1919)g; U.S. v.
Walker, 960 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1992)h; Brown v. U.S., 41 S. Ct. 501
(1921)i
The MPC § 3.04, 3.05
National Commission § 603, 604, 606,
607

§ 303. Defense of persons

The MPC § 3.07
National Commission § 602

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1 (1985)c

§ 304. Defense of property

The MPC § 4.01
National Commission § 503

The MPC § 3.08
National Commission § 605

§ 307. Mistake as to justiﬁcation

18 U.S.C. § 17a,b,c; United States v.
Lawrenson, 210 F.Supp. 422 (D.
Md. 1962)d

The MPC § 3.09
National Commission § 608

§ 306. Special
responsibility

United States v. Ward, 39
M.J. 1085 (U.S. Army Ct.
of Military Review
1994)a; Hudson v.
McMillian, 112 S. Ct.
995 (1992)b

§ 305. Law enforcement
authority
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Ala. Code § 13A-3-2a,b,c;
Miller v. State, 439
So.2d 800 (1983)a,c

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2207a,b,c

People v. Mathson, 210
Cal.App.4th 1297
(Cal. Ct. App.
2012)a,b,c; People v.
Murray, 247
Cal.App.2d 730 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1967)a,b;
People v. Velez, 175
Cal.App.3d 785
(1986)c

Ala. Code § 13A-3-1a,b,c,d

Alaska Stat. Ann. §
12.47.010a,b,d

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-502a,b,c,d

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2312a,b,c,d

Cal. Penal Code § 25a,b,c;
People v. Fields, 35
Cal.3d 329 (Cal.
1984)d

Ala. (AL)

Alaska (AK)

Ariz. (AZ)

Ark. (AR)

Cal. (CA)

Evans v. State, 645 P.2d
155 (Alaska 1982)a,b,c;
Paradiso v. State, WL
880624 (2012)a,b,c
Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz.
99 (1931)a,b,c

§ 402. Involuntary
intoxication

§ 401. Insanity

Jurisdiction

Ala. Code § 13A-3-3a,d;
Ala.Code § 12-15203d; Ala.Code § 1215-204b,d
Alaska Stat. Ann. §
47.12.020b,e; Alaska
Stat. Ann. §
47.12.100c,d,e
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-501a,b,d; Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-504c,d
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27303a; Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-27-306a,b,d; Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-27318b,c,d; Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-27-507b,c,d
Cal. Penal Code § 26b

§ 403. Immaturity

A2 EXCUSE: NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSES

Cal. Penal Code §
26a,b,d

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2208a,b,e,f

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-412a,b,c,d,e,f

Alaska Stat. Ann. §
11.81.440a,e,f

Ala. Code § 13A-330a,c,d,e,f

§ 404. Duress

Cal. Penal Code § 26a,c

Alaska Stat. Ann. §
11.81.600a; Alaska
Stat. Ann. §
11.81.900b
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-105b; Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-201a
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2201a,b; Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-2-204a,b

Ala.Code § 13A-2-1a,b;
Ala.Code § 13A-2-3a

§ 405. Involuntary act
or omission

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2209b,d

People v. Watson, 22
Cal.4th 220 (2000)b

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-107a,b,c,d
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1109a,b,c,d,e

Cal. Penal Code § 801a,d

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-103
Ark. Code Ann. §1-2119

People v. Vasilyan, 174
Cal. App. 4th 443
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009)

People v. Snyder, 32
Cal.3d 590 (1982)c

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2206a,c

Alaska Stat. Ann. §
12.10.010a,b,e

Alaska Stat. Ann. §
11.81.220

(continued)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-206a,b,d

Alaska Stat. Ann. §
11.81.450b,c

Johnson v. State, 285
So. 2d 723
(1973)a,b,d

Clark v. State, 739 P.2d
777 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987)a,c

Ala. Code § 15-3-1a,b,c,e;
Ala. Code § 15-3-5b,c

Ala. Code § 13A-1-4

§ 503. Entrapment

Ala. Code § 13A-2-6a,b,c

§ 502. Statute of
limitations

§ 501. All defenses
deﬁned by statute

§ 406. Reliance upon
ofﬁcial mistatement of
law
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Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
16-8-101.5a,b,c,d

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
53a-13a,b,c,d

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §
401a,c,d

Howard v. United States,
954 A.2d 415 (D.C.
2008)a,b,c; Bethea v.
United States, 365
A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976)d
Fla. Stat. Ann. §
775.027a,b,c; Patton v.
State, 878 So.2d 368
(Fla. 2004)d

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-32a,b,c; Dimauro v.
State, 185 Ga.App.
524 (Ga. 1988)d

Colo. (CO)

Conn. (CT)

Del. (DE)

D.C. (DC)

Ga. (GA)

Fla. (FL)

§ 401. Insanity

Jurisdiction

Appendix A2. Continued

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-34a,b,c

Fla. Stat. Ann. §
775.051a; Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 3.6a,b,c;
Brancaccio v. State,
698 So.2d 597 (Fla.
Dist. Cir. Ct. App.
1997)a,b,c

Salzman v. United States,
405 F.2d 358 (D.C.
Cir. 1968)a,b

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §
423a,b,c

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
19-1-103a,d; Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 181-801a; Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 19-2518b,c,d

People v. Sommers, 200
P.3d 1089 (Colo. App.
2008)a,b,c; Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 18-1804a,b,c; People v.
Grenier, 200 P.3d
1062 (2008)c
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
53a-7a,b,c

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-31a,d; Ga. Code Ann. §
15-11-28a,b,c,d

Fla. Stat. Ann. §
985.03a,d; Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 985.461b,c;
Fla. Stat. Ann. §
985.556b,c,d

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann §
46b-120a,d; Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann §
46b-127b,c,d
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §
1010b,c,d; Del. Code
Ann. tit. 10, § 1002a,d
D.C. Code § 16-2301a,d;
D.C. Code § 162307b,c,d

§ 403. Immaturity

§ 402. Involuntary
intoxication

Driggers v. State, 917
So.2d 329 (Fl.
2005)a,d; Hall v.
State, 187 So. 392
(Fla. 1939)c; Salas
v. State, 972 So.2d
941 (Fl. Ct. App.
2008)f
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-326a,b,c,d

McClam v. U.S., 775
A.2d 1100 (D.C.
2001)a,b,c

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann
§ 53a-14a,c,e,f; State
v. Heinemann, 282
Conn. 281 (2007)a
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
§ 431a,e,f

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
18-1-708a,d,e,f

§ 404. Duress

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-2-1a

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §
242a; Del. Code Ann.
tit. 11, § 243b
United States v. Bailey,
585 F.2d 1087
(D.C.Cir. 1978)
(Wilkey, C.J.,
dissenting)a
Cook v. Florida, 271
So.2d 232 (1973)a,b

State v. Pierson, 514 A.2d
724 (1986)a,b

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
18-1-502a,b

§ 405. Involuntary act
or omission

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
16-5-401a,b,c,d,e

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §
205a,b,c,d
D.C. Code § 23-113a,d,e

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.14d;
Fla. Stat. Ann. §
775.15a,b,c,d,e

Ga. Code Ann. § 17-31a,b,c,d

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
18-1-104

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann
§ 53a-4

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
§ 202
U.S. v. Jackson, 528
A.2d 1211 (D.C.
1987)

Fla. Stat. Ann. §
775.01

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-14

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
18-1-504a,c

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann §
53a-6a,c

Bryson v. State, 840 A.2d
631 (2003)a,b,c
U.S. v. Barker, 178
U.S.App.D.C. 174
(1975)a,b,c

State ex rel. Williams v.
Whitman, 116 Fla.
196 (1934)a,b,c

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann §
54-193a,d,e

§ 502. Statute of
limitations

§ 501. All defenses
deﬁned by statute

§ 406. Reliance upon
ofﬁcial mistatement of
law
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Ga. Code Ann. § 16-325a,b,c,d

Fla. Stat. Ann. §
777.201a,b,c,d

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
§ 432a,b,e

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann
§ 53a-15a,b,c

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
18-1-709a,b,c,d

§ 503. Entrapment

Iowa Code § 701.5a,b,c

Ind. Code § 35-41-36a,b,c,d

Iowa Code § 701.4a,b,c;
State v. Buck, 510
N.W.2d 850, 851–52
(Iowa 1994)d
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 215209a,c,d

Ind. (IN)

Iowa (IA)

Kan. (KS)

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/6-3a,b,c; People v.
Hari, 218 Ill.2d 275
(Ill. 2006)c
Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d
731 (Ind. 2000)a; Ind.
Code § 35-41-3-5b,c

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/6-2a,b,d

Ill. (IL)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 215205a,b,c; State v.
Cooper, 252 Kan. 340
(1993)c

Idaho Code Ann. § 18116a,b,c

Idaho Code Ann. § 18207a,c,d

Idaho (ID)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38101a,d; Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 38-2302a; Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 38-2304d; Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 382347b,c,d

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/6-1a,d; 705 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann.
405/5-805b,c,d
Ind. Code § 31-30-1-4c,d;
Ind. Code § 31-9-27a,d; Ind. Code § 319-2-13a,b,c,d
Iowa Code § 232.2b,e;
Iowa Code §
232.45c,d,e

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 704418b,c,d; Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 571-11a,d;
Haw. Rev. Stat. §
571-22b,c,d
Idaho Code Ann. § 18216a,b,c,d; Idaho Code
Ann. § 20-508a,b,c,d

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702230a,b,c

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 704400a,b,c,d

Haw. (HI)

§ 403. Immaturity

§ 402. Involuntary
intoxication

§ 401. Insanity

Jurisdiction

Appendix A2. Continued

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 215206a,b,c,d,e,f

Iowa Code §
704.10a,b,c,d

Ind. Code § 35-41-38a,c,d,e

720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 5/7-11a,b,c,d,e

Idaho Code Ann. §
18-201a,c; Tugmon
v. State, 896 P.2d
342 (Id. 1995)a

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702231a,e,f

§ 404. Duress

State v. Tomlinson,
243 N.W.2d 551
(1976)d

Iowa Code § 802a,b,c,d,e

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 213106a,c,d,e

State v. Berdetta, 73
Ind. 185 (1880)

State v. Di Paglia, 247
Iowa 79 (1955)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 215103

State v. Black, 177
Ind.App. 588 (1978)a,c

Ind. Code § 35-41-2-1a,b;
Davidson v. State,
849 N.E.2d 591 (Ind.
1996)b,c
Iowa Code § 702.2a;
State v. Moore, 106
N.W. 16 (1906)a
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 215201a

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 215207a,c

Iowa Code § 701.6a,c

Ind. Code § 35-41-39a,b

Ind. Code § 35-41-42a,b,c,d,e

720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 5/1-3

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
§ 5/4-8a,c

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/4-1a,b

Idaho Code Ann. § 19401e; Idaho Code
Ann. § 19-402a,b,d,e;
Idaho Code Ann. §
19-403c; Idaho Code
Ann. § 19-404d,e;
Idaho Code Ann. §
19-405d,e; Idaho Code
Ann. § 19-406e
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/3-5a,b,c,d,e

Idaho Code Ann. §
18-100

State v. Barlow’s, 111
Idaho 958 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1986)a; State v.
Fox, 124 Idaho 924
(1993)c

Idaho Code Ann. § 18201a,c; Idaho Code
Ann. § 18-315a

(continued)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 215208a,b,c,d

720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 5/7-12a,b,c

State v. Mata, 106
Idaho 184
(1984)a,b,c,d

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702237a,b,c,d,e

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 701108a,b,c,d,e

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 701102

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702200a; Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 702-201b; Hawaii
Rev.Stat. § 702-203a

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702220a,c

§ 503. Entrapment

§ 502. Statute of
limitations

§ 406. Reliance upon
ofﬁcial mistatement of
law

§ 501. All defenses
deﬁned by statute

§ 405. Involuntary act
or omission
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§ 401. Insanity

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
504.020a,b,c,d

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:14a,b,c,d

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
17-A, § 39a,b,c,d

Md. Code Ann., Crim. P.
§ 3-109a,b,c,d

Com. v. McHoul, 352
Mass. 544 (1967)a,b,c,d

Mi. Comp. Laws Ann. §
768.21aa,b,c; United
States v. Gay, 522
F.2d 429, 433 (6th
Cir. 1975)d

Jurisdiction

Ky. (KY)

La. (LA)

Me. (ME)

Md. (MD)

Mass. (MA)

Mi. (MI)

Appendix A2. Continued

People v. Caulley, 197
Mich.App. 177 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992)a,b,c

Com. v. Darch, 54
Mass.App.Ct. 713
(2002)a,b,c; Com. v.
McHoul, 226 N.E.2d
556 (1967)a,b

State v. Rice, 379 A.2d
140 (Me. 1977)a;
State v. Cote, 560
A.2d 558 (Me.
1989)a,b,c; Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 37a,b,c
Dubs v. State, 2 Md.App.
524 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1968)a,b,c; Parker
v. State, 7 Md. App.
167 (1969)b

Mi. Comp. Laws Ann. §
600.606b,c,d; Mi.
Comp. Laws Ann. §
712.A1a,d; Mi. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 764.27c,d

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
2.015a,d; Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 635.020a,b,c,d;
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
640.010b,c,d
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:13a,b,e; La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §
305a,b,c,d,e; La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 857c,d,e
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
17-A, § 10-Ad; Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15,
§ 3003a,d; Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §
3101b,c,d
Md. Code Courts and
Judicial Proceedings
§ 3-8A-01a,d; Md.
Code Courts and
Judicial Proceedings
§ 3-8A-03b,d; Md.
Code Courts and
Judicial Proceedings
§ 3-8A-06b,c,d
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 119, § 74a,b,c,d

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
501.080a,b,c

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
15a,b

§ 403. Immaturity

§ 402. Involuntary
intoxication

People v. Lemons, 562
N.W.2d 447 (Mich.
1997)a,b,c,f; People
v. Merhige, 180
N.W. 418 (Mich.
1920)b,c,f; People v.
Dittis, 157
Mich.App. 38
(1987)d

Com. v. Robinson, 382
Mass. 189 (1981)a,c;
Com v. Vasquez,
462 Mass. 827
(2012)d

McMillan v. State, 51
A.3d 623 (Md.
2012)a,b,c,d

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
17-A, § 103-Aa,c,d,e,f

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:18a,b,c,d

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
501.090a,d,e,f

§ 404. Duress

People v. Likine, 492
Mich. 367 (2012)a

Commonwealth v.
McHoul, 352 Mass.
544 (1967)a

Frasher v. State, 8
Md.App. 439 (1970)a

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
17-A, § 103-Ba; State
v. Case, 672 A.2d 586
(Me. 1996)b,c

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:8a

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
501.030a; Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 501.101b

§ 405. Involuntary act
or omission

Com. v. Twitchell, 416
Mass. 114 (1993)a,c

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
17-A, § 36a,c

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:17a,c

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
501.070a,c

§ 406. Reliance upon
ofﬁcial mistatement of
law
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Com. v. Madigan, 449
Mass. 702
(2007)a,b,d

People v. Juillet, 475
N.W.2d 786
(1991)b,c,d

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
572a,b,c

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
17-A, § 8a,c,d,e

Md. Code Ann., Crim.
Law § 5-106c,d

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 277, § 63b,d,e

Mi. Comp. Laws Ann. §
767.24a,b,d

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:4

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
17-A, § 3

Md. Const. art. V; Lutz
v. State, 172 A. 354
(Md. 1934)

Mass. Const. Pt. 2, C.
6, art. VI; New
Bedford StandardTimes Publishing
Company v. Clerk
of the Third District
Court of Bristol,
377 Mass. 404
(1979)
Gruskin v. Fisher, 405
Mich. 51 (1979)
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Moore v. State, 7 A.3d
617 (2010)a,d

State v. Farnsworth,
447 A.2d 1216
(Me. 1982)a,b,d

State v. Tate, 593 So.
2d 864 (La. Ct.
App. 1992)a,b,c

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
505.010a,b,c,d,e

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
500.050a,b,d,e

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
500-020

§ 503. Entrapment

§ 502. Statute of
limitations

§ 501. All defenses
deﬁned by statute

State v. Rawland, 294
Minn. 17 (1972)a,b,c,d

Groseclose v. State, 440
So.2d 297 (Miss.
1983)a,b,c,d

Mo. Ann. Stat. §
552.010d; Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 562.086a,b,c

State v. Korell, 213 Mont.
316 (1984)a,c,d

State v. Hotz, 281 Neb.
260 (2011)a,b,c; State
v. Hankins, 232 Neb.
608 (1989)d
Finger v. State, 117 Nev.
548 (2001)a,c,d

Minn. (MN)

Miss. (MS)

Mo. (MO)

Mont. (MT)

Neb. (NE)

Nevada (NV)

§ 401. Insanity

Jurisdiction
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Grey v. State, 124 Nev.
110 (Nev. 2008)a,b,c;
Estes v. State, 122
Nev. 1123 (2007)c

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
43-245a,d; Neb. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 43247b,c,d
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
194.010a,d; Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §
62A.030a,d; Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §
62B.330b,c,d; Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §
62B.335b,c,d; Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §
62B.390b,b,d; Nev.

Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5103a,d; Mont. Code
Ann. § 41-5-203b,c,d;
Mont. Code Ann. §
41-5-206b,c,d

Miss. Code Ann. § 4321-151b,c,d; Miss.
Code Ann. § 43-21105a,d
Mo. Ann. Stat. §
211.021a,d; Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 211.071b,c,d

Minn. Stat. Ann. §
609.055a,b,c,d

City of Minneapolis v.
Altimus, 305 Minn.
462 (Minn. 1976)a,b,c

Fortune v. State, 110
S.3d 831 (Miss.
2013)a,b; Miss. Code
Ann. § 23:294a
Mo. Ann. Stat. §
562.076a,b; State v.
Burroughs, 729
S.W.2d 571 (Mo.
1987)c
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2203a,b,c; City of
Missoula v.
Paffhausen, 367
Mont. 80 (Mont.
2012)c
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
29-122a,b,c

§ 403. Immaturity

§ 402. Involuntary
intoxication

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
28-109a,b

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
194.010a,c

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
194.010a,b,d

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2101b,c; Mont. Code
Ann. § 45-2-202a

Mo. Ann. Stat. §
562.011a,b

State v. Welch, 21 Minn.
22 (1874)a

§ 405. Involuntary act
or omission

State v. Reed, 286
N.W.2d 111 (Neb.
1979)a,c,d

Mont. Code Ann. §
45-2-212a,b,c,d

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 562071a,c,d,e,f

Rufﬁn v. State, 992
So.2d 1165 (Miss.
(2008)a,b,c,d,f

Minn. Stat. Ann. §
609.08a,b,c,d

§ 404. Duress

Mo. Ann. Stat. §
556.036a,b,c,d

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
29-110a,b,c,d,e

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
171.080a,d,e; Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §
171.083a,d,e; Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §
171.085a,b,d; Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 171.090c;
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 171.095a,d,e

Mo. Ann. Stat. §
556.026

Mont. Code Ann. §
45-1-104

State v. Eynon, 197
Neb. 734 (1977)

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
193.050

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2103a,c

Neb. Rev. St. § 28-1414c

Whiterock v. State, 112
Nev. 775 (1996)c

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15a,b,d,e

Hemingway v. Scales,
42 Miss. 1 (1868)

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1205a,b,c

Minn. Stat. Ann. §
628.26a,b,d,e

Minn. Stat. Ann. §
609.015

State v. Chicago, L.R.A.
1916B,764 (Minn.
1915)a; State v.
Cooper 2004 WL
2283431 (Minn.
2004)a; State v.
Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d
610 (Minn. 2005)b,c
State v. Longino, 109
Miss. 125 (1915)a;
Burnley v. State, 201
Miss. 234 (1947)c
Mo. Ann. Stat. §
562.031a,b,c

§ 502. Statute of
limitations

§ 501. All defenses
deﬁned by statute

§ 406. Reliance upon
ofﬁcial mistatement of
law
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State v. Swenson, 352
N.W.2d 149
(1984)a,b,c,d

Mont. Code Ann. §
45-2-213a,b,c,d

Mo. Ann. Stat. §
562.066a,b,c,d,e

Walls v. State, 672 So.
2d 1227 (Miss.
1996)a,c,d

State v. Grilli, 230
N.W.2d 445
(1975)a,d

§ 503. Entrapment

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41a,b,c,d

State v. Hartley, 90 N.M.
488 (1977)a,b,c,d

N.Y. Penal Law §
40.15a,b,c; People v.
Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d
241 (1980)d
State v. Humphrey, 283
N.C. 570 (1973)a,b,c;
State v. Corley, 310
N.C. 40 (1984)d

N.J. (NJ)

N.M. (NM)

N.Y. (NY)

N.D. (ND)

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.104.1-01a,d

State v. Fichera, 153 N.H.
588 (2006)a,c,d

N.H. (NH)

N.C. (NC)

§ 401. Insanity

Jurisdiction
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State v. Bunn, 283 N.C.
444 (N.C. 1973)a,b,c;
State v. Gilmore, 162
N.C.App. 360 (N.C.
2004)a

People v. Tocco, 138
Misc. 2d 510 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988)a,b,c

State v. Gurule, 149 N.M.
599 (N.M. Ct. App.
2011)a,b

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
626:4a; State v.
Plummer, 117 N.H.
320 (1977)a,b,c; State
v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369
(1871)b
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:28a,b,c

§ 402. Involuntary
intoxication

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B101a; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1501a,d; N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B1604b,c,d; N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-2200b,c,d
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.104-01a,b,e; N.D. Cent.
Code § 27-20-02b;
N.D. Cent. Code §
27-20-03c,e; N.D.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-14a,d; N.M. Stat. Ann. §
32A-1-8a,b,d; N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 32A-220b,c,d; State v.
Garcia, 596 P.2d 264
(N.M. 1979)b,c
N.Y. Penal Law §
30.00a,b,c,d

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:411a,b,c,d

Rev. Stat. Ann. §
62B.400b,c,d; 2013
Nevada Laws Ch. 483
(A.B. 202)b,c
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
628:1a,b,c,d

§ 403. Immaturity

State v. Caddell, 287 N.C.
266 (1975)a

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.102-01a

N.D. Cent. Code §
12.1-05-10a,c,e,f

N.Y.Penal Law § 15.10a,b

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21a,b

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
626:1a

§ 405. Involuntary act
or omission

State v. Kearns, 219
S.E.2d 228 (N.C.
1975)a,c; State v.
Little, 312 S.E.2d
695 (N.C. 1984)b,d

N.Y. Penal Law §
40.00a,c,e,f

Esquibel v. State, 576
P.2d 1129 (N.M.
1978)a,c,d

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29a,d,e,f

State v. Daoud, 679
A.2d 577 (N.H.
1996)a,c

§ 404. Duress

State v. Vallejos, 123
N.M. 739 (1997)b

N.Y. Penal Law §
40.05b,c

State v. Branham, 569
S.E.2d 24
(2002)a,b,d

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:16a,b,d; N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:11-3a,b,d
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-18a,b,c,d

N.Y. Penal Law §
30.10a,b,c,d,e

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-1c,d

N.D. Cent. Code § 2904a,b,c,d,e

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-13

N.Y. Penal Law § 276;
N.Y. Stat. Law § 4;
N.Y. Stat. Law §
301
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 4-1

N.D. Cent. Code § 101-06

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24a,b,c
N.M. Stat. Ann. § UJI 14141c; N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ UJI 14-5121c; State
v. Bent, WL 4517161
(2013)c; State v.
Jones, 44 N.M. 623
(1940)a
N.Y. Penal Law § 15.20a,c

State v. Godwin, 123 N.C.
697 (1898)a,c; State v.
Pearson, 97 N.C. 434
(1887)a; State v.
Chavis, 45 N.C.App.
438 (1980)c
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.105-09a,b,c
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N.D. Cent. Code §
12.1-05-11a,c,d

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:212b,c,d,e

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
626:5b,c

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
625:8a,b,c,d

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
626:3a,c

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
625:6
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limitations

§ 501. All defenses
deﬁned by statute

§ 406. Reliance upon
ofﬁcial mistatement of
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§ 401. Insanity

State v. Staten, 18 Ohio
St.2d 13 (1969)a,b,c,d

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §
152a,b,c; Okla. Stat. tit.
21, § 154d

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.295a,b,c,d

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
315a,b,c;
Commonwealth v.
Christy, 540 Pa. 192
(1995)d

State v. Johnson, 121 R.I.
254 (1979)a,b,c,d

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-2410a,b,c,d

Jurisdiction

Ohio (OH)

Okla. (OK)

Or. (OR)

Pa. (PA)

R.I. (RI)

S.C. (SC)
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Commonwealth v. Smith,
831 A.2d 636 (Penn.
2003)a,b,c; 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. §
308b,c

Wooldridge v. State, 801
P.2d 729 (Okla.
1990)a,b,c; Grayson v.
State, 687 P.2d 747
(1984)c

Akron v. Peoples, 2011
Ct.App. WL 444147
(Ohio 2011)a,b,c

§ 402. Involuntary
intoxication

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §
14-1-3a,d; R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 14-1-6d;
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §
14-1-7a,b,c,d; R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 14-17.2d
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-1920a,b,c,d

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.290a,d; Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §
137.707b,c,d; Or. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §
419C.005a,c,d
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
6302a,d; 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 6355b,c,d

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §
152a,c,d; Okla. Stat. tit.
10A, § 2-5-101a,b,c,d

Cent. Code § 27-2034c,d,e
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2152.02a,d; Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §
2152.12b,c,d

§ 403. Immaturity

State v. Robinson, 363
S.E.2d 104 (S.C.
1987)a,c; State v.
Rocheville, 425

State v. Lopez-Navor,
951 A.2d 508 (R.I.
2008)a,b,c

18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 309a,e,f

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.270a,d,e,f

State v. Good, 165
N.E.2d 28 (Ohio
1960)a; State v.
Getsy, 84 Ohio
St.3d 180 (1998)d
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §
156a,b,c,e

§ 404. Duress

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
301a,b

Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.085b;
Or. Rev. Stat. §
161.095a

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §
152a,b,c

Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §
2901.21a,c

§ 405. Involuntary act
or omission

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §
11-1-1

S.C. Code Ann. § 14-150

State v. Brown, 401 S.C.
82 (2012)

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 107

State v. Berberian, 427
A.2d 1298 (RI.
1981)a,c

Com. v. Kratsas, 564 Pa.
36 (Pa. 2001)a,b,c; 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
304b,c

State v. Ayers, 49 Or.
61 (1907)

McAllister v. Schlemmer
& Graber Co., 39
Ohio App. 434
(Ohio Ct. App.
1930)
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 2

State v. Coyne, 10 Ohio
Misc.2d 9 (1983)c

Needham v. State, 55
Okla.Crim. 430
(1934)c; Coury v.
State, 20 Okla.Crim. 8
(1921)c
State v. Baker, 48
Or.App. 999 (1980)c

§ 501. All defenses
deﬁned by statute

§ 406. Reliance upon
ofﬁcial mistatement of
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42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
5551a,b,d,e; 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. §
5552b,c,d; 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. §
5554a,d,e
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §
12-12-17a,b,c,d,e

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
131.125a,b,c,d,e

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §
152d,e

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2901.13a,b,c,d

§ 502. Statute of
limitations

(continued)

State v. Jones, 416
A.2d 676 (R.I.
1980)a,b,d

18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 313b,c,d,e

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
161.275a,b,c

Raymer v. City of
Tulsa, 595 P.2d
810 (1979) (footnote 2)a,d

State v. Doran, 449
N.E.2d 1295
(1983)a,c

§ 503. Entrapment

§ 401. Insanity

S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 221-2a,b,c; S.D. Codiﬁed
Laws § 22-5-7d

Tenn. Code Ann. § 3911-501a,b,c,d

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
8.01a,b,c,d

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2305a,c,d

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §
4801a,b,c,d

Jurisdiction
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Tex. (TX)
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State v. Joyce, 139 Vt.
638 (1981)a,b; State v.

Mendenhall v. State, 15
S.W.3d 560 (Tex.
2000)a,b,c; Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 8.04a;
Heard v. State, 887
S.W.2d 94 (Tex.
1995)c
State v. Gardner, 870
P.2d 900 (Utah
1993)a,b,c; Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-305a,b

Tenn. Code Ann. § 3911-503a,b,c

Utsler v. State, 84 S.D.
360 (S.D. 1969)a,b,c;
Utsler v. Erickson, 315
F.Supp 480 (S.D.
1970)a,b

§ 402. Involuntary
intoxication

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §
5102a; Vt. Stat. Ann.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2301a

S.D. Codiﬁed Laws §
12.1-04-01a; S.D.
Codiﬁed Laws § 22-31a,d; S.D. Codiﬁed
Laws § 26-1-1a,d; S.D.
Codiﬁed Laws § 2611-3.1a,b,c,d; S.D.
Codiﬁed Laws § 2611-4b,c,d
Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1102b; Tenn. Code
Ann. § 37-1-103e;
Tenn. Code Ann. §
37-1-134b,c,d,e
Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
8.07a,d; Tex. Family
Code Ann. §
54.02b,c,d

§ 403. Immaturity

Utah Code Ann. § 762-302a,c,e,f

Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 8.05a,c,e,f

Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-11-504a,b,c,e,f

S.E.2d 32 (S.C.
1993)b,d
S.D. Codiﬁed Laws §
22-5-1a,e

§ 404. Duress

State v. Gadreault, 171
Vt. 534 (2000)a,b

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1601a,b

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
6.01a; Brown v. State,
955 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997)b,c

State v. Turner, 953
S.W.2d 213 (1996)a,b

§ 405. Involuntary act
or omission

Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 1.03

Utah Code Ann. § 761-105

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1,
§271

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
8.03a,c

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2304a,c

State v. Woods, 107 Vt.
354 (1935)c

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1301.5e; Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-302b,c,d,e;
Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-303e
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §
4501a,b,c,e

Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
12.01a,b,d,e; Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 12.02c

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2101a,b,c,d

S.D. Codiﬁed Laws §
23A-42a,c,d

S.D. Codiﬁed Laws §
22-1-8

Tenn. Code Ann. § 3911-102

§ 502. Statute of
limitations

§ 501. All defenses
deﬁned by statute

Tenn. Code Ann. § 3911-610a; State v.
Casper, 297 S.W.3d
676 (2009)c

§ 406. Reliance upon
ofﬁcial mistatement of
law
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State v. George, 602
A.2d 953 (1991)b,c,d

Utah Code Ann. § 762-303b,c,e

Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 8.06a,b,d

Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-11-505b

State v. Nelsen, 228
N.W.2d 143
(1975)a,c,d,e

§ 503. Entrapment

Herbin v. Commonwealth,
28 Va.App. 173
(1998)a,b,c; Shifﬂett v.
Commonwealth, 221
Va. 760 (1981)d

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9A.12.010a,b,c; State v.
White, 60 Wash.2d
551 (1962)d

State v. Parsons, 181
W.Va. 131 (1989)a,b,c,d

State v. Esser, 16 Wis.2d
567 (1962)a,b,c;
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